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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The European Union and its constituent national governments have invested considerable resources in 
the collection of survey data relating to citizenship and democratic participation, with a number of 
surveys potentially capable of addressing some of this project’s central research questions. In addition 
to being cost-efficient, perhaps the primary advantage of using existing cross-national survey data is 
the large sample sizes available at EU, national and regional levels. Not only does this enable 
powerful modelling of the ‘population average’ factors and trends underlying democratic 
participation, the large number of observations in these comparative surveys also facilitate fine-
grained analysis amongst key sub-groups of interest.  For instance, we examine how age, gender, and 
ethnic group status moderate the effects of social and individual level characteristics on diverse forms 
of citizen participation and engagement.  
 
Our assessment of existing data suggests five suitable sources of data on engagement and 
participation that will be of use to examining these two forms of democratic participation: the 
European Social Survey (ESS); the Eurobarometer; the International Social Survey Programme 
(ISSP); and the Comparative Study of Election Systems (CSES). These were selected because they 
provide a clear picture across Europe, and contain a range of different questions of interest. In 
addition, the World Values Survey (WVS) will be used to assess country differences in voting. Whilst 
not containing the range of questions that are available from the other surveys, the large sample of 
countries included in the WVS makes it suitable for analysis of cross-country differences in voting.  
 
 
STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT 
The report is broken down into four components, each exploring the extent and forms of participation 
across Europe from a different methodological and conceptual perspective. Taken together, these 
provide an integrated assessment of the existing data available about democratic ownership and 
participation in Europe (and to a lesser extent globally). This report contains two inter-linked 
tranches, one focusing on formal (electoral) democratic participation and the other on non-formal 
aspects of citizen engagement such as political talk, protest, demonstration, petitioning and 
organisational membership.  
 
In chapter 1, we explore basic descriptives from the four different surveys, providing an initial picture 
of the extent and nature of participation and citizenship across Europe. The four different sources of 
data have relative strengths, and by looking at them together we will gain a clear picture. In 
subsequent reports, the European Social Survey data will be used to provide a more detailed 
assessment of the processes influencing democratic ownership and participation across Europe. The 
ESS has been selected because it contains the broadest range of data, covers a wide range of 
countries, and is the most methodologically robust survey.  
 
Chapter 2 explores the processes leading to participation, drawing on the work of wp3 and wp4, and 
in particular the conceptual maps of Barrett and Emler outlining the various processes that lead people 
to participate in various forms of conventional and non-conventional political action. The social 
dimension to participation is also incorporated here, drawing on the work of wp3. Structural equation 
models (SEM) are used both to measure the important concepts of interest, and also to more clearly 
explore the specific processes that influence participation.  
 
Chapter 3 then provides a broader examination of the macro influences on participation across 
countries, drawing on the work of wp3. Using a multilevel modeling approach, country and regional 
differences in conventional and non-conventional forms of participation and civic engagement are 
explored, before incorporating macro indicators of country differences that help explain variations in 
participation across countries.  
 
 2
Finally, in chapter 4 we provide an alternative examination of the forms and nature of political 
participation that integrates data from conventional and non-conventional types of engagement. Using 
latent class analysis, respondents from the European Social Survey are classified according to the 
nature of their political participation, providing an insight into how these different activities are 
interlinked. We then explore differences in the membership of these participation ‘classes’ based on 
gender, ethnicity, and age group, highlighting how different types of people choose to engage with 
political activity.  
 
 
THE SURVEYS 
No single data source provides complete coverage of the full nature of political participation and 
democratic ownership across Europe. However, taken together, the five surveys outlined below 
represent the most comprehensive collection of studies available, enabling a detailed assessment of 
the full range of influences on participation, both micro and macro.   
 
European Social Survey 
The ESS was first conducted in 2002, and has quickly becoming become recognised as a world leader 
in comparative data as a result of its rigorous and standardized1 methodology across all of the member 
countries. We use data from the initial round of the ESS, which fielded a series of questions covering 
‘Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy’, allowing us to link individual drivers of participation to 
contextual differences between sampled countries. This was a nationally representative probability 
sample of residents aged 15 and over within each country, with a total sample size of 42,359 from 22 
countries (ranging from 1,207 in Italy to 2,919 in Germany). The analytic sample available for this 
research is reduced to 20 countries, with no suitable data on participation in Switzerland or the Czech 
Republic. 
 
Eurobarometer 
The Eurobarometer series has been running since 1970, covering a wide range of topics. The long 
time frame of the Eurobarometer makes it particularly useful for this study, allowing us to examine 
changes in levels of political participation and engagement over time. However, the range of 
questions on these topics included in multiple rounds of the survey is considerably less extensive than 
the ESS, restricting the scope of our analysis. Additionally the methodology of the Eurobarometer is 
less standardized over time and across countries, leaving open the possibility that some observed 
differences may reflect methodological artefacts. Nevertheless, this still represents the only resource 
providing data from a long time frame, making it essential to a full understanding of overall trends in 
democratic participation..  
 
International Social Survey Programme 
The ISSP is a collection of surveys fielded across the world covering a range of different research 
topics. Collected since 1985, the topics include ‘social networks’, ‘environment’ and ‘religion’, 
designed to provide an insight into variations across the globe. Of importance for the current project, 
in 2004 the ISSP fielded a survey on the topic of citizenship, including a range of questions pertinent 
to the issue of democratic ownership and political participation. Unlike the ESS, this also fields 
surveys beyond Europe, allowing us to make direct comparisons between the extent of participation in 
Europe, and more broadly across the world. This includes countries in the Americas, Australasia, and 
Africa, making it an important resource to capture the true nature of participation. However, like the 
Eurobaromater the methodology of the ISSP is less consistent across countries. Notwithstanding this 
limitation, the large number of countries surveyed also makes the ISSP a suitable resource for the 
more complex multilevel analyses undertaken in part 3. 
 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 
The CSES brings together post-election study data from a range of countries across the world, 
enabling an in-depth study of vote choice, candidate and party evaluations, current and retrospective 
                                               
1
 Within the limits of a cross-national sample design. 
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economic evaluations, and evaluation of the electoral system itself. The CSES also includes detailed 
macro data on each country, enabling us to gain an insight into the true level of voter turnout in each 
surveyed country. This allows us to contrast self assessments of voting with recorded data from each 
country, adding further detail to our assessment of political participation across Europe.  
 
World Values Survey 
Finally, in part 3 data is also drawn from the WVS. This is an extensive social survey conducted in 
more than 50 countries and cities worldwide, representing the most widespread source of survey data 
on political participation available to social researchers. However, despite offering extensive coverage 
of different countries, the WVS includes only a limited selection of survey items directly relating to 
political participation, and only provides information on formal participation via intention to vote. No 
equivalent data is available on non-conventional forms of political activity, limiting the use of the 
Survey for the current report.   
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CHAPTER 1: INDIVIDUAL AND COUNTRY VARIATIONS IN FORMS OF 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND THE PROCESSES THAT INFLUENCE 
PARTICIPATION 
 
 
The following chapter provides descriptive analyses of the European Social Survey, Eurobarometer, 
International Social Survey Programme, and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. Here we 
set out the relative rates of different forms of citizen participation and engagement across national, 
and socio-economic boundaries. This enables us to answer basic questions relating to who engages in 
what forms of formal and informal political activity. Where data permits, we also include a 
consideration of over-time trends across and within EU member states. All analyses are descriptive, 
therefore it is not possible to determine whether any observed differences are significant. This will be 
addressed in chapter 2 and 3, where inferential models will be specified to explore more directly 
individual and country differences in political participation.  
 
 
1.1: THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY 
Data is taken from the initial round of the ESS, fielded in 2002. This contains the most complete 
coverage of different forms of political participation, enabling us to distinguish between voting, 
conventional political participation, non-conventional participation, and civic engagement. 
Additionally, the ESS contains data on political interest and attentiveness, internal and external 
efficacy, institutional trust, social capital, political opinionation, strength of ideological identity, and 
identity threat. Data is available from 20 different European countries, with sample sizes of more than 
1,000 from each country (table 1.1). Data is available for six of the PIDOP consortium countries, with 
no ESS conducted in Turkey or the Czech Republic. 
 
Table 1.1. ESS countries 
  Frequency Percent 
Austria 2,257 5.8 
Belgium 1,899 4.9 
Germany 2,919 7.5 
Denmark 1,506 3.9 
Spain 1,729 4.4 
Finland 2,000 5.1 
France 1,503 3.9 
United Kingdom 2,052 5.3 
Greece 2,566 6.6 
Hungary 1,685 4.3 
Ireland 2,046 5.3 
Israel 2,499 6.4 
Italy 1,207 3.1 
Luxembourg 1,552 4.0 
Netherlands 2,364 6.1 
Norway 2,036 5.2 
Poland 2,110 5.4 
Portugal 1,511 3.9 
Sweden 1,999 5.1 
Slovenia 1,519 3.9 
Total 38,959 100.0 
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For each of these topics a global picture is provided, before differences based on gender, age, and 
ethnicity are explored. Key differences between countries across Europe are also outlined. For 
brevity, full differences based on gender, age, and ethnicity within each country are provided in 
appendix x, with notable differences noted in the text.  
 
Voted in last election 
Voting is measured using a single item included in the survey asking respondents whether they 
participated in the last national election. This is restricted to those respondents that were eligible to 
vote in the previous election, with approximately 3,000 people omitted from the final models 
examining voting (this will adjust for the differential age limit on voting in different countries, as well 
as other eligibility restrictions).  
 
Across the eligible sample, approximately 81% of all respondents indicated that they had voted in the 
previous election (figure 1.1). No differences in voter turnout are evident between men and women 
across the full sample, however younger people (those aged 16-24) are considerably less likely to vote 
with only 54% of this group voting in the previous election. This, of course, reflects the age 
distribution of this group, with some of these respondents below the voting age at the time of data 
collection. Minority groups are also identified as less likely to vote, with 67% of those from a 
minority group voting in the previous election. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 
 
Looking across Europe, some variability is voter turnout is evident between countries (figure 1.2), 
with the lowest turnout in Poland (66%), and the highest turnout in Denmark (where 94% voted). 
Some variation is also evident in the magnitude of the age, and ethnicity gaps within different 
countries, whilst very few differences between men and women are evident. Very few minorities in 
Portugal reported voting in the previous election (20%, compared with 73% of those from the ethnic 
majority), whilst very high proportions of minority individuals voted in Austria, Italy, Sweden and 
Slovenia (more than 80%). Young people were particularly unlikely to vote in Luxembourg, where 
only 17% of those aged 16-24 reported voting, whilst more than 80% of young people reported voting 
in Denmark and Sweden (for full details see appendix A.1). 
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Figure 1.2 
 
Conventional participation 
Conventional political participation covers a range of activities directly related to involvement with a 
particular political party, but does not include voting. The activities included are working in a political 
party, wearing a campaign badge or sticker, donating money to a political organisation, being a 
member of a political party, and contacting a politician2. Individuals are identified as participating in 
conventional political activities if they report doing any of the highlighted activities within the last 
year.  
 
Considerably fewer individuals are identified as participating in conventional forms of political 
activity across the ESS sample, with a total of 24.4% of respondents participating within the last year 
(figure 1.3). Unlike voting, there are also differences in participation rates between men and women, 
with 31% of men involved in conventional forms of activity, compared with 25% of women. Older 
people are slightly more likely to be involved in conventional forms of participation, although the 
difference is less notable than when considering voting. Interestingly, minority respondents are 
slightly more likely to participate in this way than non-minorities.  
 
                                               
2
 In some studies contacting a politician is treated as another indicator of non-conventional participation. 
However, exploratory factor analyses revealed stronger links between this measure and the other items 
measuring conventional participation using ESS data. Full details are provided in chapter 2.  
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Figure 1.3 
 
The most common form of activity undertaken as conventional participation is ‘contacting a 
politician’, with 16% of respondents involved in this manner in the last 12 months (figure 1.4). All 
other forms of conventional participation are less evident, with 7% identified as members of a 
political party, and 8% donating money or wearing a campaign sticker. Only 5% of the total sample 
across Europe are identified as particularly active in conventional forms of participation (working for 
a political party).  
 
 
Figure 1.4 
 
Looking across all included ESS Countries, considerable variability in participation rates is again 
evident (figure 1.5). The lowest levels of participation are evident in Portugal (17%), Hungary 
(17.4%), Poland (18.6%) and Greece (18.8%), whilst the highest levels of participation are evident in 
Norway (45%). Differences are also evident within countries. Across all Countries, higher proportions 
of men participate in conventional activities, although the magnitude of the difference does vary. In 
the majority of countries, older respondents are more likely to participate, however this picture is 
reversed in Spain and France (no clear differences are identified in Sweden and Greece). The picture 
is less straightforward when comparing minority and non-minority participation across countries, with 
the aggregate picture masking significant variability between countries. In Spain, Finland, France, 
UK, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, and Sweden minority individuals are identified as considerably more 
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likely to participate. In contrast, higher proportions of non-minorities are identified as participating in 
conventional activities in Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal and Slovenia. Full details of 
these within country differences are included in appendix A.1.  
 
 
Figure 1.5 
 
Non-Conventional participation 
Non-conventional participation captures involvement in other activities not traditionally associated 
with political engagement. This covers minor forms of involvement including signing a petition and 
boycotting particular products for political reasons, as well as more significant forms of participation 
including involvement in lawful and illegal protest activities. Like conventional forms of participation 
we distinguish here between those not involved in any form of activity, and those that have been 
involved in any form of activity irrespective of how serious it is.  
 
Rates of non-conventional participation are again lower than levels of voting, with 45% of people 
identified as participating in non-conventional activities within the last year (figure 1.6). No clear 
differences in participation are evident between men and women, or old and young people when 
looking at the aggregate picture across countries. However, minorities are less likely to be involved, 
with only 39% of this group participating within the last year.  
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Figure 1.6 
 
Considering the types of activity that people are involved in (figure 1.7), a very small percentage of 
people admit to taking part in illegal protest activities (1%), whilst slightly more have been involved 
in lawful demonstrations (8%). More common forms of non-conventional activity are singing a 
petition, and buying (or boycotting) certain products on political or ethical grounds. 
 
 
Figure 1.7 
 
Across the sample of ESS countries some clear differences in levels of non-conventional participation 
are evident, with only 15% of those in Portugal and Hungary participating in non-conventional 
activities, compared to more than 70% of those from Sweden (figure 1.8). There are also some 
differences within countries that were not evident when considering the aggregate picture. Young 
people in Spain, France, Greece, Luxembourg and Slovenia are more likely to participate than older 
residents of the same country, whilst in the UK it is older residents that are more likely to participate 
(a picture also seen in the Netherlands and Sweden). Some large differences in participation are also 
evident between minority and non-minority individuals within particular countries, with minorities in 
Germany and Denmark much less likely than non-minorities to participate, and minorities in Italy 
much more likely to participate (full details included in appendix A.1). 
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Figure 1.8 
 
Civic engagement 
Civic engagement refers to involvement in various forms of non-political activity. The full list of 
activities covers: trade unions; business, professional and farmers organisations; humanitarian and 
human rights activities; environmental protection, peace and human rights; outdoor activity clubs; 
cultural and hobby organisations; religious and church organisations; science, education and teaching 
social clubs; and other voluntary organisations.  
 
Approximately 64% of residents are engaged in civic activities across the full ESS sample, with more 
men identified as involved, and few minority individuals (figure 1.9).    
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Figure 1.9 
 
Participation rates vary across the range of activities (figure 1.10), with the highest percentage of 
people involved in sporting or outdoor activities (30%). More than 20% of people also identify 
themselves as members of trade unions or cultural or hobby clubs. Noticeably fewer people in social 
clubs (16%), religious groups (18%), environmental (12%), or humanitarian organizations (16%). 
Approximately 10% of people report being a member of an educational or teaching organization, or 
being a member of a business, professional, or farmers group.  
 
 
Figure 1.10 
 
Looking at overall levels of engagement across countries, a similar picture is again evident, with 
lower rates of engagement in Portugal, Poland, Hungary, and Greece, and higher levels of 
involvement in Sweden (figure 1.11). Across all countries men are more likely to participate than 
women, however no consistent picture is evident across countries when comparing young and old 
respondents, and minority to non-minorities (for full details see appendix A.1).  
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
Non-minority
Minority
Age 25+
Age 16-24
Female
Male
Total
Civic engagement
0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
Trade union
Business, professional or famers
Humanitarian or human rights
Environmental
Sports or outdoor activity
Cultural or hobby
Religious or church
Education or teacing
Social club
Civic engagement
 12
 
Figure 1.11 
 
Interest in politics 
Two items are included in the ESS that capture political interest, asking respondents how interested 
they are in politics, and how often they discuss politics with friends and family.  
 
There is a very high degree of consistency between the two items when considering the aggregate 
picture across counties, with approximately 49% of respondents identified as both very or quite 
interested in politics and discussing politics once a week or more (figure 1.12). In both cases higher 
proportions of men and older people are identified as having an interest in politics, but no clear 
differences are evident between minority and non-minority individuals.  
 
 
Figure 1.12 
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Turning to differences between countries (figure 1.13), levels of interest are generally higher in 
Netherlands, Israel, Denmark, Germany, and Austria, and Lowest in Greece and Spain. Some 
differences between the two questions are evident, with levels of discussion about politics noticeably 
higher than levels of interest in Poland, Norway, Luxembourg, Italy, France, Finland, and Spain, 
whilst levels of interest are higher in Sweden, Netherlands, Israel, and Denmark. For more specific 
differences in age, gender, and minority status between countries, see appendix A.1.  
 
 
Figure 1.13 
 
Political attentiveness 
Three items measure political attentiveness, capturing the extent that individuals expose themselves to 
political news stories on television, in newspapers, and on the radio on an average weekday. Higher 
scores here correspond to individuals that spend a greater proportion of the average week day 
watching news programmes about politics and current affairs, listening to radio programmes about 
politics, and reading about politics in newspapers. This is based on an 8 point scale from ‘no time at 
all’ (0) to ‘more than 3 hours per day’ (7). 
 
Looking across the full sample, people are considerably more likely to watch politics on television 
than listen on the radio or read about politics in the newspaper (figure 1.14). This pattern is consistent 
across age, gender and ethnic minority groups, however, overall young people are shown to be less 
attentive to all forms of political information than older people.  
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Figure 1.14 
 
The picture is surprisingly consistent across countries, with people in all countries accessing 
considerably more political information on television (figure 1.15). The overall level of media 
consumption is also similar across countries, particularly when considering the consumption of 
television news. When looking at radio and newspaper consumption some differences are evident, 
with lower levels of consumption of politics in newspapers in Portugal, Poland, Greece and Spain, 
and lower levels of radio consumption in Italy and Greece (full details of within country differences 
based on gender, age, and ethnicity available in appendix A.1).  
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Internal efficacy 
Internal efficacy is represented by three items. Respondents are asked to rate how often they find 
politics too complicated to understand, whether people feel they could take an active role in a group 
involved with political issues, and how easy they find it to make their mind up about political issues. 
 
Looking across the three items, a higher proportions of people find it ‘easy or very easy’ to make their 
mind up about political issues (35%) than believe they could ‘definitely or probably’ take an active 
role in politics (23%) or that politics is ‘never or seldom’ too complicated to understand (28%). In 
each case, men are identified as having higher levels of efficacy, whilst no clear differences are 
evident based on age or minority status (figure 1.16).  
 
 
Figure 1.16 
 
Across countries considerable variation in each item is evident (figure 1.17), although in general 
higher proportions report feeling confident they can make their mind up about political issues. 
Denmark has the highest proportion of residents who believe they can make their mind up about 
political issues (56%), and also the highest proportion who believe that they can take an active role in 
politics (53%), whilst Israel has the highest proportion that believe politics is not too complicated 
(38%). The lowest levels of confidence in making their mind up about political issues are evident in 
France (18%) and Italy (19%), whilst the lowest proportion believing that they can take an active in 
politics is found in Spain (10%), and Greece has the lowest proportion believing politics is not too 
complicated (18%). Full details of the differences based on gender, age, and ethnicity within each 
country can be found in appendix A.1. This shows that the gender gap evident across all countries is 
consistent within each country, but that some differences are evident based on age and minority status 
between countries.  
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Figure 1.17 
 
External efficacy 
The ESS includes two items capturing external efficacy. The first item asks whether people believe 
that politicians care what people think. The second asks people the extent that they believe that 
politicians are interested in votes rather than people’s opinions. 
 
Very low proportions of people believe that politicians are interested in issues rather than votes (2%), 
and only 5% believe that politicians care what people think (figure 1.18). There are no clear 
differences based on gender, age or minority status, with low proportions of all groups having high 
levels of external efficacy.  
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Figure 1.18 
 
Looking across all countries (figure 1.19), higher proportions of people believe that politicians care 
what people think than believe that politicians are interested in issues rather than simply votes. Some 
differences are evident across countries, with considerably higher levels of external efficacy in 
Denmark than in any other country. For more specific differences in age, gender, and minority status 
between countries, see appendix A.1.  
 
 
Figure 1.19 
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Institutional trust 
Institutional trust captures individual levels of trust in formal institutions. In the ESS six different 
institutions are covered, with levels of trust measured on an 11 point scale from no trust (0) to very 
high levels of trust (10). Four items cover different domestic institutions with trust in the police, 
parliament, politicians and the legal system. The remaining two items capture levels of trust in the 
broader international community, specifically measuring trust in the United Nations and the European 
Parliament. In all cases, higher scores reflect individuals that are more trusting of these institutions. 
 
Looking first at the four forms of domestic institutional trust, levels of trust are shown to be lowest in 
politicians, and highest in the police (figure 1.20). This pattern holds across gender, age, and 
ethnicity, with no discernible differences in levels of trust evident between these groups.   
 
  
Figure 1.20 
 
Turning to the two items examining trust in international institutions, levels of trust are close to the 
levels of trust in politicians and parliament domestically (figure 1.21). Trust is slightly higher in the 
United Nations than in the European Parliament, and unlike domestic institutions young people are 
shown to be slightly more trusting than older people.  
 
 
Figure1.21 
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Looking at domestic institutional trust across countries, a reasonably consistent picture is evident 
(figure 1.22), with trust in politicians lowest in all counties, and trust in the police highest. Some 
variability in the average levels of trust is evident across countries, with trust highest in Finland, and 
lowest in Portugal and Poland. More detailed results comparing demographic differences between 
countries is available in appendix A.1.  
 
 
Figure1.22 
 
Looking at international trust, a consistent picture is again evident across countries (figure 1.23). One 
notable exception is that in Greece and Israel trust in the European Parliament is shown to be higher 
than trust in the United Nations. Full comparisons of demographic differences are available in 
appendix A.1.  
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Figure 1.23 
 
Social Capital 
Two different dimensions of social capital are incorporated within the ESS dataset, social trust, and 
social network support. Social trust is measured with three items asking: whether people can be 
trusted, whether people are fair to one another, and whether people are mostly helpful to others. All 
three items are measured on an 11-point likert scale, with higher scores representing higher levels of 
trust in others.  
 
This reveals an overall score for each of the three trust items that are close to average (5), with 
slightly more favourable views of the extent that people are fair (figure 1.24). The pattern of 
responses is very similar between gender and age groups, but there is a slight tendency for minorities 
to be less trusting than non-minorities, with average scores approximately half a point lower.  
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Figure 1.24 
 
Looking across countries, some variability in levels of social trust is evident, with lower levels of trust 
in Greece, and higher levels of trust in Denmark, Norway and Sweden (figure 1.25). More detail on 
the demographic differences between countries is included in appendix x, revealing consistently lower 
levels of social trust amongst minority individuals across countries.  
 
 
Figure 1.25 
 
In addition to social trust, a single item identifying how often people meet socially with friends, 
relatives or colleagues, is included, capturing the extent that individuals may be able to benefit from 
social network support (figure 1.26). 53% of people report meeting people socially more than once a 
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month, with no clear differences based on gender or minority status, but young people more likely 
than older people to meet friends socially.  
 
 
Figure 1.26 
 
This varies to a certain extent across countries, with less than 40% of people from Hungary seeing 
friends more often than once a month, and more than 65% of respondents from Portugal meeting 
friends this often (figure 1.27). Within countries the demographic differences identified above are 
shown to be largely consistent (for full details see appendix A.1).   
 
 
Figure 1.27 
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Extremity of ideological identity 
Ideological identity is measured by asking respondents to place themselves on a political value scale 
from left (0) to right (10). Here, those that place themselves towards the middle of the scale are 
identified as having a more politically centrist view than those that identify themselves as either more 
left or right wing in their political values (0,1,2 and 8,9,10).  
 
Approximately 26% of the ESS sample are identified as having a more extreme ideological identity, 
with no differences based on gender and age (figure 1.28). In contrast, a higher proportion of those 
from minority groups have a more extreme ideological identity (37%).  
 
 
Figure 1.28 
 
Across countries some differences are evident (figure 1.29), most notably that Israeli residents are 
considerably more likely to have a more extreme ideological identity (51%). Looking within 
countries, the demographic patterns above are shown to be consistent, with no clear differences based 
on gender and age, and a higher proportion of those form minority groups having a strong ideological 
identity (for full details see appendix A.1).  
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Figure 1.29 
 
Identity threat 
To see the extent that people feel their identity is under threat, the ESS includes a single item asking 
people whether they are a member of a group that is discriminated against within their country. Less 
than 10% of the ESS sample perceive themselves to be members of a group that is discriminated 
against by society (figure 1.30). Unsurprisingly, the one exception to this low proportion is evident 
when considering minority respondents, with nearly 35% of those identified as from a minority group 
believing themselves to also be discriminated against.  
 
 
Figure 1.30 
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There are differences in the proportion of people feeling they are discriminated against between 
countries (figure 1.31). Israel has the highest proportion of residents that feel they are the member of a 
group that is discriminated against within their country, with 19% believing this. In contrast, only 2% 
of respondents from Italy believe they are discriminated against. Looking within countries, the higher 
proportion of minority respondents that believe they are discriminated against identified above is 
confirmed as consistent across all countries (for full details see appendix A.1).  
 
 
Figure 1.31 
 
Political Opinonation  
Finally, we also explore levels of political opinionation. This is captured by identifying those that 
report a ‘don’t know’ response to any one of a series of questions about political issues. The full list 
of questions is:  
 
1. Preferred decision level of environmental protection policies 
2. Preferred decision level of fighting against organised crime policies 
3. Preferred decision level of agricultural policies 
4. Preferred decision level of defence policies 
5. Preferred decision level of social welfare policies 
6. Preferred decision level of policies about aid to developing countries 
7. Preferred decision level of immigration and refugees policies 
8. Preferred decision level of interest rates policies 
9. The less government intervenes in economy, the better for country 
10. Government should reduce differences in income levels 
11. Employees need strong trade unions to protect work conditions/wages 
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12. Gays and lesbians free to live life as they whish 
13. The law should always be obeyed 
14. Ban political parties that wish overthrow democracy 
15. Economic growth always ends up harming environment 
16. Modern science can be relied on to solve environmental problems 
 
Just under 25% of people responded ‘don’t know’ to one or more of the questions about political 
issues included in the ESS (figure 1.32). Some differences are evident across demographic groups, 
with more women and minority respondents willing to report not having an opinion on political 
issues. No clear differences are evident between young and old people when considered across all 
countries.  
 
 
Figure 1.32 
 
Looking across different countries, some clear differences in levels of opinionation are evident (figure 
1.33). Luxembourg has the highest proportion of people responding ‘don’t know’ to one or more of 
the questions on political issues (45%), whilst Norway and Finland have the lowest proportion of 
people reporting don’t know (less than 10%). Looking separately at each country, men and non-
minorities are consistently less likely to report ‘don’t know’. The picture is less clear when 
considering differences based on age, with considerable variability between countries (for full details 
see appendix A.1).  
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Figure 1.33 
 
 
1.2: THE EUROBAROMETER 
An extensive range of surveys have fielded as part of the Eurobarometer programme, with trend data 
available from 1970 to 2002. However, despite the breadth of data, there are comparatively few 
survey items available that demonstrate longer term trends in political engagement and participation. 
Data is available on levels of voting, political interest and attentiveness, and strength of ideological 
identity. Like the ESS, data are not available for Turkey and the Czech Republic.  
  
Voting 
Unlike the ESS, the Eurobarometer does not contain consistent data on past voting behavior. Instead, 
we rely on a measure of individual intention to vote, measured in every survey since 1970. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, this reveals a high self reported intention to vote for all years that data has been 
collected, with more than 90% of eligible respondents indicating that they would vote in the next 
election (figure 1.34). However, there is perhaps a general tendency for this to have reduced slightly 
over the course of the survey.  
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Figure 1.34 
 
Appendix A.2 includes details of intention to vote separately for each country included in the 
Eurobarometer sample. Despite some variability between countries, this reveals that more than 80% 
of those eligible to vote intend to vote in the next election across all countries, and that there is no 
clear changing pattern over time.  
 
Interest in politics 
The Eurobarometer contains two items covering interest in politics. The first asks people the extent 
that they are interested in politics, with data available at 5 time points between 1983 and 1994. Across 
the 11 year period more than 40% of respondents report a great deal or some interest in politics, with 
some suggestion of a slight increase to 1994 (figure 1.35). The second item asks people the extent 
they discuss politics with friends, distinguishing between frequently, occasionally and never. This is 
asked in every year between 1973 and 2002, providing a much longer trend. This reveals that across 
the 30 year period less than 20% of people reported frequently discussing politics with friends. No 
clear trend is evident across this time, although there is perhaps a slight reduction in the proportion 
frequently discussing politics with friends by 2002.  
 
 
Figure 1.35 
 
Looking at frequency of discussion of political issues across countries (appendix X), there is some 
evidence of variability, with residents of countries including Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and 
Denmark more likely to discuss political issues frequently, and residents of countries including 
Belgium, Spain and Portugal less likely to discuss political issues. Residents of Greece are also 
identified as more likely to discuss political issues, with more than 40% of residents discussing 
politics frequently throughout the 1980s (compared to the average of less than 20% during this 
period). Given the short time frame of available data, we do not include cross-country differences in 
political interest.  
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Political attentiveness 
Political attentiveness is measured in a very similar fashion to the ESS, with three items covering 
engagement with television, radio, and newspaper coverage of news and politics. These are measured 
on a 6 point scale ranging from never (0) to everyday (5). Looking across the previous 20 years it is 
clear that people are exposed to politics more on the television than radio or newspaper (figure 1.36), 
and that the amount of time people spend accessing this information has remained very consistent 
(with the exception of some slight fluctuations in newspaper readership during the earliest years). 
 
 
Figure 1.36 
 
Looking across countries, consistently higher scores are evident for watching politics and news 
broadcasts on television, with all countries scoring more than 3. The picture is less clear when 
considering attention to politics in newspapers and on the radio. The Netherlands, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Denmark, UK, Norway, Finland and Sweden all have considerably higher scores when 
considering politics and news issues in newspapers and the radio, with Ireland also scoring highly 
when considering attention to politics on the radio. There is some evidence of a downward trend in 
levels of attention to politics on the radio and newspaper when considering Greece across the 20 years 
of available data.  
 
Ideological identity 
The Eurobarometer includes an equivalent measure of ideological identity to the ESS capturing 
placement on a left/right political scale (although here the measure is on a 10 point scale).3 To capture 
extremity of ideological identity we distinguish those individuals who report having very strong 
political tendencies for the left or right from those that place themselves in the political middle 
ground. Data from the Eurobarometer is available from 1973 to 2002, and reveals a general 
downward tendency in extremity of identity, with approximately 40% identified as having an extreme 
ideological position in the earlier years, and just less than 35% in this group in the later years (figure 
1.37).  
 
                                               
3
 Here the measurement is on a 10 point scale, with no middle option. This contrasts with the 11 point scale 
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Figure 1.37 
 
Across all countries there is some evidence of variability in the proportion of residents identified as 
having a stronger ideological identity. There is also evidence of variability within each country over 
time. However, no clear patterns in this variability are evident (appendix A.2).  
 
 
1.3: THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SURVEY PROGRAMME 
In 2003 the ISSP included a module that covered a number of dimensions of political participation 
and civic engagement. Although this does not include the full range of items available in the ESS, it 
does benefit from a considerably broader selection of countries. Surveys were conducted in the 
America’s, Russia, Africa, Asia and Australasia, allowing us to examine the extent of participation 
and engagement throughout the world (table 1.2). Survey items were included covering: conventional 
and nonconventional forms of participation; civic engagement; internal efficacy; and interest in 
politics. In general, there is a high level of consistency in the results from Europe as measured by the 
ISSP and those measured by the ESS.  
 
Table 1.2. ISSP data 
  Frequency Percent 
Europe 29,649 56.4 
Australasia 3,284 6.2 
North 
America 
2,412 4.6 
South 
America 
5,812 11.1 
Asia 6,820 13.0 
South Africa 2,784 5.3 
Russia 1,789 3.4 
Total 52,550 100.0 
 
Conventional participation 
Conventional participation is constructed in a very similar fashion to the ESS, incorporating 
information on those who are a member of a political party, have donated money or worn a campaign 
badge, or have contacted a politician in the past year.  
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Looking across the world, a total of 28% of the sample were identified as having participated in 
conventional forms of political activity within the last year (figure 1.38). However, considerable 
variability is evident across different parts of the world. The figure for Europe is 31%, which is only 
marginally higher than the 28% estimated by the ESS. Levels of participation are considerably lower 
in Russia (7%) and South Africa (6%), and are also lower in Asia (24%) and South America (24%). In 
contrast, levels of participation are noticeably higher in North America (39%) and Australasia (39%).  
 
 
Figure 1.38 
 
Non-conventional participation 
The range of non-conventional political activities undertaken in the past year is also very similar to 
the ESS, covering: signing a petition; boycotting a product for political reasons; taking part in a 
demonstration; and attending a political rally. The ISSP also includes two activities not covered by the 
ESS, contacting the media, and joining an internet political forum. Although less than 5% of all 
respondents have been involved in either of these additional activities in the past year, these are 
included in our overall measure of non-conventional participation.   
 
Figure 1.39 indicates that a higher proportion of people across the sample are involved in non-
conventional forms of political activity (34%), with a similar number of Europeans (35%). This is 10 
percentage points lower than the proportion involved in non-conventional activities in the ESS. Like 
conventional political participation, there is considerable variability across the world, with the lowest 
levels of participation in Russia (10%) and South Africa (15%), and the highest levels of participation 
in North America (44%) and Australasia (66%).  
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Figure 1.39 
 
Civic engagement 
Turning to civic engagement, a smaller group of activities is included in the ISSP than the ESS. This 
covers membership in a trade union, church (or other religious organization), sport club, or other 
group. Like the ESS, levels of civic engagement are considerably higher in Europe than levels of 
conventional and non-conventional participation (figure 1.40), with 64% of Europeans identified as 
members of an organization (the equivalent figure from the ESS was also 64%). Again, levels of civic 
engagement are lower in Russia (31.5%)4, and higher for North America (89%) and Australasia 
(71%).  
 
 
Figure 1.40 
 
Internal efficacy 
A single item is included in the ISSP that captures internal efficacy, asking people whether they think 
they have a good understanding of political issues. This is broadly similar to the item from the ESS 
asking respondents whether they believe politics is too complicated to understand.  
 
                                               
4
 No data about civic engagement was available for South Africa. 
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In Europe, approximately 56% of people are identified as believing they have a good understanding of 
politics (figure 1.41). This is considerably higher than the equivalent estimate from the ESS, pointing 
to differences in the measurement instrument used in each survey. Levels of internal efficacy are 
largely comparable across the continents, with the exception of Russia where only 36% of people 
report feeling they have a good understanding of political issues, and Australasia, where 69% of 
people feel they understand political issues.  
 
 
Figure 1.41 
 
External efficacy 
The ISSP includes two items covering levels of external efficacy that are again broadly comparable to 
those from the ESS. The first asks whether respondents believe that people have any influence on 
what the government does, and the second whether they believe the government cares what people 
think. 
 
Levels of external efficacy are considerably higher using the ISSP data than the ESS (figure 1.42). 
This may reflect differences in the measurement scales used across the surveys, and the different 
wording adopted. Comparing Europe to the rest of the world the picture is somewhat different to the 
picture when considering political participation. Here levels of efficacy are only lower in Russia than 
they are in Europe, with the highest levels of external efficacy found in the Americas. Like Europe, 
Australasia also has low levels of external efficacy.  
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Figure 1.42 
 
Interest in politics 
Interest in politics is again represented by a general measure of political interest, and a second 
measure determining how frequently respondents discuss political issues with friends (figure 1.43). A 
very similar proportion of Europeans are identified as interested in politics using the ISSP data (47%) 
when compared with both the ESS (49%) and the Eurobarometer (average 45%). The measure of 
frequency of political discussion more closely resembles data from the Eurobarometer, with a similar 
question construction adopted in both surveys. Across the full sample, levels of political interest are 
broadly comparable, with slightly lower levels of interest in South America and South Africa. The 
proportion of people frequently discussing politics with friends is also similar across the full sample, 
with just over 10% of people in this group (the one exception is South Africa, where 6% of people are 
identified as frequently discussing politics).  
 
 
Figure 1.43 
 
 
1.4: THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 
The CSES provides basic details of electoral turnout across a wide range of countries between 1996 
and 2006. Information is also available about the extent of external efficacy using this dataset.  
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Electoral turnout 
The CSES provides details of the level of voter turnout in a range of different countries, drawing from 
administrative data about the voting process in each country.5 Covering the period from 1996 to 2006, 
these reveal considerable variability in turnout rates cross countries (table 1.3), and generally lower 
turnout levels than were predicted using ESS data. Looking at round 1, the highest turnout rates can 
be found in Australia (82.5%), Belgium (90.5%), Chile (90.5%)m, Germany (82.2%), Denmark 
(83.1%), Iceland (84.7), Israel (84.7), New Zealand (83%) and Sweden (81.4%).The lowest turnout 
rates are evident in Switzerland (43.4%), Hong Kong (43.%%), Poland (48.8%), and USA (59%). A 
similar picture is evident in round 2 of the CSES, with high turnout in Australia (94.8%), Belgium 
(91.9%), Chile (87.7%), Denmark (87.1%), and Peru (88.7%), and low turnout in Switzerland 
(45.4%), Mexico (41.7%), and Poland (46.3%). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
5
 No data were available for Turkey 
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Table 1.3. CSES electoral turnout data 
CSES Round 1   CSES Round 2 
   
Albania (2005) 49.2 
Australia (1999) 82.5 
 
Australia (2004) 94.8 
Belgium (1999) 90.5 
 
Belgium (2003) 91.9 
   
Brazil (2002) 82.3 
Canada (1997) 56.2 
 
Canada (2004) 60.9 
Switzerland (1999) 43.4 
 
Switzerland (2003) 45.4 
Chile (1999) 90.5 
 
Chile (2005) 87.7 
Czech republic (1996) 76.7 
 
Czech republic (2002) 58 
Germany (1998) 82.2 
 
Germany (2002) 79.1 
Denmark (1998) 83.1 
 
Denmark (2001) 87.1 
Spain (1996) 80.6 
 
Spain (2004) 75.7 
Spain (2000) 77.3 
   
   
Finland (2003) 69.7 
   
France (2002) 71.6 
Great Britain (1997) 59.4 
 
Great Britain (2005) 61.3 
Hong Kong (1998) 53.2 
 
Hong Kong (2004) 55.6 
Hong Kong (2000) 43.5 
   Hungary (1998) 59.9 
 
Hungary (2002) 70.5 
   
Ireland (2002) 62.6 
Iceland (1999) 84.7 
 
Iceland (2003) 87.7 
Israel (1996) 84.7 
 
Israel (2003) 67.8 
   
Italy (2006) 83.6 
Japan (1996) 59.8 
 
Japan (2004) 56.6 
   
Kyrgyzstan (2005)  78.1 
South Korea (2000) 57.2 
 
South Korea (2004) 59.9 
Lithuania (1997) 50.0 
   Mexico (1997) 54.4 
 
Mexico (2003) 41.7 
Mexico (2000) 63.9 
   Netherlands (1998) 73.0 
 
Netherlands (2002) 79.1 
Norway (1997) 76.8 
 
Norway (2001) 75.5 
New Zealand (1996) 83.0 
 
New Zealand (2002) 77 
Peru (2000) 82.8 
 
Peru (2006) 88.7 
Peru (2001) 63.2 
   
   
Philippines (2004) 77.1 
Poland (1997) 48.8 
 
Poland (2001) 46.3 
Portugal (2002) 61.6 
 
Portugal (2005) 64.3 
Romania (1996) 78.2 
 
Romania (2004) 58.5 
Russia (1999) 61.8 
 
Russia (2004) 64.4 
Russia (2000) 68.7 
   Slovenia (1996) 75.5 
 
Slovenia (2004) 60.6 
Sweden (1998) 81.4 
 
Sweden (2002) 80.1 
Taiwan (1998) 75.1 
 
Taiwan (2001) 66.2 
   
Taiwan (2004) 80.3 
Ukraine (1998) 68.1 
   USA (1996) 49.0   USA (2004) 56.2 
 
External efficacy 
The CSES also asks people from all countries whether they believe it makes a difference who they 
vote for, and how well voters views are represented in elections. This provides a slightly different 
insight into levels of external efficacy than was possible with the ESS, Eurobarometer, and ISSP. 
Considerable variability is evident across countries, with a general tendency for higher proportions of 
people to believe that vote choice is important (figure 1.44). People are most likely to believe vote 
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choice is important in Sweden (81%), Israel (80%), and Hungary (81%), and least likely to believe it 
is important in Russia (49%), Japan (51%), Germany (46%), and the Czech Republic (48%). People 
are most likely to believe their vote is important in the USA (71%) and Denmark (79%), and least 
likely in Slovenia (28%), Japan (25%), the Czech Republic (28%), and Brazil (30%).   
 
 
Figure 1.44 
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CHAPTER 2: EXPLORING THE PROCESSES INFLUENCING 
DEMOCRATIC OWNERSHIP AND PARTICIPATION USING 
STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELS 
 
 
Having provided a general assessment of the extent and trends in political participation and 
engagement, the following chapter outlines the findings from a series of analyses exploring some of 
the social and psychological processes that contribute to individual engagement in political activities. 
Analysing data from the European Social Survey (ESS) within a structural equation framework, the 
roles of interest and engagement with politics, external and internal political efficacy, social capital, 
institutional trust, opinionation, ideological identity, and identity threat are explored. In particular, this 
report assesses the extent that these processes are differentially experienced by women, younger 
people, and minorities.   
 
Figure 2.1 (replicated from Barrett, 2010) includes details of the full range of different psychological 
and sociological attributes that have been linked with a tendency to participate in political activities 
(whether considering conventional or non-conventional forms of participation). Clearly this is a very 
detailed and complex representation that it is not possible to directly test. However, it is possible to 
explore some parts of this process (coloured red) using the ESS. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 
 
 
2.1: STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELLING 
To fully integrate the structural models outlined above in figure x, a structural equation modelling  
(SEM) framework is adopted (Bollen, 1989). This allows us to directly specify which variables are 
related to each other, and conversely which variables are unrelated. The SEM approach also provides 
an integrated framework from which to combine data from multiple indicators of the same underlying 
construct (referred to as latent variables), adjusting efficiently for measurement error associated with 
individual items. Here we assume that the responses each person provides to a given set of items is 
partially influenced by the underlying latent variable, and partially influenced by other random error. 
With multiple items it is then possible to separate the common component (the part that is influenced 
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by the latent characteristic) from the random error, producing a measurement of the latent 
characteristic that is free from other sources of error.  
 
Figure 2.2 is a graphical representation of a basic SEM model where the latent variable ‘interest in 
politics’ is assumed to be a driver of individual tendency to vote. The latent variable is represented by 
the oval ‘interest’, measured by three observed indicators (rectangles i1-i3). The single headed arrows 
pointing in to the indicators show that individual responses to each item are caused by the underlying 
level of latent political interest, whilst the residual error terms ζ1-ζ3 adjust for measurement error 
associated with each indicator. Voter tendency is measured with a single binary item, represented in 
figure x by the rectangle ‘vote’. The directional arrow from ‘interest’ to ‘vote’ reflects the implied 
direction of causality from interest to voting, and is the equivalent to a regression coefficient in a 
standard regression model. The disturbance term δ1 quantifies the residual error in the estimated 
relationship between interest and voting. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 
 
SEM is also a convenient framework to deal with missing data, with a full information maximum 
likelihood (FIML) estimation procedure dealing efficiently with missing data under the Missing At 
Random (MAR) assumption (Little and Rubin, 2002). Essentially this requires that conditional on any 
included covariates, the mechanism producing missingness is unrelated to the other included 
covariates. Given the relatively small proportion of missing data across all survey items, and the range 
of included variables, this assumption is plausible (Enders, 2010).  
 
As such, it represents the most suitable modelling approach to accurately capture the full information 
from Barrett’s integrative model. All models are estimated using Mplus. This is a flexible SEM 
package that allows for the straightforward inclusion of variables measured on different scales (as 
both independent and dependent variables).  
 
 
2.2: DATA 
To explore the psychological model of civic and political participation across Europe we draw out 
data from the ESS. We use data from the initial round of the ESS, which fielded a series of questions 
covering ‘Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy’, allowing us to link individual drivers of 
participation to contextual differences between sampled countries.  
 
The ESS does not provide sufficient data to test the full model outlined above. Notwithstanding the 
complexity of the paths between different attributes, there are many variables that we have no specific 
measures of, and no way to proxy them. There is also no appropriate way to merge in alternative 
sources of data to measure these concepts, as this would require individual data directly mapped onto 
the individual respondents from the survey. However, the ESS does contain a number of suitable 
measures to capture some of these different processes that are linked to political participation 
(coloured red). This represents the best selection of variables that we currently have to explore the 
processes influencing political participation, allowing us to examine part of the model of Barrett (and 
Emler) in considerable detail. In particular, it is possible to examine the extent that different forms of 
political participation are influenced by these different constructs, and whether any pathways to 
participation are mediated by other variables. Having explored general models of political 
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participation, the extent that these models are applicable to different population groups is examined. 
This allows for the possibility not only that different groups participate in different ways and to a 
different extent, but also that the mechanisms influencing participation are different.  
 
Measuring political participation 
Four different types of political participation are measured in this analysis; voting; conventional 
participation; non-conventional participation; and civic engagement (table 2.1). This allows us to 
explore more general differences in the propensity to vote across countries, whilst also capturing other 
forms of political participation that may be more common amongst particular subgroups in society. In 
each case, these are treated as observed occurrences of participation, and therefore are assumed to be 
measured without error. This differs from the latent variable approach used to identify less tangible 
constructs like social trust and internal efficacy, where each item is treated as an imperfect (measured 
with error) indicator of an underlying trait.  
 
Table 2.1.  Forms of political participation   
  Percentage 
Voted in last national election 80.2 
Conventional Participation 28.3 
Worked in political party or action group last 12 months 5.2 
Worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker last 12 months 8.0 
Donated money to political organisation or group last 12 months 8.8 
Member of political party 6.9 
Contacted politician or government official last 12 months 16.2 
Non-conventional participation 46.1 
Worked in another organisation or association last 12 months 14.9 
Signed petition last 12 months 23.8 
Taken part in lawful public demonstration last 12 months 7.7 
Boycotted certain products last 12 months 16.5 
Bought product for political/ethical/environment reason last 12 months 26.3 
Participated illegal protest activities last 12 months 1.2 
Civic engagement* 64.4 
Involvement with a trade union 22.8 
Involvement with a business, professional or farmers organisation 10.1 
Involvement with an organisation for humanitarian aid, human rights, minorities or 
immigrants 
16.4 
Involvement with an organisation for environmental protection, peace or animal 
rights 
12.2 
Involvement with a sports or outdoor activity club 30.1 
Involvement with a cultural or hobby organisation 21.3 
Involvement with a religious or church organisation 18.2 
Involvement with a science, education or teach organisation 9.8 
Involvement with a social club 15.9 
*
 Includes membership of (or registered with) the organisation; direct participation; donation of money; and 
undertaking of voluntary work 
 
Voting is measured using a single item included in the survey asking respondents whether they 
participated in the last national election. This is restricted to those respondents that were eligible to 
vote in the previous election, with approximately 3,000 people omitted from the final models 
examining voting (this will adjust for the differential age limit on voting in different countries, as well 
as other eligibility restrictions).  
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Conventional political participation covers a range of activities directly related to involvement with a 
particular political party, but does not include voting. The activities included are working in a political 
party, wearing a campaign badge or sticker, donating money to a political organisation, and being a 
member of a political party. In addition, we also include contacting a politician in this group of items 
because exploratory factor analyses revealed it to be more closely linked to these items than to those 
traditionally associated with non-conventional forms of political participation (see appendix B.1 for 
full details of the results from this analysis). Individuals are identified as participating in conventional 
political activities if they report doing any of the highlighted activities within the last year.6  
 
In contrast, non-conventional participation captures involvement in other activities not traditionally 
associated with conventional political engagement. This covers minor forms of involvement including 
signing a petition and boycotting particular products for political reasons, as well as more significant 
forms of participation including involvement in lawful and illegal protest activities. Like conventional 
forms of participation we distinguish here between those not involved in any form of activity, and 
those that have been involved in any form of activity irrespective of how serious it is. Attempts to 
produce more nuanced measures of participation that also incorporated the extent of participation 
would not estimate, reflecting the relatively small number of people that admit being involved in these 
forms of activity.   
 
Finally, to capture civic engagement we use a number of survey items covering involvement in 
various forms of activity. The full list of activities covers involvement in: trade unions; business, 
professional and farmers organisations; humanitarian and human rights activities; environmental 
protection, peace and human rights; outdoor activity clubs; cultural and hobby organisations; religious 
and church organisations; science, education and teaching social clubs; and other voluntary 
organisations. For consistency, we again make the simple distinction between any form of 
involvement and no involvement. 
 
Independent variables 
A range of individual variables are included to capture both the psychological and social drivers of 
political engagement (Table 2.2). These have been grouped according to the classifications of Barrett 
et al., (WP4). With the exception of opinionation, all original survey items have been recoded so that 
higher scores represent a positive outcome.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
6
 Construction of an ordinal measure was not possible because of the relatively low numbers of people reporting 
involvement in more than one form if activity – ordinal SEM models would not estimate 
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Table 2.2.  Independent variables 
Mean SD 
Political attentiveness  
  TV watching, news/ politics/current affairs on average weekday  2.02 1.37 
  Radio listening, news/ politics/current affairs on average weekday  1.36 1.58 
  Newspaper reading, politics/current affairs on average weekday  0.93 0.99 
Political interest   
  How interested in politics 1.42 0.91 
  How often discuss politics/current affairs  3.13 2.20 
Internal efficacy    
  Politics too complicated to understand 1.85 1.17 
  Could take an active role in a group involved with political issues  1.25 1.34 
  Making mind up about political issues  2.01 1.08 
External efficacy    
  Politicians in general care what people like respondent think  1.35 1.05 
  Politicians are interested in votes rather than people's opinions 1.22 1.04 
Institutional trust    
  Trust in the police 6.21 2.49 
  Trust in country's parliament 4.90 2.46 
  Trust in the legal system 5.50 2.60 
  Trust in the United Nations 5.36 2.58 
Social capital    
  How often socially meet with friends, relatives or colleagues  0.48 0.50 
  Social trust  
  
    Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful  5.00 2.50 
    Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair  5.58 2.42 
    Most of the time people helpful or mostly looking out for themselves 4.76 2.42 
Ideological identity   
  Strength of left/right alignment 0.26 0.44 
Political opinionation    
  Report don't know to one or more political value items 0.24 0.43 
Identity threat   
  Member of a group discriminated against in this country 0.07 0.25 
 
Many of these are drivers of political engagement are intangible concepts measured imperfectly with 
multiple items, therefore we adopt a latent variable approach to identify the common components of 
these items that reflect value son the underlying latent construct (Bollen, 1989).  
 
Political attentiveness is measured with 3 items capturing the extent that individuals expose 
themselves to political news stories on television, in newspapers, and on the radio on an average 
weekday. Higher scores here correspond to individuals that spend a greater proportion of the average 
week day watching news programmes about politics and current affairs, listening to radio 
programmes about politics, and reading about politics in newspapers. This is based on an 8 point scale 
from ‘no time at all’ (0) to ‘more than 3 hours per day’ (7). 
 
Political interest is measured with two survey items asking respondents how interested they are in 
politics, and how often they discuss politics with friends and family. Interest in politics is measured 
on a 4-point likert scale from ‘not at all interested’ (0) to ‘very interested’ (3). Discussing politics with 
friends is measured on 7-point scale ranging from ‘never’ (0) to ‘every day’ (6).  
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Following the conceptual model above, we measure both internal and external efficacy, drawing the 
distinction between those qualities relating to the individual, and those relating to politicians in 
general. Internal efficacy is measured using three items on 5-point likert scales that have been recoded 
so that higher scores represent greater levels of internal efficacy. Respondents are asked to rate how 
often they find politics too complicated to understand, from ‘frequently’ (0) to ‘never’ (4). The second 
measure asks whether people feel they could take an active role in a group involved with political 
issues, ranging from ‘definitely not’ (0) to ‘definitely’ (4). The final item asks people how easy they 
find it to make their mind up about political issues, with a scale from ‘very difficult’ (0) to ‘very easy’ 
(4). External efficacy is measured using 2 items that have been recoded with higher scores 
representing greater levels of efficacy. The first item asks whether people believe that politicians care 
what people think, ranging from ‘hardly any politicians care’ (0) to ‘most politicians care’ (4). The 
second item asks people the extent that they believe that politicians are interested in votes rather than 
people’s opinions, ranging from ‘only interested in votes’ (0) to ‘interested in people’s opinions (4). 
 
Institutional trust is measured using 4 different items, with each measured on an 11 point scales. 
Three items cover different domestic institutions capturing trust in the police, parliament, and the 
legal system. The remaining item captures levels of trust in the broader international community, 
specifically measuring trust in the United Nations. 
 
Social trust is measured with three items asking: whether people can be trusted; whether people are 
fair to one another; and whether people are mostly helpful to others. All three items are measured on 
an 11-point likert scale, with higher scores representing higher levels of trust in others.  
 
In addition to these latent variables, we also include items measured using single variables. A single 
item is included that identifies how often people meet socially with friends, relatives or colleagues, 
capturing the extent that individuals can benefit from social network support. This is a dichotomous 
item with individuals that report meeting with others several times a month or more identified as 
having stronger networks of support. 
 
We also include an indicator of whether people feel their identity is under threat, which specifically 
asks whether people feel they are a member of a group that is discriminated against within their 
country. Across our sample only 7% of respondents report that they feel they are discriminated 
against.  
 
Ideological identity is measured by asking respondents to place themselves on a left-right political 
value scale from left (0) to right (10). Here, those that place themselves towards the middle of the 
scale are identified as having a more centrist ideological identity than those that identify themselves 
as either more left or right wing in their political values (0,1,2 and 8,9,10). This item has been 
dichotomised.  
 
This is captured by identifying those that report a ‘don’t know’ response to any one of a series of 
questions about political issues. The full list of questions is:  
 
1. Preferred decision level of environmental protection policies 
2. Preferred decision level of fighting against organised crime policies 
3. Preferred decision level of agricultural policies 
4. Preferred decision level of defence policies 
5. Preferred decision level of social welfare policies 
6. Preferred decision level of policies about aid to developing countries 
7. Preferred decision level of immigration and refugees policies 
8. Preferred decision level of interest rates policies 
9. The less government intervenes in economy, the better for country 
10. Government should reduce differences in income levels 
11. Employees need strong trade unions to protect work conditions/wages 
12. Gays and lesbians free to live life as they whish 
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13. The law should always be obeyed 
14. Ban political parties that wish overthrow democracy 
15. Economic growth always ends up harming environment 
16. Modern science can be relied on to solve environmental problems 
 
Details of respondent age, gender, and minority status are also included to enable examination of 
differences between population subgroups. Less than 5% of all respondents identify themselves as 
belonging to a minority ethnic group, limiting the extent that we are able to identify clear differences 
based on ethnicity.  
 
Assessing the validity of the measurement models for each latent variable 
In order to examine the extent that the included survey items are appropriate indicators of each latent 
variable, we begin by specifying a naïve measurement model where all residual errors are 
uncorrelated, and each survey item is assumed to only measure a single latent variable. Here we are 
interested in overall model fit, as well as the magnitude of the correlations between different latent 
variables. Poor model fit might indicate the need to include residual correlations between the error 
terms for some items (indicating similarity of measurement properties ‘over and above’ those implied 
by the latent factor structure). It may also indicate items that do not correspond closely to a particular 
latent variable, pointing to a need to remove items, or treat them as imperfect measures of a different 
latent construct. Particularly high correlations between latent variables might be indicative of latent 
constructs that are too closely related to accurately distinguish, and is also an indicator of potential 
problems with model fit when structural models are specified.  
 
In all cases, overall model fit is assessed in relation to three fit statistics provided by mplus –CFI, TLI, 
and RMSEA. General rules of thumb for appropriate values of these fit statistics taken from Hu and 
Bentler (1999) are indicated below.7  
 
CFI >.9 is good fit, >.95 is optimal. 
TLI >.9 is good fit, >.95 is optimal. 
RMSEA <.06 is very good fit. 
 
The naïve model including no correlated errors between survey items fit the data reasonably well 
(.955/.941/.043). However, a large correlation (>.8) between political interest and internal efficacy 
was identified, suggesting that it is not possible to empirically distinguish between these latent 
constructs. Whilst it was possible to estimate this model, such high correlations could indicate a 
model mis-specification, and lead to inaccurate estimates of some of the structural pathways implied 
by the figure above. This is not all that surprising given the wording of the items, with all items 
picking up the same latent level of engagement with political issues. To mitigate potential mis-
specification errors, the model was therefore updated to treat all 5 items as indicators of a single latent 
variable capturing a more general sense of interest and engagement with political issues. To 
incorporate our prior belief that the items originally associated with internal efficacy are qualitatively 
different from the two more general interest items, we also include residual correlations between the 
three internal efficacy items. This re-specification results in a small fall in model fit (.944/.930/.047). 
However, the results still fall within acceptable limits, suggesting that the included latent variables are 
a reasonably good approximation of the data (Hu and Bentler, 1999). Further, no large ‘cross-
loadings’ from observed indicators to other latent variables were identified as potential modifications, 
suggesting a high degree of discriminant validity with particular indicators only capturing single 
latent constructs.  
 
                                               
7
 Before running this sequence of models, an equivalent analysis was specified that incorporated citizenship 
beliefs as an additional factor. Results indicated very poor discriminant validity for this factor, with a number of 
items picking up elements of other things. Returning to the conceptual models outlined above, citizenship 
beliefs is also typically identified as distinct from the other processes, therefore this latent variable was omitted 
from the final model building process.  
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Before exploring the structural pathways between these latent variables and political participation, the 
possibility that some of the included indicators might be more closely related to one another 
(reflecting shared measurement characteristics) was explored. A strong correlation was identified 
between trust in the police and trust in a country’s legal system. This makes clear conceptual sense as 
both items are picking up issues relating to the criminal justice system, and as such we might expect 
people’s responses to these two items to be more closely linked than their responses to the other 
institutional trust items. A correlation was also identified between watching political programs on 
television and listening to politics on the radio. This might reflect the ways that people interact with 
these media, when compared to newspaper readership. Incorporating these adjustments, the model fits 
considerably better (.974/.967/.034), suggesting that we are representing the structure of the data well.  
 
Turning to the factor loadings (table 2.3), all items display reasonable loadings on the latent variable 
they are associated with, suggesting that they making a strong contribution to the measurement of 
each latent variable. 
 
Table 2.3. Factor loadings 
   
B SE B(Std) 
Attentiveness    
  TV watching, news/ politics/current affairs on average weekday  1.00 0.00 0.47 
  Radio listening, news/ politics/current affairs on average weekday  0.96 0.03 0.40 
  Newspaper reading, politics/current affairs on average weekday  1.06 0.02 0.70 
Political engagement (interest and internal efficacy)    
  How interested in politics 1.00 0.00 0.82 
  How often discuss politics/current affairs  1.75 0.02 0.63 
  Politics too complicated to understand 0.75 0.01 0.48 
  Could take an active role in a group involved with political issues  0.93 0.01 0.51 
  Making mind up about political issues  0.74 0.01 0.51 
External efficacy    
  Politicians in general care what people like respondent think  1.00 0.00 0.80 
  Politicians are interested in votes rather than people's opinions 0.92 0.01 0.75 
Institutional trust 
  Trust in the police 1.00 0.00 0.82 
  Trust in country's parliament 0.86 0.01 0.66 
  Trust in the legal system 0.67 0.01 0.54 
  Trust in the United Nations 0.75 0.01 0.58 
   
Social capital (trust)    
  Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful  1.00 0.00 0.76 
  Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair  0.98 0.01 0.76 
  Most of the time people helpful or mostly looking out for themselves 0.83 0.01 0.65 
   
FIT .975/.967/.032 
 
 
2.3: ANALYSIS 1 – NAÏVE ESTIMATES OF THE PREDICTORS OF PARTICIPATION  
To explore the extent that the series of independent variables identified above influence various forms 
of political participation, we begin by estimating regression models linking the independent variables 
to each form of political participation. In each instance two models are specified. The first model 
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includes only those variables (latent and observed) that are featured within Emler’s (2011) conceptual 
model outlined in wp4 (a subset of the broader model outlined above). These variables are 
attentiveness to politics, political engagement (incorporating interest and internal efficacy), political 
opinionation and ideological identity. The second model adds in the additional latent and observed 
variables that were identified in above that are also available in the ESS. Figure 2.3 outlines the full 
model for voting, although for simplicity we do not include the observed indicators of each latent 
variable. As in standard linear regression, all independent variables are allowed to be correlated with 
one another.  
 
 
Figure 2.3 
 
Voting 
Looking first at voting (table 2.4), model 1 identifies strong (and highly significant) positive effects of 
attentiveness and political interest on tendency to vote, with those that are more interested and 
attentive more likely to vote. Those who hold a more extreme ideological position (left or right) are 
also more likely to vote. Surprisingly, those who have weaker levels of political opinionation are also 
slightly more likely to vote, however this is a weak effect (and is shown to be non-significant in 
subsequent structural models). All available fit statistics are shown to be well within acceptable limits, 
suggesting that this is a reasonable approximation of the data.  
 
Table 2.4. Voting 
  Model 1   Model 2 
Voting B SE Z   B SE Z 
  
              
Attentiveness 0.36 0.03 10.93   0.36 0.04 10.30 
Political engagement (interest and 
efficacy) 0.33 0.02 16.23   0.33 0.02 14.87 
Opinionation 0.07 0.02 3.05   0.09 0.02 3.92 
Ideological identity 0.07 0.02 3.24   0.10 0.02 4.50 
Institutional trust 
        0.07 0.01 8.36 
Social trust 
        -0.005 0.01 -0.69 
External efficacy 
        -0.01 0.02 -0.51 
Identity threat 
        -0.31 0.04 -9.06 
Meet socially 
        -0.03 0.02 -1.79 
                
FIT .968/.973/.030     .935/.961/.032   
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Adding the additional latent and observed variables has no effect on the effect sizes from the Emler 
(2011) model. Those with higher institutional trust are more likely to vote, whilst those who feel their 
identity is under threat are less likely to vote. There are no direct links between external efficacy and 
voting, social trust and voting, or the strength of social networks. Model fit indices indicate that this 
model does not represent the data as well as the simpler model, reflecting the high number of 
additional variables incorporated within the model and also the number of non-significant pathways.  
 
Conventional participation 
When considering conventional forms of political participation (table 2.5), the main difference when 
compared to voting is that attentiveness to politics (whether on the newspaper, television or radio) is 
not associated with changes in participation levels. Engagement with politics is also more strongly 
related to conventional forms of participation than to voting. When additional variables are added to 
the model, there are clear differences when compared to voting. Those with higher levels of trust in 
institutions are marginally less likely to participate. In contrast, those with higher levels of social trust 
and external efficacy are more likely to participate (when looking at voting, there were no effects of 
these latent variables). The effect of identity threat operates in the opposite direction to their influence 
on voting, with those who feel their identity is under threat being more likely to participate.  
 
Table 2.5. Conventional participation 
  Model 1   Model 2 
Conventional participation B SE Z   B SE Z 
  
              
Attentiveness 0.02 0.03 0.63   0.01 0.03 0.43 
Political engagement (interest and 
efficacy) 0.72 0.02 33.58   0.70 0.02 30.94 
Opinionation 0.03 0.02 1.47   0.05 0.02 2.11 
Ideological identity 0.09 0.02 5.05   0.09 0.02 5.21 
Institutional trust 
        -0.03 0.01 -4.79 
Social trust 
        0.03 0.01 5.42 
External efficacy 
        0.08 0.02 5.22 
Identity threat 
        0.24 0.03 7.87 
Meet socially 
        0.03 0.02 1.61 
                
FIT .954/.963/.037     .933/.959/.033   
 
Non-conventional participation 
The influence of attentiveness to political issues is again different when we consider non-conventional 
forms of participation (table 2.6). Here, those that are more attentive to political issues are less likely 
to participate. Once again, the effect of engagement with politics is positive. Those who hold stronger 
views about political issues are more likely to participate in non-conventional forms of participation 
(no significant effect was evident when considering voting and conventional forms of participation). 
The impact of ideological identity is in the opposite direction when considering non-conventional 
participation, with those that hold more extreme views identified as less likely to participate. This 
may reflect a ‘liberal’ (or country specific equivalent) effect, with those placing themselves in the 
centre on the left right scale being more likely to take part in non-conventional forms of activity. 
People with higher levels of trust in institutions are less likely to participate in non-conventional 
activities, whilst those with higher levels of social trust and external efficacy are more likely to 
participate. Those whose identity is under threat are also much more likely to participate in this 
manner.  
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Table 2.6. Non-conventional participation 
  Model 1   Model 2 
Non-conventional participation B SE Z   B SE Z 
  
              
Attentiveness -0.06 0.03 -2.27   -0.12 0.03 -4.27 
Political engagement (interest and 
efficacy) 0.72 0.02 35.20   0.67 0.02 30.47 
Opinionation 
-0.14 0.02 -7.47   -0.11 0.02 -5.35 
Ideological identity -0.12 0.02 -7.27   -0.09 0.02 -5.18 
Institutional trust 
        -0.06 0.01 -9.00 
Social trust 
        0.14 0.01 22.51 
External efficacy 
        0.16 0.02 10.57 
Identity threat 
        0.34 0.03 11.07 
Meet socially 
        0.01 0.02 0.78 
                
FIT .950/.960/.038     .932/.959/.033   
 
Civic engagement 
There is a very similar picture when considering levels of civic engagement for all independent 
measures, with the exception of levels of attentiveness where it is those that are more attentive to 
political issues who are more likely to be engaged in civic activities (table 2.7). The higher tendency 
to participate amongst those that feel their identity is under threat is weaker than when considering 
non-conventional participation, and there is also a weak effect of social interest.  
 
Table 2.7. Civic engagement 
  Model 1   Model 2 
Civic engagement B SE Z   B SE Z 
  
              
Attentiveness 0.26 0.03 10.24   0.20 0.03 7.49 
Political engagement (interest and 
efficacy) 0.39 0.02 22.02   0.29 0.02 15.11 
Opinionation 
-0.22 0.02 -11.88   -0.17 0.02 -8.79 
Ideological identity -0.17 0.02 -10.10   -0.12 0.02 -6.74 
Institutional trust 
        -0.04 0.01 -5.43 
Social trust 
        0.17 0.01 26.32 
External efficacy 
        0.23 0.02 14.18 
Identity threat 
        0.15 0.03 4.80 
Meet socially 
        0.06 0.02 3.68 
                
FIT .954/.962/.037     .933/.960/.033   
 
 
2.4: ANALYSIS 2 – TOWARDS A PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL OF POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION 
In wp4, Emler (2011) proposed a psychological model of participation that that unpicks the causal 
pathway through which people come to participate in political activities. To explore this model 
empirically, direct tests of the model were run for each measure of participation. The analysis is 
restricted to four available independent variables from this model – attentiveness, political 
engagement, ideological identity and opinionation. Here we are specifying a model that links political 
engagement to attentiveness, which then leads people to form stronger opinions and in turn develop a 
clear ideological identity, ultimately resulting in an increased tendency to participate in different 
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forms of political activity. This is a causal conceptual model, however the available data is cross-
sectional. As a result the findings from this analysis need to be considered with caution about the 
extent that direct causation is implied.  
 
To illustrate this model, figure 2.4 includes survey estimates from an analysis examining voting. The 
direction of the direct paths included in this model do conform to a-priori expectations, with more 
engagement with political issues prompting more attention to political issues in the media, which in 
turn reduces the extent that people report don’t know on political questions (i.e. it increases their level 
of opinionation). Holding a stronger political opinion is in turn linked to a stronger ideological 
identity, which is itself positively associated with voting.  
 
 
Figure 2.4 
 
However, based on all included model fit criteria this falls some way short of accurately representing 
the data. In simple terms, the key problem with this model is that a number of correlations between 
the included constructs have been fixed to 0, when a strong association exists in the data. For 
example, the direct link between levels of political interest and voting that was identified in the 
previous models has been restricted to 0, with interest only allowed to influence participation levels 
indirectly via attentiveness. Clearly these are strong assumptions to make, particularly given the cross 
sectional nature of the data, and the evidence outlined in analysis 1.  
 
Across all four forms of participation the restricted model does not fit the data well, with all fit 
statistics falling some way from the cut-off points suggested by Hu and Bentler (table 2.8). As a 
result, with the current cross-sectional data there is not sufficient evidence in support of the restricted 
model, with the reality likely to incorporate additional pathways to participation.  
 
Table 2.8. Model fit 
Vote Conventional participation Non-conventional Civic engagement 
        
.726/.787/.091 .607/.698/.112 .544/.662/.120 .636/.720/.107 
        
 
To better understand which of the model restrictions included above are not appropriate for the data, a 
number of model adjustments were made. These were driven by the modification indices provided by 
Mplus, and the earlier descriptive analysis. The casual path from political interest to attentiveness was 
replaced by a correlation (reflecting the lack of sufficient data to accurately distinguish whether 
attentiveness promotes engagement, or engagement increases attentiveness). Here we are no longer 
attempting to predict attentiveness, instead this is treated as an independent variable in the model.  
 
Opinionation and ideological identity are identified as mediating variables, with attentiveness and 
political engagement related to participation directly, and indirectly via these two measures. 
Following the conceptual model of Emler (2011), the directional path from opinionation to 
ideological identity is also retained (figure 2.5). Having estimated this model separately for each form 
of participation, all non-significant pathways were removed to produce final models that most closely 
Political 
interest 
Political 
attentiveness Opinionation Closeparty vote 
CFI=.726 
TFI=.787 
RMSEA=.091 
.449 -.284 -.029 .159 
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reflect the relationships between the included variables.8 Figure 2.5 includes details of the full model 
for voting, with opinionation and ideological identity mediating the relationships between the other 
variables and voting. Following standard regression procedures, with the exception of opinionation 
and ideological identity (which are endogenous), all other (exogenous) independent variables are 
correlated with one another (Muthén and Muthén, 2007).   
 
 
Figure 2.5 
 
Voting 
Looking first at what predicts whether someone voted in the last general election (table 2.9), direct 
links from attentiveness, political engagement, and ideological identity are evident. These operate in 
the same direction (and are of a similar magnitude) to the unconditional regression model. However, 
in the structural model there is now no significant path from opinionation to voting. In addition to 
these main effects, there is a significant link between political engagement and opinionation, with 
those that identify themselves as more interested in politics also more likely to have an opinion about 
political issues. However, the fact that there is no direct link from opinionation to voting means that 
this does not result in an additional indirect effect from political engagement to voting via 
opinionation. Those with higher levels of engagement with politics are also more likely to be 
identified as holding a stronger ideological identity. Those who report more don’t know’s to political 
questions are also more likely to have a stronger ideological identity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
8
 In each case, the indirect pathways will be similar, as the model that is being specified is effectively the same. 
The key differences will be in the magnitude of the direct effects on forms of participation. 
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Table 2.9. Voting 
Voting B SE Z 
        
Vote ON       
Attentiveness 0.38 0.03 12.73 
Political engagement 0.36 0.02 19.11 
Ideological identity 0.04 0.01 3.24 
        
Opinionation ON       
Political engagement -0.61 0.01 -45.03 
        
Ideological identity ON       
Political engagement 0.23 0.02 15.44 
Opinionation 0.12 0.01 10.05 
        
FIT .967/.978/.029   
 
Conventional participation 
Turning to conventional participation (table 2.10), the strong positive effect of political engagement is 
again evident. There is also a positive effect of ideological identity, with those who have more 
extreme ideological identities being more likely to participate. As was identified in the unconditional 
model there is no link between levels of attentiveness to political issues in the media and participation 
levels. Like voting there is also no direct link between political opinionation and conventional 
participation. The associations between political engagement and opinionation, and engagement/ 
opinionation and ideological identity are of the same magnitude as the model examining variations in 
voter tendency. 
 
Table 2.10. Conventional participation 
Conventional participation B SE Z 
        
Conventional ON       
Political engagement 0.73 0.01 52.36 
Ideological identity  0.06 0.01 5.34 
        
Opinionation ON       
Political engagement -0.62 0.01 -46.73 
        
Ideological identity ON       
Political engagement 0.24 0.02 16.45 
Opinionation 0.13 0.01 10.52 
        
FIT .957/.973.034   
 
Non-conventional participation 
Looking at non-conventional participation (table 2.11) those who are more attentiveness to political 
issues are slightly less likely to participate in non-conventional forms of political activity (mirroring 
the unconditional model). Engagement with politics is again associated with an increased tendency to 
participate. Those who have stronger opinions about politics are more likely to participate in non-
conditional forms of activity (reflected by the negative association with don’t knows on political 
items). Those who hold a more extreme ideological identity are less likely to participate in this 
manner – as highlighted earlier, this may reflect the ‘liberal’ effect, or the fact that these individuals 
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may be more confident in, and engaged with the traditional political system. Additionally, those who 
are more opinionated on political issues are more likely to be involved in non-conventional forms of 
political activity. As before, the indirect effects are consistent, with more politically engaged people 
identified as more opinionated and ideological identity driven by engagement and opinionation.  
 
Table 2.11. Non-conventional participation 
Non-conventional participation B SE Z 
        
Non-conventional ON       
Attentiveness -0.03 0.01 -2.34 
Political engagement 0.47 0.01 41.44 
Opinionation -0.08 0.01 -8.32 
Ideological identity  -0.06 0.01 -6.74 
        
Opinionation ON       
Political engagement -0.42 0.01 -60.36 
        
Ideological identity ON       
Political engagement 0.17 0.01 17.01 
Opinionation 0.14 0.01 10.64 
        
FIT .952/.968/.037   
 
Civic engagement 
Finally, when considering civic engagement (table 2.12), those that are more attentive to political 
issues are shown to be more likely to be civically engaged. This is in line with voting, but contrasts 
the negative effect of attentiveness on non-conventional forms of participation (no effect of 
attentiveness was found when considering conventional forms of participation). Those who are 
interested in politics are also more likely to be civically engaged (a consistent effect across all forms 
of participation). There is also a clear effect of political opinionation on civic engagement, with those 
that have a stronger political opinion identified as more likely to participate.  
 
Table 2.12. Civic engagement 
Civic engagement B SE Z 
        
Civic ON       
Attentiveness 0.26 0.02 11.69 
Political engagement 0.39 0.02 21.80 
Opinionation -0.13 0.01 -12.30 
Ideological identity  -0.10 0.01 -9.60 
        
Opinionation ON       
Political engagement -0.62 0.01 -46.61 
        
Ideological identity ON       
Political engagement 0.24 0.01 16.43 
Opinionation 0.12 0.01 10.48 
        
FIT .955/.969/.036   
 
 
 53
2.5: ANALYSIS 3: EXTENDING THE REVISED MODEL TO INCORPORATE ADDITIONAL 
DRIVERS OF PARTICIPATION 
Having re-specified the psychological model based on the modification indices of Mplus to 
incorporate the additional significant direct pathways to participation, the additional independent 
variables are added to the model. Looking closely at figure 2.1, with the exception of attention to 
politics (which we have already shown is problematic to treat as a mediating variable) all of the 
variables we have identified in the ESS are exogenous variables (only have arrows coming out of 
them). As a result, in the first instance all direct pathways are specified between the additional 
measures and participation, as well as all indirect pathways via opinionation and ideological identity 
(figure 2.6). All non-significant pathways are then removed to produce a final series of models (model 
1). Having produced a simplified model, controls for respondent age, gender, and ethnicity are 
included to provide an initial indication of whether the global model is applicable to different 
population subgroups (model 2). In general, these models show reduction in model fit, suggestive of 
potential differences in the overall model between demographic groups.  
 
 
Figure 2.6 
 
Voting 
Looking first at voting (table 2.13), the main effects of attentiveness and ideological identity are 
shown to be of a similar magnitude when the additional variables are included. Similarly, the link 
between engagement with politics and opinionation, and the links from engagement and opinionation 
to ideological identity remain significant.  
 
Turning to the additional variables, those who have higher levels of trust in official institutions are 
more likely to vote than those with lower levels of trust. Those who feel their identity is at threat are 
less likely to vote, an effect that remains of a similar magnitude when controlling for individual 
ethnicity.  
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Table 2.13. Voting 
Model 1 Model 2 
Voting B SE Z   B SE Z 
Vote ON               
Attentiveness 0.37 0.03 12.09   0.23 0.03 6.74 
Political engagement 0.35 0.02 17.98   0.44 0.02 20.70 
Institutional trust 0.06 0.01 12.07   0.07 0.01 13.08 
Ideological identity 0.06 0.01 4.96   0.07 0.01 5.54 
Identity threat -0.35 0.03 -11.35   -0.29 0.03 -8.84 
                
Opinionation ON               
Political engagement -0.57 0.02 -37.08   -0.57 0.02 -35.63 
Social trust -0.03 0.01 -5.84   -0.03 0.01 -5.67 
External efficacy -0.05 0.02 -3.39   -0.05 0.02 -3.02 
Identity threat 0.09 0.03 2.96   0.07 0.03 2.13 
Meet socially  -0.07 0.02 -4.46   -0.06 0.02 -3.90 
                
Ideological identity ON               
Political engagement 0.27 0.02 16.66   0.28 0.02 16.49 
Social trust -0.03 0.01 -6.08   -0.03 0.01 -5.86 
External efficacy -0.08 0.01 -5.57   -0.08 0.01 -5.42 
Opinionation 0.11 0.01 9.05   0.11 0.01 8.93 
Identity threat 0.19 0.03 6.28   0.14 0.03 4.49 
                
Demographics               
Minority         -0.40 0.04 -9.52 
Male         -0.17 0.02 -9.52 
Young         -0.86 0.03 -34.08 
                
FIT .935/.966/.031     .923/.956/.032   
 
Turning to the indirect effects, in addition to the effects identified in the previous models, those 
people with higher levels of external efficacy and social trust are more likely to hold an opinion about 
political issues. In contrast, those who feel their identity is under threat are less likely to hold an 
opinion. Turning to ideological identity, those who feel their identity is at threat are more likely to 
hold a more extreme ideological position. Those with higher levels of social trust and external 
efficacy are less likely to hold a more extreme ideological position (as are those that hold stronger 
political opinions).  
 
When demographics are included (model 2), younger people are shown to be significantly less likely 
to vote than older people (aged over 24). Men are less likely to vote than women are, and minority 
groups are also identified as less likely to vote than the majority. The main effects identified in model 
1 remain of a similar magnitude and significance. 
 
Conventional participation 
Considering conventional forms of participation (table 2.14), the inclusion of additional independent 
variables does not substantively alter the magnitude of the associations between political engagement 
and ideological identity, and levels of participation. Those with higher levels of institutional trust are 
marginally less likely to participate, whilst those with higher levels of social capital (as measured by 
social trust) are more likely to participate. Those with higher levels of external efficacy are more 
likely to participate, as are those who feel that their identity is under threat. The indirect effects via 
opinionation and ideological identity are of a similar magnitude to those of the models for voting. 
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Table 2.14. Conventional participation 
Model 1 Model 2 
Conventional Participation B SE Z   B SE Z 
Conventional ON               
Political engagement 0.70 0.02 43.56   0.71 0.02 41.54 
Institutional trust -0.03 0.01 -5.27   -0.03 0.01 -4.80 
Social trust 0.04 0.01 6.20   0.04 0.01 6.10 
External efficacy 0.08 0.02 5.21   0.07 0.02 4.72 
Ideological identity  0.06 0.01 5.50   0.06 0.01 5.62 
Identity threat 0.24 0.03 8.78   0.26 0.03 8.83 
                
Opinionation ON               
Political engagement -0.58 0.02 -38.71   -0.58 0.02 -37.13 
Social trust -0.03 0.01 -6.11   -0.03 0.01 -5.88 
External efficacy -0.05 0.01 -3.20   -0.04 0.01 -2.95 
Identity threat 0.12 0.03 4.06   0.09 0.03 3.02 
Meet socially -0.06 0.02 -4.20   -0.06 0.02 -3.68 
                
Ideological identity ON               
Political engagement 0.29 0.02 17.75   0.29 0.02 17.66 
Social trust -0.03 0.01 -6.09   -0.03 0.01 -5.79 
External efficacy -0.08 0.01 -6.04   -0.08 0.01 -5.92 
Opinionation 0.11 0.01 9.55   0.12 0.01 9.48 
Identity threat 0.18 0.03 6.29   0.13 0.03 4.41 
Meet socially 0.03 0.02 1.95   0.03 0.02 1.90 
                
Demographics               
Minority         0.00 0.04 -0.09 
Male         -0.06 0.02 -3.67 
Young         -0.04 0.02 -1.56 
                
FIT .933/.964/.032     .918/.952/.033   
 
Model 2 includes basic demographic details for each respondent. This reveals no differences in levels 
of participation in conventional activities based on ethnicity and gender, whilst younger people and 
men are identified as slightly less likely to participate than older people.  
 
Non-conventional participation 
Turning to non-conventional forms of participation (table 2.15), the inclusion of additional 
independent variables results in a stronger negative association between attentiveness to political 
issues and non-conventional forms of participation – those that are more attentive are less likely to 
participate. In contrast, the effects of political engagement, opinionation and ideological identity are 
not altered by the inclusion of these additional pathways. Those with higher levels of institutional 
trust are less likely to participate in non-conventional political activities than those with lower levels 
of trust, whilst higher levels of social trust are associated with an increased tendency to participate in 
non-conventional activities. The indirect effects via opinionation and ideological identity are in the 
same direction and of similar magnitude to the models exploring voting and conventional forms of 
political participation.  
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Table 2.15. Non-conventional participation 
Model 1 Model 2 
Non-conventional Participation B SE Z   B SE Z 
Non-conventional ON               
Attentiveness -0.11 0.03 -4.38   -0.09 0.03 -3.33 
Political engagement 0.68 0.02 30.76   0.73 0.02 30.75 
Institutional trust -0.06 0.01 -9.71   -0.06 0.01 -8.78 
Social trust 0.13 0.01 23.66   0.13 0.01 22.50 
External efficacy 0.15 0.02 9.96   0.13 0.02 8.88 
Opinionation -0.07 0.01 -6.76   -0.07 0.01 -6.57 
Ideological identity  -0.05 0.01 -4.85   -0.05 0.01 -4.48 
Identity threat 0.35 0.03 12.32   0.38 0.03 12.69 
                
Opinionation ON               
Political engagement -0.59 0.02 -38.77   -0.58 0.02 -37.26 
Social trust -0.03 0.01 -6.11   -0.03 0.01 -5.88 
External efficacy -0.04 0.01 -3.15   -0.04 0.01 -2.88 
Identity threat 0.12 0.03 4.07   0.10 0.03 3.04 
Meet socially -0.07 0.02 -4.27   -0.06 0.02 -3.75 
                
Ideological identity ON               
Political engagement 0.29 0.02 17.73   0.30 0.02 17.62 
Social trust -0.03 0.01 -6.09   -0.03 0.01 -5.80 
External efficacy -0.08 0.01 -6.05   -0.08 0.01 -5.94 
Opinionation 0.11 0.01 9.51   0.11 0.01 9.41 
Identity threat 0.18 0.03 6.29   0.13 0.03 4.41 
Meet socially 0.03 0.02 1.89   0.03 0.02 1.83 
                
Demographics               
Minority         -0.21 0.04 -5.39 
Male         -0.21 0.02 -13.84 
Young         0.10 0.02 4.32 
                
FIT .931/.963/.033     .917/.952/.034   
 
When demographics are added (model 2), young people are identified as significantly more likely to 
participate in non-conventional activities than older people. By contrast,  men are significantly less 
likely to participate than women, and those from minority groups are less likely to participate than 
those from the majority ethnic group. 
 
Civic engagement 
Finally, considering civic engagement (table 2.16), a small negative effect of institutional trust is 
again evident with more trusting individuals being less likely to participate (perhaps reflecting higher 
levels of satisfaction with the current regime). Those with higher levels of social capital (as measured 
by both social trust and social network support) are more likely to be involved in civic activities, as 
are those who feel their identity is under threat. Those with a stronger political opinion are also more 
likely to be involved. Adjusting for demographic differences, these effects remain significant and of a 
similar magnitude.  
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Table 2.16. Civic engagement 
Model 1 Model 2 
Civic Engagement B SE Z   B SE Z 
Civic ON               
Attentiveness 0.21 0.02 8.80   0.25 0.03 9.28 
Political engagement 0.30 0.02 15.17   0.28 0.02 13.43 
Institutional trust -0.04 0.01 -6.43   -0.04 0.01 -5.99 
Social trust 0.16 0.01 27.87   0.16 0.01 27.35 
External efficacy 0.22 0.02 14.48   0.22 0.02 14.25 
Opinionation -0.10 0.01 -9.82   -0.10 0.01 -8.91 
Ideological identity  -0.07 0.01 -6.50   -0.07 0.01 -6.06 
Identity threat 0.16 0.03 5.48   0.17 0.03 5.62 
Meet socially 0.07 0.01 4.82   0.06 0.02 4.41 
                
Opinionation ON               
Political engagement -0.58 0.02 -38.69   -0.58 0.02 -37.18 
Social trust -0.03 0.01 -6.09   -0.03 0.01 -5.86 
External efficacy -0.05 0.01 -3.17   -0.04 0.01 -2.90 
Identity threat 0.12 0.03 4.06   0.10 0.03 3.03 
Meet socially -0.06 0.02 -4.27   -0.06 0.02 -3.75 
                
Ideological identity ON               
Political engagement 0.29 0.02 17.72   0.29 0.02 17.62 
Social trust -0.03 0.01 -6.09   -0.03 0.01 -5.80 
External efficacy -0.08 0.01 -6.04   -0.08 0.01 -5.93 
Opinionation 0.11 0.01 9.51   0.11 0.01 9.41 
Identity threat 0.18 0.03 6.29   0.13 0.03 4.41 
Meet socially 0.03 0.02 1.92   0.03 0.02 1.86 
                
Demographics               
Minority         -0.06 0.04 -1.42 
Male         0.05 0.02 3.41 
Young         0.05 0.02 2.00 
                
FIT .933/.964/.033     .919/.952/.033   
 
Including demographic characteristics (model 2), younger people are identified as slightly more likely 
to be engaged in these activities, as are men (in contrast to the other forms of participation). No 
differences in civic engagement are evident based on minority status.  
 
 
2.6: ANALYSIS 4: ALLOWING FOR DIFFERENTIAL PROCESSES BY DEMOGRAPHICS  
In the final sequence of analyses, these revised models with additional independent variables are 
examined across population subgroups. Here the primary interest is in the differences in particular 
pathways between men and women, young and old people, and minority and non-minority groups.9 
For each form of participation separate models are specified based on gender (male and female), age 
(16-24 and 25 plus), and minority status (self rated minority and non-minority). Like the previous 
analyses, we begin with models that include all direct pathways, which are then simplified to produce 
a series of final models with only significant pathways (model 1). An additional model including the 
                                               
9
 Currently, one crucial assumption is that the latent variables have the same meaning for different groups – this 
has not been directly tested, however the factor loadings in the measurement models are allowed to be different 
for each population group to account for the possibility that different items may have more or less importance 
for particular groups. It would be possible to examine this in more detail on completion of all models. 
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other two demographics is also specified (model 2), enabling us to test for the presence of interaction 
effects between combinations of individual characteristics: for example, do young women differ from 
older women, and men.   
 
Voting 
Looking first at voting, some large and highly significant differences were evident when considering 
the models including demographic controls, with young people, minority groups, and men all 
identified as less likely to vote than their counterparts. As a result, it is possible that some of the 
pathways identified in the overall model may be different for particular subgroups. 
 
Across men and women (table 2.17), the structural model is largely equivalent, with only small 
differences in the magnitude of some effects between the two models, and all effects operating in the 
same substantive direction. Exceptions to the overall consistent picture are that men with higher levels 
of social trust are less likely to vote (no equivalent effect is evident for women). Looking at the 
indirect effects, men who feel their identity is under threat are less likely to hold a political opinion, 
whilst women with stronger networks of social support are more likely to form strong political 
opinions. The lower tendencies to vote amongst young people and minority groups are also similar for 
men and women, suggesting no interaction effects. However, the inclusion of these effects removes 
the significant effect of feeling their identity is under threat on opinionation. 
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Table 2.17. Voting                         
  Model 1   Model 2 
  Male Female   Male Female 
Voting B SE Z B SE Z   B SE Z B SE Z 
                            
Vote ON                           
Attentiveness 0.48 0.04 10.90 0.30 0.04 6.74   0.32 0.05 6.76 0.16 0.05 3.43 
Political engagement 0.37 0.03 13.38 0.38 0.03 13.71   0.41 0.03 14.08 0.44 0.03 15.20 
Institutional trust 0.08 0.01 8.13 0.06 0.01 8.98   0.09 0.01 9.10 0.07 0.01 9.56 
Social trust -0.03 0.01 -3.08         -0.03 0.01 -2.79       
Ideological identity 0.04 0.02 2.39 0.07 0.02 4.01   0.06 0.02 3.40 0.07 0.02 3.82 
Identity threat -0.38 0.05 -8.44 -0.33 0.04 -7.82   -0.32 0.05 -6.84 -0.25 0.05 -5.52 
                            
Opinionation ON                           
Political engagement -0.50 0.02 -21.08 -0.55 0.02 -29.42   -0.50 0.02 -20.64 -0.56 0.02 -29.05 
Social trust -0.04 0.01 -4.91 -0.03 0.01 -5.47   -0.04 0.01 -4.79 -0.03 0.01 -5.01 
External efficacy -0.10 0.02 -4.48         -0.10 0.02 -4.43       
Identity threat 0.11 0.05 2.41         0.09 0.05 1.77       
Meet socially       -0.09 0.02 -4.39         -0.09 0.02 -4.14 
                            
Ideological identity ON                           
Political engagement 0.29 0.02 12.50 0.25 0.02 10.67   0.30 0.02 12.43 0.25 0.02 10.58 
Social trust -0.03 0.01 -4.03 -0.03 0.01 -4.16   -0.03 0.01 -3.75 -0.03 0.01 -4.14 
External efficacy -0.09 0.02 -4.33 -0.07 0.02 -3.61   -0.10 0.02 -4.52 -0.07 0.02 -3.37 
Opinionation 0.12 0.02 6.44 0.10 0.02 6.13   0.12 0.02 6.13 0.10 0.02 6.15 
Identity threat 0.20 0.04 4.65 0.18 0.04 4.30   0.13 0.04 2.96 0.15 0.04 3.37 
                            
Vote ON Demographics                           
Minority               -0.37 0.06 -6.26 -0.44 0.06 -7.38 
Young               -0.81 0.04 -22.05 -0.90 0.04 -25.64 
                            
FIT .931/.963/.031   .938/.968/.030     .925/.957/.031   .935/.964/.030   
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More differences in voting are evident when comparing young people with older people (table 2.18). 
Here, the model for older people closely resembles the global model (likely reflecting the large 
sample size), with only a small increase in the tendency to vote amongst those with weaker levels of 
opinionation that was not previously evident.  
 
When considering younger people, a number of clear differences are evident. Attentiveness to politics 
in the media is not associated with voting, and instead there is a stronger link with engagement with 
politics. There is also no increased tendency to vote amongst those who are more trusting in 
institutions or those who have a more extreme ideological identity, and the reduced tendency to vote 
amongst those who feel their identity is under threat is of a smaller magnitude. Interestingly, whilst 
attentiveness to politics, trust in institutions, and ideological identity are not associated with voting, 
those who hold a stronger opinion about political issues are more likely to vote. This is in direct 
contrast to the experience of older people. There is also a much stronger effect of identity threat on 
opinionation and ideological identity, with those who feel their identity is under threat much less 
likely to hold an opinion, but more likely to have a more extreme ideological position.  
 
Including the additional demographic controls has a marginal effect on results, with the magnitude of 
the lower level of voting amongst men and minority groups is similar for younger and older 
respondents. This removes the effect of identity threat on opinionation for both groups.  
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Table 2.18. Voting                           
  Model 1   Model 2 
  Young Old   Young Old 
Voting B SE Z B SE Z   B SE Z B SE Z 
                            
Vote ON                           
Attentiveness 0.23 0.04 6.36   0.24 0.04 6.44 
Political engagement 0.58 0.05 11.99 0.41 0.02 17.03   0.61 0.05 12.24 0.44 0.03 17.66 
Institutional trust       0.08 0.01 14.33         0.08 0.01 13.80 
Opinionation -0.11 0.03 -3.22 0.03 0.01 2.02   -0.11 0.03 -3.19 0.03 0.01 2.16 
Ideological identity       0.08 0.01 5.36         0.08 0.01 5.60 
Identity threat -0.17 0.08 -2.01 -0.38 0.03 -11.17   -0.14 0.09 -1.53 -0.31 0.04 -8.85 
Meet socially -0.12 0.05 -2.54         -0.10 0.05 -2.12       
                            
Opinionation ON                           
Political engagement -0.64 0.05 -13.53 -0.59 0.02 -35.35   -0.61 0.05 -12.99 -0.58 0.02 -33.90 
Social trust       -0.03 0.01 -6.11         -0.03 0.01 -6.08 
External efficacy       -0.04 0.02 -2.89         -0.04 0.02 -2.54 
Identity threat 0.28 0.09 3.16 0.08 0.03 2.36   0.17 0.10 1.74 0.06 0.04 1.75 
Meet socially       -0.08 0.02 -4.55         -0.07 0.02 -4.12 
                            
Ideological identity ON                           
Political engagement 0.34 0.06 6.19 0.27 0.02 15.47   0.35 0.06 6.27 0.27 0.02 15.29 
Social trust -0.09 0.02 -4.91 -0.03 0.01 -5.03   -0.08 0.02 -4.69 -0.03 0.01 -4.96 
External efficacy       -0.08 0.02 -5.49         -0.08 0.02 -5.31 
Opinionation 0.14 0.04 3.45 0.11 0.01 8.49   0.15 0.04 3.60 0.11 0.01 8.25 
Identity threat 0.34 0.09 3.93 0.16 0.03 4.94   0.28 0.09 2.97 0.12 0.03 3.52 
                            
Vote ON Demographics                           
Minority               -0.44 0.11 -3.83 -0.39 0.05 -8.73 
Male               -0.13 0.05 -2.85 -0.17 0.02 -8.76 
                            
FIT .954/.972/.028   .934/.965/.031     .940/.962/.030   .928/.959/.031   
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There are also clear differences when considering those who define themselves as from a minority 
group (table 2.19), with considerably fewer significant pathways (and some different pathways when 
compared to the general model). It is likely that this reflects the small sample of respondents across 
Europe who define themselves as from a minority group, but also points to differences in the drivers 
of participation amongst this group. For minority individuals, there are no direct associations between 
attentiveness, institutional trust, ideological identity or social capital (both social trust and meeting 
people socially) and levels of voting. The higher tendency to vote amongst those who are more 
engaged with politics is also stronger amongst minority groups, but there is a smaller negative effect 
on voting of feeling your identity is under threat (reflecting a high correlation between these 
variables).  
 
The predictors of political opinionation are also different for minority groups, suggesting different 
processes that are influencing the ways that minority individuals form judgements about political 
issues. Like the population majority, minorities who are more engaged in politics are more likely to 
have an opinion. No other characteristics are associated with opinionation. The processes determining 
the strength of someone’s ideological identity are also different to the majority, with no differences 
based on political engagement, external efficacy, or opinionation. For minority individuals those who 
are more attentive to politics in the media are more likely to have a more extreme ideological position. 
In contrast, no similar path is evident when considering non-minorities.  
 
Including the additional demographic measures has no effect on the magnitude of these effects, and 
the pattern of demographic effects is the same for minority and non-minority individuals.  
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Table 2.19. Voting                           
  Model 1   Model 2 
  Minority Non-minority   Minority Non-minority 
Voting B SE Z B SE Z   B SE Z B SE Z 
                            
Vote ON                           
Attentiveness       0.42 0.03 12.48         0.26 0.04 7.36 
Political engagement 0.65 0.07 9.22 0.33 0.02 16.47   0.64 0.07 8.79 0.43 0.02 19.64 
Institutional trust       0.07 0.01 11.27         0.08 0.01 11.90 
Social trust       -0.02 0.01 -2.41         -0.01 0.01 -2.05 
Ideological identity       0.07 0.01 5.17         0.07 0.01 5.34 
Identity threat -0.24 0.09 -2.80 -0.29 0.04 -8.21   -0.17 0.09 -1.94 -0.31 0.04 -8.79 
                            
Opinionation ON                           
Political engagement -0.75 0.08 -9.51 -0.55 0.02 -35.48   -0.73 0.08 -9.32 -0.56 0.02 -34.71 
Social trust       -0.03 0.01 -5.70         -0.03 0.01 -5.70 
External efficacy       -0.05 0.02 -3.41         -0.05 0.02 -3.10 
Meet socially       -0.07 0.02 -4.35         -0.06 0.02 -3.81 
                            
Ideological identity ON                           
Attentiveness 0.42 0.09 4.81         0.43 0.09 4.85       
Political engagement       0.27 0.02 16.11         0.28 0.02 16.08 
Social trust -0.14 0.03 -4.92 -0.03 0.01 -5.07   -0.14 0.03 -4.87 -0.03 0.01 -5.08 
External efficacy       -0.08 0.01 -5.59         -0.08 0.02 -5.46 
Opinionation       0.11 0.01 8.77         0.11 0.01 8.75 
Identity threat 0.22 0.09 2.50 0.14 0.03 4.23   0.19 0.09 2.10 0.14 0.03 4.16 
                            
Vote ON Demographics                           
Male               -0.14 0.09 -1.62 -0.18 0.02 -9.48 
Young               -0.90 0.12 -7.54 -0.86 0.03 -32.98 
                            
FIT .925/.957/.033   .935/.966/.031     .912/.947/.034   .922/.956/.033   
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Conventional participation 
Considering conventional participation, looking at the overall models no differences in tendency to 
participate were evident between minority and non-minority groups. Differences based on gender and 
age were also identified as small and only marginally significant. 
 
Direct comparison of the overall model between men and women reveals a very similar picture, with 
all direct effects on conventional participation of a similar magnitude (table 2.20). The positive link 
between ideological identity and participation is stronger for women, but both are significant and 
operate in the same direction. The paths to opinionation are also similar. However, there is no 
significant link between external efficacy and opinionation for women (for men, those with higher 
levels of external efficacy are more likely to hold an opinion), and the lower levels of opinionation 
amongst those who feel their identity is under threat is a stronger effect for men. Women who meet 
socially with others are more likely to hold a political opinion, and have a more extreme ideological 
identity. When demographics are added, there are no clear differences based on age or minority status. 
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Table 2.20. Conventional participation                          
  Model 1   Model 2 
  Male Female   Male Female 
Conventional participation B SE Z B SE Z   B SE Z B SE Z 
                            
Conventional ON                           
Political engagement 0.76 0.03 27.97 0.68 0.02 29.49   0.76 0.03 27.34 0.67 0.02 28.96 
Institutional trust -0.03 0.01 -3.01 -0.04 0.01 -4.47   -0.03 0.01 -2.73 -0.04 0.01 -4.14 
Social trust 0.03 0.01 3.57 0.04 0.01 5.64   0.03 0.01 3.45 0.05 0.01 5.77 
External efficacy 0.09 0.02 3.74 0.07 0.02 3.32   0.08 0.02 3.58 0.06 0.02 3.09 
Opinionation 0.07 0.02 3.76         0.07 0.02 3.73       
Ideological identity  0.03 0.02 2.20 0.07 0.02 4.50   0.03 0.02 2.23 0.07 0.02 4.52 
Identity threat 0.22 0.04 5.32 0.27 0.04 6.97   0.24 0.04 5.78 0.27 0.04 6.67 
  
                          
Opinionation ON                           
Political engagement -0.53 0.02 -23.02 -0.57 0.02 -30.40   -0.52 0.02 -22.41 -0.57 0.02 -29.93 
Social trust -0.04 0.01 -5.26 -0.03 0.01 -5.32   -0.04 0.01 -5.11 -0.03 0.01 -4.89 
External efficacy -0.09 0.02 -3.97         -0.09 0.02 -4.09       
Identity threat 0.16 0.04 3.68 0.08 0.04 2.08   0.13 0.05 2.73 0.05 0.04 1.29 
Meet socially       -0.08 0.02 -4.16         -0.08 0.02 -3.91 
  
                          
Ideological identity ON                           
Political engagement 0.32 0.02 13.42 0.26 0.02 11.29   0.32 0.02 13.35 0.26 0.02 11.24 
Social trust -0.03 0.01 -3.71 -0.03 0.01 -4.55   -0.03 0.01 -3.38 -0.03 0.01 -4.49 
External efficacy -0.10 0.02 -4.83 -0.07 0.02 -3.77   -0.10 0.02 -4.99 -0.07 0.02 -3.58 
Opinionation 0.13 0.02 7.03 0.10 0.02 6.22   0.12 0.02 6.68 0.10 0.02 6.30 
Identity threat 0.19 0.04 4.56 0.17 0.04 4.20   0.13 0.04 2.98 0.13 0.04 3.15 
Meet socially       0.04 0.02 2.06         0.04 0.02 1.91 
  
                          
Demographics                           
Minority               -0.05 0.05 -1.01 0.05 0.05 1.00 
Young               -0.06 0.03 -1.79 0.00 0.03 -0.08 
                            
FIT .930/.961/.032   .936/.965/.032     .920/.954/.033   .929/.960/.032   
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Again, more differences are evident when comparing younger people to older people (table 2.21). 
There is no link to conventional participation from institutional trust or external efficacy when 
considering younger people, whereas older people are less likely to participate if they have a higher 
level of institutional trust and are more likely to participate if they have a higher level of external 
efficacy. There is a much stronger positive effect of identity threat on participation amongst younger 
people, and the positive effect of ideological identity is also twice as large.  
 
Like voting, opinionation is only driven by engagement with politics and identity threat when 
considering younger people. The drivers of ideological identity are also different, with younger 
people less likely to hold a more extreme ideological position if they are attentive to political issues in 
the media, but much more likely than older people to hold a more extreme ideological position if they 
are engaged with politics. The less extreme ideological identity amongst those with higher levels of 
social trust is stronger when considering younger people, whilst those who feel their identity is under 
threat are much more likely to have a stronger ideological identity if they are younger. Finally, no 
effects of external efficacy or opinionation on ideological identity are identified when considering 
young people. Demographic differences between young and older people are evident, with the 
reduced tendency to participate amongst men stronger amongst young people.  
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Table 2.21. Conventional participation                         
  Model 1   Model 2 
  Young Old   Young Old 
Conventional participation B SE Z B SE Z   B SE Z B SE Z 
                            
Conventional ON                           
Political engagement 0.68 0.04 16.81 0.70 0.02 40.49 0.69 0.04 16.60 0.72 0.02 38.79 
Institutional trust -0.04 0.01 -5.35         -0.03 0.01 -5.03 
Social trust 0.06 0.02 3.61 0.03 0.01 5.65   0.05 0.02 3.37 0.03 0.01 5.63 
External efficacy 0.08 0.02 5.11         0.08 0.02 4.73 
Ideological identity  0.11 0.03 3.77 0.05 0.01 4.41   0.10 0.03 3.58 0.05 0.01 4.63 
Identity threat 0.39 0.07 5.65 0.22 0.03 7.36   0.38 0.07 5.07 0.23 0.03 7.45 
                
      
Opinionation ON                           
Political engagement -0.62 0.04 -16.02 -0.60 0.02 -36.02   -0.61 0.04 -15.52 -0.59 0.02 -34.53 
Social trust       -0.03 0.01 -6.02         -0.03 0.01 -5.95 
External efficacy       -0.04 0.02 -2.83         -0.04 0.02 -2.51 
Identity threat 0.32 0.07 4.49 0.09 0.03 2.87   0.25 0.08 3.14 0.07 0.03 2.14 
Meet socially       -0.07 0.02 -4.19         -0.06 0.02 -3.77 
        
      
        
      
Ideological identity ON                           
Attentiveness -0.30 0.10 -2.93         -0.32 0.11 -3.00       
Political engagement 0.55 0.08 7.34 0.28 0.02 15.65   0.57 0.08 7.42 0.28 0.02 15.51 
Social trust -0.10 0.02 -6.11 -0.03 0.01 -4.96   -0.10 0.02 -5.87 -0.03 0.01 -4.84 
External efficacy       -0.08 0.02 -5.74         -0.08 0.02 -5.61 
Opinionation 0.17 0.04 4.80 0.11 0.01 8.45   0.18 0.04 5.01 0.11 0.01 8.24 
Identity threat 0.26 0.08 3.39 0.15 0.03 4.90   0.18 0.08 2.26 0.11 0.03 3.50 
Meet socially 0.12 0.04 2.70       0.12 0.05 2.72       
                      
      
Demographics                     
      
Minority               0.04 0.09 0.45 -0.02 0.04 -0.47 
Male               -0.12 0.04 -2.82 -0.05 0.02 -3.00 
                            
FIT .950/.970/.029   .930/.963/.032     .939/.961/.030   .925/.958/.032   
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Differences are also evident when comparing minority individuals to the majority (table 2.22). 
Minority participation is only influenced by engagement with politics, institutional trust and social 
trust, whereas for the majority this is also driven by external efficacy, their ideological identity, and 
whether people feel their identity is at threat. Those who are more engaged with politics are more 
likely to hold an opinion (for both minority and non-minority individuals), whereas all other 
predictors of opinionation are specific to the majority.  
 
The processes determining the strength of someone’s ideological identity are also different to the 
majority, with no differences based on political engagement, external efficacy, and opinionation. For 
minority individuals those who are more attentive to politics in the media are more likely to have a 
more extreme ideological position. In contrast, no similar path is evident when considering non-
minorities. 
 
Including the remaining demographic characteristics, minority men are shown to be much less likely 
to participate than women, with a considerably smaller gender gap when examining those from the 
majority. No significant age differences in participation are evident for minority or non-minority 
groups. 
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Table 2.22. Conventional participation                         
  Model 1   Model 2 
  Minority Non-minority   Minority Non-minority 
Conventional participation B SE Z B SE Z   B SE Z B SE Z 
                            
Conventional ON                           
Political engagement 0.81 0.08 10.43 0.69 0.02 41.98   0.87 0.08 10.47 0.70 0.02 40.40 
Institutional trust -0.06 0.02 -2.59 -0.03 0.01 -4.31   -0.07 0.02 -2.66 -0.03 0.01 -4.25 
Social trust 0.08 0.03 2.71 0.03 0.01 5.76   0.08 0.03 2.55 0.03 0.01 5.73 
External efficacy       0.07 0.02 4.67         0.07 0.02 4.47 
Ideological identity        0.06 0.01 5.52         0.06 0.01 5.68 
Identity threat       0.28 0.03 9.00         0.28 0.03 9.11 
                            
Opinionation ON                           
Political engagement -0.78 0.07 -10.55 -0.57 0.02 -36.73   -0.76 0.07 -10.33 -0.57 0.02 -35.86 
Social trust       -0.03 0.01 -5.96         -0.03 0.01 -5.99 
External efficacy       -0.05 0.01 -3.13         -0.04 0.02 -2.85 
Identity threat       0.08 0.03 2.34         0.09 0.03 2.51 
Meeet socially        -0.06 0.02 -4.08         -0.06 0.02 -3.56 
                            
Ideological identity ON                           
Attentiveness  0.39 0.08 5.10         0.40 0.08 5.16       
Political engagement       0.29 0.02 17.03         0.29 0.02 17.07 
Social trust -0.12 0.03 -4.60 -0.03 0.01 -5.13   -0.12 0.03 -4.52 -0.03 0.01 -5.11 
External efficacy       -0.09 0.01 -5.95         -0.08 0.01 -5.86 
Opinionation       0.11 0.01 9.12         0.11 0.01 9.16 
Identity threat 0.19 0.08 2.33 0.13 0.03 4.04   0.16 0.08 1.97 0.13 0.03 3.95 
                            
Demographics                           
Male               -0.20 0.08 -2.40 -0.05 0.02 -3.26 
Young               0.14 0.10 1.34 -0.04 0.02 -1.83 
                            
FIT .932/.958/.033   .933/.964/.032     .918/.947/.034   .917/.953/.034   
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Non-conventional participation 
No differences in tendency to participate in non-conventional activities were evident based on age. 
However, men and minority groups were shown to be considerably less likely to participate than 
women and non-minority groups respectively.  
 
Like conventional forms of participation, comparisons between men and women reveal a very similar 
pattern of associations with non-conventional participation (table 2.23). The paths to opinionation are 
also similar, although there is no significant link between external efficacy and opinionation for 
women (for men, those with higher levels of external efficacy are more likely to hold an opinion), and 
the lower levels opinionation amongst those who feel their identity is under threat is stronger for men. 
Women who meet others socially are more likely to hold an opinion and have a more extreme 
ideological identity, reflecting the importance of social networks. When demographics are added, the 
differences based on age and minority status are similar. When these are added, there is no longer an 
effect of identity threat on opinionation for women. 
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Table 2.23. Non-conventional participation                       
  Model 1   Model 2 
  Male Female   Male Female 
Non-conventional participation B SE Z B SE Z   B SE Z B SE Z 
                            
Non-conventional ON                           
Attentiveness -0.11 0.04 -2.92 -0.10 0.04 -2.84   -0.09 0.04 -2.23 -0.08 0.04 -2.00 
Political engagement 0.68 0.03 21.36 0.73 0.03 23.19   0.68 0.03 20.93 0.73 0.03 22.69 
Institutional trust -0.06 0.01 -6.03 -0.06 0.01 -6.93   -0.06 0.01 -5.80 -0.06 0.01 -6.33 
Social trust 0.12 0.01 14.10 0.14 0.01 18.33   0.11 0.01 13.64 0.14 0.01 17.88 
External efficacy 0.16 0.02 6.94 0.12 0.02 6.21   0.16 0.02 6.88 0.12 0.02 5.74 
Opinionation -0.05 0.02 -2.78 -0.11 0.01 -7.63   -0.05 0.02 -2.76 -0.10 0.01 -7.05 
Ideological identity  -0.05 0.02 -3.13 -0.06 0.02 -3.87   -0.04 0.02 -2.65 -0.06 0.02 -3.79 
Identity threat 0.33 0.04 8.08 0.37 0.04 9.21   0.36 0.04 8.54 0.40 0.04 9.48 
  
                          
Opinionation ON                           
Political engagement -0.53 0.02 -22.99 -0.56 0.02 -30.27   -0.52 0.02 -22.38 -0.56 0.02 -29.82 
Social trust -0.04 0.01 -5.26 -0.03 0.01 -5.38   -0.04 0.01 -5.11 -0.03 0.01 -4.95 
External efficacy -0.09 0.02 -3.97         -0.09 0.02 -4.10       
Identity threat 0.16 0.04 3.68 0.08 0.04 2.06   0.13 0.05 2.73 0.05 0.04 1.27 
Meet socially       -0.08 0.02 -4.21         -0.08 0.02 -3.93 
  
                          
Ideological identity ON                           
Political engagement 0.32 0.02 13.40 0.26 0.02 11.32   0.32 0.02 13.33 0.26 0.02 11.28 
Social trust -0.03 0.01 -3.71 -0.03 0.01 -4.54   -0.03 0.01 -3.38 -0.03 0.01 -4.48 
External efficacy -0.10 0.02 -4.82 -0.07 0.02 -3.76   -0.10 0.02 -4.99 -0.07 0.02 -3.58 
Opinionation 0.13 0.02 7.04 0.10 0.02 6.31   0.12 0.02 6.67 0.10 0.02 6.39 
Identity threat 0.19 0.04 4.56 0.17 0.04 4.20   0.13 0.04 2.98 0.13 0.04 3.15 
Meet socially       0.04 0.02 2.03         0.04 0.02 1.87 
  
                          
Demographics                           
Minority               -0.18 0.05 -3.50 -0.23 0.06 -4.19 
Young               0.07 0.03 2.02 0.13 0.03 4.20 
                            
FIT .928/.961/.033   .934/.964/.033     .919/.954/.033   .927/.959/.032   
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More differences are evident when comparing young and old people (table 2.24). There are no links 
between attentiveness and non-conventional participation, or institutional trust and participation when 
considering young people. Additionally, the effects of opinionation and ideological identity operate in 
the opposite direction when considering young people. Amongst younger people those who hold less 
clearly formed opinions about politics are more likely to participate in non-conventional ways. In 
contrast, when considering older people, those who have less clearly formed opinions are less likely 
to participate. All other differences are the same as those identified when considering conventional 
participation (reflecting the model specification). Therefore, opinionation is only driven by political 
interest and identity threat when considering younger people (and the effect of identity threat is 
stronger than for older people).  
 
The drivers of ideological identity are also similar to conventional participation, with younger people 
less likely to hold an extreme ideological position if they are attentive to political issues in the media, 
but much more likely than older people to hold a more extreme ideological position if they are 
engaged with politics. The less extreme ideological identity amongst those with higher levels of social 
trust is more evident when considering younger people, whilst those who feel their identity is under 
threat are more likely to have a more extreme ideological identity if they are younger. Finally, no 
effect of external efficacy on ideological identity is identified when considering young people.  
 
Demographic differences between young and older people are evident, with the reduced tendency to 
participate amongst minority groups only apparent amongst older people.  
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Table 2.24. Non-conventional participation                        
  Model 1   Model 2 
  Young Old   Young Old 
Non-conventional participation B SE Z B SE Z   B SE Z B SE Z 
                            
Non-conventional ON                           
Attentiveness       -0.10 0.03 -3.45         -0.10 0.03 -3.22 
Political engagement 0.69 0.05 14.93 0.68 0.02 28.41   0.71 0.05 15.06 0.73 0.03 28.84 
Institutional trust       -0.07 0.01 -9.72         -0.06 0.01 -8.89 
Social trust 0.09 0.02 5.32 0.14 0.01 22.90   0.09 0.02 5.33 0.13 0.01 21.87 
External efficacy 0.13 0.04 3.42 0.14 0.02 9.00   0.12 0.04 3.03 0.13 0.02 8.25 
Opinionation 0.07 0.03 2.53 -0.10 0.01 -8.25   0.07 0.03 2.36 -0.10 0.01 -8.05 
Ideological identity        -0.07 0.01 -5.79         -0.06 0.01 -5.43 
Identity threat 0.30 0.07 4.45 0.35 0.03 11.18   0.34 0.07 4.61 0.39 0.03 11.81 
                            
Opinionation ON                           
Political engagement -0.62 0.04 -15.96 -0.60 0.02 -36.13   -0.61 0.04 -15.45 -0.59 0.02 -34.69 
Social trust       -0.03 0.01 -6.01         -0.03 0.01 -5.95 
External efficacy       -0.04 0.02 -2.76         -0.04 0.02 -2.42 
Identity threat 0.32 0.07 4.49 0.09 0.03 2.89   0.25 0.08 3.13 0.07 0.03 2.17 
Meet socially       -0.07 0.02 -4.28         -0.06 0.02 -3.85 
                            
Ideological identity ON                           
Attentiveness -0.27 0.10 -2.73         -0.29 0.10 -2.79       
Political engagement 0.53 0.07 7.26 0.28 0.02 15.62   0.55 0.08 7.34 0.28 0.02 15.47 
Social trust -0.09 0.02 -5.76 -0.03 0.01 -4.96   -0.09 0.02 -5.40 -0.03 0.01 -4.85 
External efficacy       -0.08 0.02 -5.76         -0.08 0.02 -5.62 
Opinionation 0.17 0.03 4.82 0.11 0.01 8.42   0.18 0.04 5.06 0.11 0.01 8.18 
Identity threat 0.26 0.08 3.52 0.15 0.03 4.89   0.19 0.08 2.39 0.11 0.03 3.50 
Meet socially 0.12 0.04 2.75         0.12 0.05 2.73       
                            
Demographics                           
Minority               -0.13 0.09 -1.42 -0.23 0.04 -5.53 
Male               -0.24 0.04 -6.14 -0.21 0.02 -12.46 
                            
FIT .944/.966/.031   .930/.963/.033     .934/.958/.032   .924/.958/.033   
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In a very similar manner to conventional participation, differences are also evident when comparing 
minority individuals to the majority (table 2.25). Minority participation is not influenced by 
attentiveness, external efficacy, opinionation or ideological identity. Non-minorities who feel their 
identity is under threat are much more likely to participate than minorities. Differences in the drivers 
of opinionation are also evident between minority and non-minority individuals. For both groups, 
those who are interested in politics are more likely to hold an opinion. For the majority, higher levels 
of social trust and external efficacy are associated with a stronger opinion. Opinionation is also driven 
by whether people feel their identity is under threat, with those that do feel their identity is under 
threat being more likely to report don’t know to these questions. In contrast, for minority groups these 
associations are not significant.  
 
The processes determining the strength of someone’s ideological identity are also different to the 
majority, with no differences based on political engagement, external efficacy, and opinionation. For 
minority individuals those who are more attentive to politics in the media are more likely to have a 
more extreme ideological position. In contrast, no similar path is evident when considering non-
minorities.  
 
Finally, when the additional demographic characteristics are included, men are much less likely to 
participate in non-conventional activities than women. Young minorities are much more likely to 
participate, with a noticeably smaller age difference amongst non-minorities.   
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Table 2.25. Non-conventional participation                        
  Model 1   Model 2 
  Minority Non-minority   Minority Non-minority 
Non-conventional participation B SE Z B SE Z   B SE Z B SE Z 
                            
Non-conventional ON                           
Attentiveness 
  
    -0.11 0.03 -4.10         -0.09 0.03 -3.27 
Political engagement 0.68 0.07 9.91 0.68 0.02 29.83   0.75 0.07 10.23 0.73 0.02 30.13 
Institutional trust -0.11 0.03 -4.47 -0.06 0.01 -8.47   -0.12 0.03 -4.51 -0.05 0.01 -7.99 
Social trust 0.18 0.03 5.66 0.13 0.01 22.54   0.18 0.03 5.59 0.13 0.01 21.87 
External efficacy       0.15 0.02 9.76         0.14 0.02 8.80 
Opinionation       -0.07 0.01 -6.54         -0.07 0.01 -6.66 
Ideological identity        -0.05 0.01 -4.29         -0.05 0.01 -4.30 
Identity threat 0.24 0.08 3.04 0.41 0.03 12.63   0.24 0.08 2.94 0.40 0.03 12.24 
  
                          
Opinionation ON                           
Political engagement -0.76 0.07 -10.58 -0.57 0.02 -36.81   -0.74 0.07 -10.36 -0.57 0.02 -35.99 
Social trust       -0.03 0.01 -5.97         -0.03 0.01 -5.98 
External efficacy       -0.04 0.01 -3.08         -0.04 0.02 -2.80 
Identity threat       0.08 0.03 2.35         0.09 0.03 2.53 
Meeet socially        -0.07 0.02 -4.17         -0.06 0.02 -3.64 
  
                          
Ideological identity ON                           
Attentiveness 0.39 0.08 5.08         0.40 0.08 5.14       
Political engagement       0.29 0.02 17.00         0.29 0.02 17.03 
Social trust -0.12 0.03 -4.59 -0.03 0.01 -5.14   -0.12 0.03 -4.52 -0.03 0.01 -5.11 
External efficacy       -0.08 0.01 -5.96         -0.08 0.01 -5.88 
Opinionation       0.11 0.01 9.08         0.11 0.01 9.10 
Identity threat 0.19 0.08 2.33 0.13 0.03 4.03   0.16 0.08 1.97 0.13 0.03 3.95 
  
                          
Demographics                           
Male               -0.18 0.08 -2.28 -0.22 0.02 -13.65 
Young               0.29 0.10 2.83 0.09 0.02 3.91 
                            
FIT .931/.957/.033   .932/.964/.033     .919/.947/.034   .916/.953/.035   
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Civic engagement 
In the previous set of models, no differences in tendency to participate were evident between minority 
and non-minority groups. Men were identified as slightly more likely to be engaged in these forms of 
activity than women. Younger people were less likely to be involved than older people (although this 
was not significant at the 1% level).  
 
Directly comparing men and women, no clear differences in tendency to be engaged in civic activities 
are evident between men and women (table 2.26). As with the models for voting, conventional and 
non-conventional participation, there are some differences in the indirect paths via opinionation and 
ideological identity. The effect of external efficacy is only significant for men, and the effect of 
identity threat on opinionation is stronger for men than for women. Women’s ideological identity and 
level of opinionation are both partially influenced by the extent that they meet others socially.  
 
When the remaining demographics are added, young men are shown to be significantly more likely to 
be involved than older men, whereas there are no equivalent differences between older and younger 
people when considering women. Having adjusted for age and ethnicity, the lower levels of 
opinionation amongst women who feel their identity is under threat is no longer significant.  
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Table 2.26. Civic engagement                           
  Model 1   Model 2 
  Male Female   Male Female 
Civic engagement B SE Z B SE Z   B SE Z B SE Z 
                            
Civic ON                           
Attentiveness 0.21 0.03 6.23 0.21 0.04 5.96   0.26 0.04 6.98 0.23 0.04 6.17 
Political engagement 0.27 0.03 9.69 0.30 0.03 11.00   0.25 0.03 8.81 0.29 0.03 10.43 
Institutional trust -0.03 0.01 -3.39 -0.05 0.01 -5.55   -0.03 0.01 -2.81 -0.05 0.01 -5.46 
Social trust 0.15 0.01 17.94 0.16 0.01 21.18   0.15 0.01 17.23 0.17 0.01 20.98 
External efficacy 0.22 0.02 9.24 0.23 0.02 11.37   0.21 0.02 8.95 0.23 0.02 11.15 
Opinionation -0.08 0.02 -4.73 -0.12 0.01 -8.71   -0.08 0.02 -4.95 -0.11 0.01 -8.05 
Ideological identity  -0.07 0.02 -4.71 -0.07 0.02 -4.49   -0.07 0.02 -4.34 -0.07 0.02 -4.27 
Identity threat 0.15 0.04 3.51 0.17 0.04 4.16   0.17 0.04 3.77 0.18 0.04 4.15 
Meet socially 0.07 0.02 3.28 0.07 0.02 3.41   0.06 0.02 2.97 0.07 0.02 3.24 
  
                          
Opinionation ON                           
Political engagement -0.52 0.02 -22.95 -0.56 0.02 -30.19   -0.52 0.02 -22.34 -0.56 0.02 -29.74 
Social trust -0.04 0.01 -5.25 -0.03 0.01 -5.39   -0.04 0.01 -5.10 -0.03 0.01 -4.96 
External efficacy -0.09 0.02 -3.99         -0.09 0.02 -4.11       
Identity threat 0.16 0.04 3.66 0.08 0.04 2.03   0.13 0.05 2.72 0.05 0.04 1.26 
Meet socially       -0.08 0.02 -4.17         -0.08 0.02 -3.93 
  
                          
Ideological identity ON                           
Political engagement 0.31 0.02 13.40 0.26 0.02 11.32   0.31 0.02 13.33 0.26 0.02 11.27 
Social trust -0.03 0.01 -3.72 -0.03 0.01 -4.54   -0.03 0.01 -3.39 -0.03 0.01 -4.48 
External efficacy -0.10 0.02 -4.80 -0.07 0.02 -3.76   -0.10 0.02 -4.97 -0.07 0.02 -3.57 
Opinionation 0.13 0.02 7.03 0.10 0.02 6.31   0.12 0.02 6.67 0.10 0.02 6.37 
Identity threat 0.19 0.04 4.58 0.17 0.04 4.21   0.13 0.04 2.98 0.13 0.04 3.16 
Meet socially       0.04 0.02 2.06         0.04 0.02 1.91 
                            
Demographics                           
Minority               -0.06 0.05 -1.10 -0.05 0.06 -0.83 
Young               0.09 0.03 2.62 0.00 0.03 0.02 
                            
FIT .929/.961/.033   .937/.966/.032     .920/.954/.033   .930/.960/.032   
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As with the other forms of participation, there are more clear differences when comparing younger 
people to older people (table 2.27). For younger people, attentiveness to political issues in the media, 
institutional trust, political opinionation, ideological identity, feeling their identity is at threat, and 
meting others socially are not linked to civic engagement, whereas for older individuals these are 
shown to be important. Instead, participation is only driven by engagement with politics, social trust 
and external efficacy. The same indirect effects are evident. This means that opinionation is only 
driven by political interest and identity threat when considering younger people (and the effect of 
identity threat is stronger than for older people).  
 
The drivers of ideological identity are also the same, with younger people less likely to hold an 
extreme ideological position if they are attentive to political issues in the media, but much more likely 
than older people to hold an extreme ideological position if they are more engaged with politics. The 
less extreme ideological identity amongst those with higher levels of social trust is more clearly 
apparent when considering younger people, whilst those who feel their identity is under threat are 
more likely to have a more extreme ideological identity if they are younger. Finally, no effect of 
external on ideological identity is identified when considering young people. No demographic 
differences between young and older people are evident. 
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Table 2.27. Civic engagement                           
  Model 1   Model 2 
  Young Old   Young Old 
Civic engagment B SE Z B SE Z   B SE Z B SE Z 
                            Civic ON                           
Attentiveness       0.28 0.03 9.88         0.29 0.03 9.96 
Political engagement 0.37 0.04 9.92 0.29 0.02 13.65   0.34 0.04 8.96 0.28 0.02 12.75 
Institutional trust       -0.05 0.01 -6.62         -0.04 0.01 -6.26 
Social trust 0.15 0.02 9.09 0.16 0.01 26.34   0.15 0.02 8.98 0.16 0.01 25.94 
External efficacy 0.22 0.04 5.66 0.22 0.02 13.44   0.23 0.04 5.96 0.22 0.02 13.27 
Opinionation       -0.12 0.01 -10.13         -0.11 0.01 -9.28 
Ideological identity        -0.08 0.01 -6.60         -0.07 0.01 -6.27 
Identity threat       0.17 0.03 5.21         0.19 0.03 5.62 
Meet socially       0.08 0.02 4.87         0.07 0.02 4.63 
                            Opinionation ON                           
Political engagement -0.62 0.04 -15.97 -0.60 0.02 -36.05   -0.61 0.04 -15.44 -0.59 0.02 -34.62 
Social trust       -0.03 0.01 -6.01         -0.03 0.01 -5.93 
External efficacy       -0.04 0.02 -2.77         -0.04 0.02 -2.45 
Identity threat 0.32 0.07 4.54 0.09 0.03 2.87   0.25 0.08 3.17 0.07 0.03 2.15 
Meet socially       -0.07 0.02 -4.27         -0.06 0.02 -3.83 
                            Ideological identity ON                           
Attentiveness -0.28 0.10 -2.78         -0.30 0.11 -2.83       
Political engagement 0.54 0.08 7.24 0.28 0.02 15.61   0.56 0.08 7.31 0.28 0.02 15.45 
Social trust -0.09 0.02 -5.77 -0.03 0.01 -4.97   -0.09 0.02 -5.41 -0.03 0.01 -4.85 
External efficacy       -0.08 0.02 -5.74         -0.08 0.02 -5.61 
Opinionation 0.17 0.03 4.85 0.11 0.01 8.41   0.18 0.04 5.08 0.11 0.01 8.16 
Identity threat 0.26 0.08 3.47 0.15 0.03 4.89   0.19 0.08 2.35 0.11 0.03 3.50 
Meet socially 0.12 0.04 2.73         0.12 0.05 2.72       
                            Demographics                           
Minority               0.04 0.09 0.42 -0.08 0.04 -1.77 
Male               0.12 0.04 3.08 0.04 0.02 2.16 
                            FIT .949/.969/.029   .930/.964/.033     .939/.961/.031   .926/.958/.033   
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Finally, considering differences between minority and non-minority individuals (table 2.28), for 
minorities civic engagement is only driven by engagement with politics and social trust. In contrast, 
for non-minorities the full list of influences is evident. Turning to the indirect effects via opinionation 
and ideological identity, the same set of differences is evident. For both groups, those who are 
engaged with politics are more likely to hold an opinion. For the majority, higher levels of social trust 
and external efficacy are also associated with a stronger opinion. Opinionation is also driven by 
whether people feel their identity is under threat, with those that do feel their identity is under threat 
being more likely to report don’t know to these questions. In contrast, for minority groups these 
associations are not significant.  
 
The processes determining the strength of someone’s ideological identity are also different to the 
majority, with no differences based on political engagement, external efficacy, and opinionation. For 
minority individuals those who are more attentive to politics in the media are more likely to have a 
more extreme ideological position. In contrast, no similar path is evident when considering non-
minorities. Non-minority men are more likely to be civically engaged than women people, however 
no equivalent differences is evident when considering minority groups. No differences are evident 
based on age between the two groups.  
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Table 2.28. Civic engagement                           
  Model 1   Model 2 
  Minority Non-minority   Minority Non-minority 
Civic engagement B SE Z B SE Z   B SE Z B SE Z 
                            Civic ON                           
Attentiveness       0.23 0.03 8.84         0.25 0.03 8.90 
Political engagement 0.61 0.07 9.38 0.29 0.02 14.16   0.63 0.07 9.29 0.27 0.02 12.89 
Institutional trust       -0.04 0.01 -5.93         -0.04 0.01 -5.83 
Social trust 0.11 0.02 4.64 0.16 0.01 27.21   0.11 0.02 4.67 0.16 0.01 27.11 
External efficacy       0.23 0.02 14.34         0.23 0.02 14.34 
Opinionation       -0.10 0.01 -9.38         -0.10 0.01 -8.89 
Ideological identity        -0.07 0.01 -6.03         -0.07 0.01 -5.92 
Identity threat       0.19 0.03 5.81         0.19 0.03 5.75 
Meet socially       0.06 0.02 4.32         0.06 0.02 4.25 
                            Opinionation ON                           
Political engagement -0.77 0.07 -10.53 -0.57 0.02 -36.74   -0.74 0.07 -10.31 -0.57 0.02 -35.93 
Social trust       -0.03 0.01 -5.95         -0.03 0.01 -5.96 
External efficacy       -0.05 0.02 -3.10         -0.04 0.02 -2.81 
Identity threat       0.08 0.03 2.34         0.09 0.03 2.52 
Meet socially       -0.07 0.02 -4.16         -0.06 0.02 -3.64 
                            Ideological identity ON                           
Attentiveness 0.39 0.08 5.08         0.41 0.08 5.14       
Political engagement       0.28 0.02 17.00         0.29 0.02 17.03 
Social trust -0.11 0.03 -4.48 -0.03 0.01 -5.14   -0.11 0.03 -4.36 -0.03 0.01 -5.12 
External efficacy       -0.09 0.01 -5.95         -0.08 0.01 -5.87 
Opinionation       0.11 0.01 9.07         0.11 0.01 9.09 
Identity threat 0.19 0.08 2.38 0.13 0.03 4.03   0.17 0.08 2.03 0.13 0.03 3.95 
                            Demographics                           
Male               -0.01 0.08 -0.12 0.06 0.02 3.52 
Young               0.10 0.10 1.00 0.04 0.02 1.61 
                            FIT .925/.955/.034   .933/.964/.032     .915/.946/.035   .917/.953/.035   
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CHAPTER 3: EXPLORING THE MACRO PROCESS INFLUENCNG 
DEMOGRATIC OWNERSHIP AND PARTICIPATION USING MULTILEVEL 
MODELLING 
 
 
Having explored the psychological processes driving political participation, we now extend the scope of 
the analysis to examine the broader macro socio-political influences on participation. The hierarchical 
nature of the in-scope survey data sets (individuals nested within regions, within countries) lends itself 
naturally to a multi-level analysis framework. This enables a partitioning of variation in outcomes of 
interest to the three key levels of individual, region and country. This allows us to identify the proportion 
of the variation in electoral participation that is a function of an individual’s personal characteristics, and 
what proportion is due to the socio-political system within which they are located. Characteristics of 
countries which influence citizenship participation at the individual level – either directly, or indirectly – 
are then incorporated into these models to link the socio-political assessments of workpackage 3 to the 
psychological models of workpackage 4 (outlined in chapter 2).  
 
 
3.1: MULTILEVEL MODELS 
To explore how differences in the socio-political context of different countries manifest in individual 
variations in political participation we estimate a series of increasingly complex multilevel models. 
Multilevel models enable us to account properly for the non-independence between respondents from the 
same country, and to model heterogeneity in levels of participation between countries as a function of our 
derived macro indicators. When using ESS data, the multilevel model is extended to also include 
information on clustering of respondents within regions, adding a further level of complexity that allows 
for the possibility that experiences are systematically different across different regions from within the 
same country.  
 
Models are specified with a random intercept and random coefficients, meaning that each country is 
allowed to have its own mean level of political participation and the coefficients for the individual level 
covariates are allowed to take on different values in different countries. Models using ESS data also allow 
for differences between regions within each country, but this is restricted to variation in the intercept 
(reflecting the lack of regional level contextual data). Reflecting the binary nature of all of our dependent 
variables, the logistic regression extension to the standard multilevel model is adopted here. The full 
model for conventional participation is denoted in equation 3.1.10   
 
Log  piijk1-piijk  = β0ijk + β1kx1ijk + α1w1k + α2w1kx1ijk                            [3.1] 
β0ijk = β + 0k+  
β1k = β	 + 1k         
 
Here Log  piijk1-piijk is the log of the odds of participation for the ith individual in the jth region of the kth 
country, β0ijk is the intercept, and β1jk is the regression coefficient for individual i in region j of country k 
for the individual level covariate x1ijk. α1 is the regression coefficient for the country level covariate, w1k, 
in country k, and α2 is the cross level interaction between the individual covariate, x1ijk, and the country 
covariate, w1k. The second and third lines of equation 1 define the random part of the model: v0k is the 
country level error for the random intercept, and u0jk is the equivalent region level error. v1k is the country 
level error for the regression coefficient β1, indicating that the individual coefficient is allowed to vary 
                                               
10
 A detailed explanation of multilevel modeling is given in Goldstein, (2003). 
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across countries. These random effects are assumed to have means of zero and normally distributed 
variances denoted, σv02, σu02, and σv12 respectively, as well as the covariance between the random intercept 
and the random coefficient, σv01.  
 
To estimate the relative contribution of countries (and regions) to individual differences in political 
participation we assume that the individual variation follows the standard logistic distribution with a 
variance of pi
2
3
 . This assumption enables the straightforward calculation of the proportion of variance 
attributable to countries (equation 3.2).  
 
σv0
2
σv0
2 +σu0
2 +pi
2
3

                  [3.2] 
 
All models are estimated using the MlWiN modeling software and adopt a second order PQL estimation 
procedure (for full details of this approach, as well as further information on the estimation of the 
contribution of countries, see Goldstein, 2003). 
 
 
3.2: DATA 
To explore cross-national variations in levels of political participation and engagement, data from three 
surveys is used. The European Social Survey (ESS) provides excellent coverage of political participation 
across Europe, and acts as our starting point to examine cross-national variation. The clustered nature of 
the survey within each country also enables us to examine variations across regions within countries, 
further extending our understanding of the heterogeneity between individuals from different areas of the 
same country. However, with only 20 countries the ESS does not have a sufficient sample at the country 
level to explore macro models of participation (Garry, 2011).  
 
As a result, we also draw on data from the World Values Survey (WVS) and the International Social 
Survey Programme (ISSP). Whilst the WVS only contains sufficient data on levels of voting in each 
country, this data is available from 42 different countries. This allows us to specify more complex random 
coefficient models which relax the assumption that the processes influencing forms of political 
participation are the same in each country. 42 countries also gives us sufficient analytic power to identify 
basic patterns of differences between countries based on their socio-political structure.  
 
The ISSP contains data on conventional and non-conventional participation, and civic engagement. This 
also contains data from 39 countries, again making it more suitable for complex multilevel analyses. 
However, like the WVS this contains relatively few independent variables describing the mechanisms that 
influence participation.  
 
Measuring political participation 
Like chapter 2, four different types of political participation are measured in this analysis; voting; 
conventional participation; non-conventional participation; and civic engagement. This allows us to 
explore more general differences in the propensity to vote within and across countries, whilst also 
incorporating other forms of political participation that may be more common amongst particular 
subgroups in society.  
 
In both the ESS and WVS voting is measured using a single item included in the survey asking 
respondents whether they participated in the last national election. This is restricted to those respondents 
that were eligible to vote in the previous election. No equivalent measure of voting is available in the 
ISSP.   
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Conventional political participation covers a range of activities directly related to involvement with a 
particular political party, and is measured in the same way in the ESS and ISSP. This covers working in a 
political party; wearing a campaign badge or sticker; donating money to a political organisation; and 
being a member of a political party. To retain consistency with the ESS models outlined in chapter 2, we 
also include contacting a politician in our measure of conventional political participation. Individuals are 
identified as participating in conventional political activities if they report doing any of the highlighted 
activities within the last year. 
 
Measures of non-conventional participation are included in the ESS and ISSP. This captures involvement 
in other activities not traditionally associated with political engagement. This covers minor forms of 
involvement including signing a petition and boycotting particular products for political reasons, as well 
as more significant forms of participation including involvement in lawful and illegal protest activities. 
Like conventional forms of participation we distinguish here between those not involved in any form of 
activity, and those that have been involved in any form of activity irrespective of how serious it is. The 
ISSP also includes two additional activities not covered by the ESS: contacting the media; and joining an 
internet political forum. Less than 5% of all respondents have been involved in either of these additional 
activities in the past year.   
 
Finally, to capture civic engagement we use a number of survey items covering involvement in various 
forms of activity (these measures are again available in the ESS and ISSP). The full list of activities 
covers involvement in: trade unions; business, professional and farmers organisations; humanitarian and 
human rights activities; environmental protection, peace and human rights; outdoor activity clubs; cultural 
and hobby organisations; religious and church organisations; science, education and teaching social clubs; 
and other voluntary organisations. Due to the relatively low numbers involved in each form of activity, 
we again make the simple distinction between any form of involvement and no involvement. Information 
on all activities is included in the ESS, however a smaller group of activities is included in the ISSP, 
covering membership in a trade union, church (or other religious organization), sport club, or other group.  
 
Independent variables 
Across the three surveys a range of different variables have been identified to capture both the 
psychological and social drivers of political engagement discussed in chapter 2. These have been 
combined using Principal Components Analysis (PCA) to produce more general indices of the process 
influencing political participation.11 All PCA show good discriminant validity. 
 
In addition to measures intended to capture the psychological processes that lead individuals to participate 
in political activity, we also include basic demographic details about each respondent. This allows us to 
explore whether women and young people are differentially influenced by socio-political factors. The 
ESS also enables us to explore differences between minority groups and the majority population of each 
country (equivalent data is not available in the ISSP or WVS), however only 4% of the total sample 
identify themselves as belonging to a minority group within their country, limiting the extent that we are 
able to capture differences in participation amongst this group.  
 
European Social Survey 
Analyses using the ESS draw on the same range of independent variables included in chapter 2. This 
covers political engagement, attentiveness, external efficacy, institutional trust, social capital (social trust 
and meeting people socially), ideological identity, and political opinionation. Table 3.1 includes details of 
the rotated component scores from the PCA.  
                                               
11
 This is analogous to the SEM approach adopted in chapter 2, however is done in a 2 stage process. Current SEM 
procedures do not allow for the straightforward inclusion of higher levels of influence, with initial exploratory 
analyses using the ESS failing to estimate.  
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Table 3.1.  Independent variables – European Social Survey 
Component 
scores 
Political attentiveness  
  TV watching, news/ politics/current affairs on average weekday  .704 
  Radio listening, news/ politics/current affairs on average weekday  .688 
  Newspaper reading, politics/current affairs on average weekday  .731 
Political engagement  
  How interested in politics .783 
  How often discuss politics/current affairs  .703 
  Politics too complicated to understand .659 
  Could take an active role in a group involved with political issues  .661 
  Making mind up about political issues  .718 
External efficacy   
  Politicians in general care what people like respondent think  .896 
  Politicians are interested in votes rather than people's opinions .896 
Institutional trust   
  Trust in the police .815 
  Trust in country's parliament .789 
  Trust in the legal system .876 
  Trust in the United Nations .714 
Social trust   
  Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful  .834 
  Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair  .848 
  Most of the time people helpful or mostly looking out for themselves .793 
 
International Social Survey Programme – Citizenship module 
The ISSP includes a smaller set of independent variables that capture the range of potential drivers of 
political participation and democratic ownership. These cover political engagement, attentiveness, 
external efficacy, institutional trust and social trust. Like the ESS, where multiple indicators of the same 
latent concept are available, these have been combined using PCA, see table 3.2 for details of component 
scores 
 
Following the ESS political interest and internal efficacy are combined to produce a single measure of 
political engagement. Interest in politics is represented by a general measure of political interest, and a 
second measure determining how frequently people discuss political issues with friends. Both items are 
measured on 4 point likert scales, with higher scores reflecting more interest. Two further items are 
included that capture internal efficacy, asking people whether they think they have a good understanding 
of political issues, and whether they believe they are better informed about politics than other people 
(both recorded on a 5 point likert-scale so that higher scores reflecting more efficacy).   
 
Four items are used to measure attentiveness to political issues in the media, each measured on a 5 point 
scale from never (0) to frequently (4). These cover engagement with politics in newspapers, television, 
the radio, and the internet. 
 
The ISSP includes two items covering levels of external efficacy that are broadly comparable to those 
from the ESS. The first asks whether respondents believe that people have any influence on what the 
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government does, and the second whether they believe the government cares what people think (both are 
measured on a 5 point likert-scale, recoded so that higher scores mean higher efficacy). 
 
Two items are used to measure social trust, closely resembling those used in the ESS. The first asks 
whether the respondent believes that people tend to take advantage of one another or act fairly, measured 
on a 5 point scale with higher scores reflecting more positive attitudes towards other people. The second 
item asks whether people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful. This is also measured on a 5 point 
scale, and has been re-coded so that higher scores represent more trust.  
 
Finally, a single item is used to measure institutional trust. This asks whether people agree that the 
government can mostly be trusted, and has been recoded to create a binary indicator of institutional trust.  
 
Table 3.2.  Independent variables - ISSP 
Component 
scores 
Political attentiveness  
  TV watching, frequency of watching news/ politics/current affairs  .748 
  Radio listening, frequency of listening to news/ politics/current affairs .703 
  Newspaper reading, frequency of reading news/ politics/current affairs .789 
  Internet use, frequency of reading news/ politics/current affairs .494 
Political engagement  
  How interested in politics .816 
  How often discuss politics/current affairs  .787 
  I have a good understanding of political issues .660 
  I am more informed than most people about politics .587 
External efficacy   
  I have an influence over what the government does  .864 
  The government cares what I think .864 
Social trust   
  Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful  .792 
  Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair  .792 
 
World Values Survey 
The WVS includes fewer independent variables, capturing political interest, social trust and ideological 
identity. The reduced list of independent variables leaves open the possibility that some effects are 
overestimated because of a lack of sufficient controls, however it is unlikely to impact on the magnitude 
of country effects.  
 
A single item measuring political interest is included. This has been recoded as a binary indicator those 
who are ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ interested in politics from those with ‘little’ or ‘no’ interest in politics.   
 
Social trust is measured with a single binary item asking respondents whether ‘most people can be 
trusted’ (1), or ‘you can’t be too careful’ (0) 
 
The WVS also includes a measure of ideological identity, measured on a 10 point scale. Adopting the 
same strategy used in the ESS (report 2), to capture extremity of ideological identity we distinguish those 
individuals who report having very strong political tendencies for the left or right from those that place 
themselves in the political middle ground. 
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3.3: MEASURING MACRO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COUNTRIES 
A large number of indicators are now available worldwide that characterise differences in the socio-
political structure of different countries (for a full list see the quality of government institute - 
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/). Two complementary sets of indices are used in this analysis, one derived 
from objective records held about each country, and one derived from expert interviews. Drawing on such 
differing sources of contextual data ensures we are capturing the broadest range of differences between 
countries, whilst the use of summary indices enables us to better capture the key socio-political 
dimensions of countries that have been posited to be linked to variations in political participation.  
 
Our first set of indicators is the ‘Country indicators for Foreign Policy’ dataset (CIFP). CIFP identify six 
dimensions of governance and democracy at the country level that they broadly label as: democratic 
participation; government and economic efficiency; accountability; human rights; political stability and 
violence; and rule of law (for full details, see appendix C.1). These are themselves composed of a range 
of indicators from international databases including the World Bank, Polity IV, world development 
indicators; and the CIRI human rights index.  
 
Democratic participation captures the extent that each political structure is democratic, including 
measures of party dominance, legislature fractionalisation, a democracy score, the proportion of female 
parliamentarians, the proportion of minorities in public service, and data on minority voting rights. 
Government and economic efficiency focuses more closely on the economic structure of each country, 
including measures of growth and debt, economic freedom, ease of trading with other countries, 
unemployment levels, tax rates, government effectiveness, and educational attainment. Accountability 
captures the extent that the political system is accountable to the public, including data on the level of 
corruption, political freedom, and the number of political donations. Human rights focuses specifically on 
the human rights credentials of each country, documenting the number of disappearances, the extent of 
torture, freedom of speech, women’s political and social rights, civil liberties, the degree of minority 
presence in government, and level of access to education. Political stability and violence attempts to 
capture the degree of stability in the political system including information on years since a regime 
change, the size of the black market, degree of dependence on external support, and measures of political 
fragmentation. Finally Rule of law documents the size of the prison population and occupancy rating, 
information on property rights, and level of judicial independence.   
 
Within each domain, all countries are ranked according to scores on each of the composite indicators, 
with scores ranging from 1 to 9 and higher scores representing poorer performing countries (for more 
information on the construction of these indices, readers are directed to http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/).  
 
The second series of country level indicators are derived from a series of interviews undertaken by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit (Kekic, 2007) with experts from each country, combined with survey data 
from the WVS and Eurobarometer. Here they produce a five category indicator of democracy capturing: 
electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and 
political culture (for full details, see appendix C.1). 
 
Electoral process and pluralism covers the extent that the electoral process is fair and open to all 
members of society. Functioning of government details how the government operates, including the 
influence of foreign powers, whether there is a clear system of checks and balances, the extent of 
corruption, and the level of public confidence in the government. Political participation incorporates 
details of voter turnout at elections, the degree of autonomy amongst minorities, the level of 
representation of women, and the extent that the public are prepared to participate in lawful 
demonstrations. Democratic political culture includes details on the level of societal consensus and 
cohesion, perceptions of leadership and democracy, and the degree of popular support for democracy. 
Finally, civil liberties includes information on whether there is a free press, and freedom of speech, 
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whether the state uses torture, and the degree of religious freedom. Here, higher scores represent better 
performing countries, therefore interpretation of the direction of effects is opposite to the CIFP variables. 
This provides us with a very different way of classifying our countries that does not rely on objective 
indicators based on structural characteristics of each country. By looking at both types of indicator, we are 
therefore able to provide a more thorough assessment of how country characteristics impact on the 
propensity for residents to participate in politics.    
 
The ESS data also allows us to explore differences between regions within the same country. However, 
no equivalent external sources of data are available about regions within each country (and the varying 
definitions of regions across countries limits the extent that they are comparable), meaning this is 
restricted to simple estimation of the contribution of regional differences to overall variations in 
participation.    
 
 
3.4: ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
For each of our measures of participation (voting, conventional, non-conventional, and civic engagement) 
we begin by estimating a variance components model including no individual fixed effects (model 1). 
This model partitions the variance in each measure of participation between countries (and regions within 
countries when using the ESS), providing an initial assessment of the extent that levels of participation 
differ within and across countries. This also offers an indication of the extent to which unobserved 
country characteristics might be contributing to variations in participation rates and acting as a baseline 
comparison for subsequent models. This is followed by a ‘random intercept’ model including all 
independent variables that have been identified as predictive of different forms of participation, as well as 
the demographic controls (model 2). Here we are estimating the ‘cluster specific’ relationship between the 
included covariates and each outcome of interest/  
 
The restriction of the ESS to 20 countries means that it is not possible to specify additional contextual 
models with this data. As a result, subsequent models are only assessed using the ISSP (for conventional 
participation, non-conventional participation, and civic engagement) and the WVS (for voting). In model 
3 we allow all individual demographic variables to vary across countries, with each ‘random coefficient’ 
estimated separately before estimating all significant coefficients simultaneously (Hox, 2002). Significant 
random coefficients indicate that the magnitude of an individual relationship with participation varies 
significantly across the sample of countries, suggesting that socio-political differences between countries 
may also modifying individual drivers of participation. 
 
Despite the increased range of countries included in the ISSP and WVS, data is only available for a 
limited number of countries (39 in the ISSP and 42 in the WVS). This restricted sample size at the 
country level limits the extent that we can specify complex macro-level models to explain this observed 
variability in participation between countries (Garry, 2010). As a result, to assess country differences we 
begin by introducing separate dimensions of the political and economic structure of each country (models 
4-9 for CIFP, and models 4-8 using the EIU data). This provides us with an initial assessment of the 
particular socio-political dimensions that may be influencing individual residents propensity to engage, 
whether formally or informally, with political decisions. As is common with cross-national research using 
a relatively small number of countries, many of the identified macro-characteristics are correlated with 
one another, therefore any significant effects of particular variables must be viewed only as indicative of 
the influence of macro structural differences on political engagement. 
 
Finally, we explore possible interaction effects between each of our structural characteristics and the 
individual level variables for which a significant random coefficient was detected in model 3. This 
enables us to identify the socio-political characteristics which moderate individual relationships with 
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participation, directly linking these contextual processes back to the individual level psychological 
explanations that have been posited to describe variations in political participation. 
 
 
3.5: RESULTS 
The following section includes details of the results from a sequence of multilevel logistic regression 
models exploring contextual variations in propensity to participate in the political process, whether via 
conventional or non-conventional routes. Each form of participation in considered separately, drawing on 
all available sources of data.   
 
Voting 
Looking first at voting, table 3.3 includes estimates from two models using ESS data. Model 1 includes 
details of the variance partitioned between countries and regions. This reveals significant variations in the 
levels of voting between countries, accounting for approximately 7% of the total variation. In contrast, 
relatively little variation is attributable to differences between regions within countries, which account for 
less than 2% of the variability in voting levels.  
 
Table 3.3. Voting 
  Model 1   Model 2 
  Effect SE   Effect SE 
Odds 
ratio 
FIXED EFFECTS 
  
Cons 1.56 0.12 2.10 0.12 
Minority -0.49 0.09 0.61 
Male -0.21 0.04 0.81 
Young  
   
-1.45 0.05 0.23 
Attentiveness 
   
0.21 0.02 1.23 
Political engagement 0.42 0.02 1.52 
External efficacy 0.14 0.02 1.15 
Institutional trust 0.16 0.02 1.17 
Social trust 0.09 0.02 1.10 
Opinionation 0.03 0.05 1.03 
Ideological identity  0.31 0.05 1.37 
Meet socially 0.02 0.04 1.02 
Identity threat 
   
-0.34 0.07 0.71 
       RANDOM EFFECTS 
Country 0.253 0.085 0.239 0.083 
Region 0.067 0.013   0.062 0.015   
 
Model 2 includes the range of individual fixed effects first identified in chapter 2. Here, the random 
effects at the country and region level correspond to the variance adjusting for individual differences, with 
countries now accounting for 6.7% of the remaining variance in voting levels. Regions are again shown to 
contribute relatively little to explaining variations in voting. The fixed effect estimates largely correspond 
to those from the SEM analysis in chapter 2. Young people, minority groups, and men within each 
country are less likely to have voted in the most recent election. Voting levels are higher amongst those 
who are more attentive to political issues and engaged with politics. People are also slightly more likely to 
vote if they have higher levels of external efficacy, institutional trust, social trust, and those with a more 
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extreme ideological identity. In contrast, those who feel their identity is under threat are less likely to 
vote. No influence of political opinionation is identified with the current models. 
 
The World Values Survey also records details of whether people voted in the most recent election within 
their country. The WVS benefits from a larger sample of countries than the ESS (42), enabling a more 
detailed examination of the potential macro-level influences on voting. This also allows us to examine the 
extent that individual relationships with voting are the same across all countries. Table 3.4 includes 
details from three models exploring variations in voting from the WVS. Model 1 details how variations in 
voting are partitioned across countries, revealing considerably more variability than was evident when 
considering ESS data. Here, country differences account for approximately 18.7% of the total variation. 
This increase in variance is likely to reflect the increased range of countries included in the WVS, with 
the ESS restricted to a relatively homogenous group of European countries.  
 
Table 3.4. Voting 
  Model 1   Model 2 Model 3 
  Effect SE   Effect SE 
Odds 
ratio   Effect SE 
Odds 
ratio 
FIXED EFFECTS 
Cons 1.22 0.13 1.23 0.14 1.28 0.18 
Male 0.13 0.03 1.13 0.05 0.05 1.05 
Young  -1.63 0.03 0.20 -1.56 0.12 0.21 
Political interest 0.71 0.03 2.03 0.70 0.07 2.01 
Social trust 0.22 0.03 1.24 0.23 0.05 1.25 
Ideological identity 
   
0.11 0.03 1.12 
 
0.11 0.06 1.11 
  
          RANDOM 
EFFECTS 
Country 0.755 0.165 0.780 0.174 1.236 0.233 
 
Model 2 includes the subset of fixed effects available in the WVS. This indicates that young people are 
approximately 1/5 as likely to vote as older people (adjusting for the voting age within each country), and 
that levels of participation are twice as high amongst those identified as ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ interested in 
politics. Voting is also higher amongst those who have greater levels of social trust, and a more extreme 
ideological identity. In contrast to the ESS, men are identified as slightly more likely than women to vote 
using WVS data. This is likely to reflect the reduced range of control variables available in the WVS, 
with the bivariate association between gender and voting in the ESS also identifying men as more likely 
to vote (see descriptives in chapter 1). Having adjusted for these individual differences in participation, 
country difference account for 19.2% of the remaining variability in voting levels. 
 
Finally, model 3 relaxes the assumption that all individual differences in voting are consistent across 
countries, allowing for a different relationship in each country. Underlined coefficients are those that have 
been identified as varying significantly across countries. Reflecting the random co-efficient model 
specification, the country random effect now corresponds to the variation between countries for the 
reference category: an older female who is not interested in politics, has low levels of social trust, and a 
less extreme ideological identity. Compared to this group, country differences are less important for men, 
those who are interested in politics, and those with a stronger ideological identity. Country differences are 
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no more or less evident for younger people, and are more important for those with higher levels of social 
trust.12 
 
All included fixed effects are shown to vary across countries, indicating that the drivers of voting are not 
consistent across countries. To assess the magnitude of these differences across countries, table 3.5 
includes details of the range of each estimate across the middle 95% of all countries included in the 
WVS.13 This demonstrates that the magnitude of each effect varies considerably across countries. Men are 
shown to be more likely to vote in some countries, and less likely to vote in others, whereas young people 
are consistently identified as less likely to vote (albeit with varying magnitudes). In most cases, those who 
are more interested in politics are more likely to vote, however in a small proportion of countries the 
effect is close to 0, or even negative. Similarly, whilst social trust and a more extreme ideological identity 
increases voter tendency in most countries, the effect is reversed in some countries.  
 
Table 3.5. Voting 
  Bottom 2.5% Average Effect Top 2.5% 
Male -0.53 0.05 0.62 
Young  -3.03 -1.56 -0.09 
Political interest -0.06 0.70 1.46 
Social trust -0.27 0.23 0.72 
Ideological identity -0.46 0.11 0.68 
 
The random coefficient model also includes details of the covariance between the intercept and each 
included random coefficient. For simplicity of exposition, we merely describe these effects in the text. A 
negative covariance term is estimated between the intercept and the random coefficient for gender 
indicating that the positive gender gap will tend to be smaller in countries where levels of voting are 
higher than average. Therefore, in countries where women are more likely to vote, there will be less 
noticeable differences in voter turnout between men and women. A negative covariance term is also 
estimated with the random coefficient for age. Reflecting the lower levels of voting amongst younger 
respondents, this means that in countries where older people are more likely than average to vote, younger 
people will be even less likely than average to vote, further increasing the gap in voter turnout. This also 
means that in countries with lower voter turnout, low turnout will be most strongly evident amongst older 
residents.  
 
Negative covariance terms are evident for both political interest and ideological identity. Here the 
interpretation is the same as the interpretation for gender. Countries where those who are less interested in 
politics are more likely than average to vote (and likewise where those with a more centrist ideological 
identity are more likely to vote) will have a weaker positive effect of political interest (and ideological 
identity). In other words, in countries with higher voter turnout, there are less noticeable differences in 
voting tendency based on political interest and ideological identity.  
 
Finally, a positive covariance term is estimated between the intercept variance and the coefficient 
variance for social trust. As a result of the positive effect of social trust on voting, this covariance term 
means that in countries where those with low levels of social trust are more likely to vote, the positive 
effect of social trust will be larger than average. As a result, there will be a larger gap based on social trust 
in countries with higher than average voter turnout.   
                                               
12
 These differences in the magnitude of the country variance component are calculated using the variance function 
VF =  σu02  + 2σu01 + x2σu12  (for full details see Goldstein, 2003).  
13
 This is calculated using the methodology outlined in Snijders and Bosker (1999: 85) as:  Range = β1 ± 1.96*σu12  
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To explore further why these variations in overall levels of voting, and the magnitude of individual 
drivers of voting, are evident, table 3.6 and 3.7 introduce the range of macro variables describing 
differences in the overall socio-political structure of each country. Given the relatively small sample of 
countries available for this analysis, these are included independently. Possible interactions are then 
explored between significant macro effects, and individual effects where a random coefficient was 
identified.  
 
Table 3.6 includes estimate from models incorporating the CIFP variables. Here, countries performing 
poorly were given a higher number, so a positive effect indicates that poorer performing countries on a 
given metric are more likely to vote. No significant associations with any of the included variables is 
identified, suggesting that whilst country differences in voting are clearly evident, they do not closely 
correspond to the chosen macro socio-political dimensions of each country. However, whilst not quite 
reaching conventional levels of significance, there is some suggestion that people are less likely to vote in 
countries where democratic participation is low, and that people are more likely to vote in countries that 
are less politically stable (both significant at p<.1). The link between democratic participation and voting 
is not surprising, reflecting the reduced opportunities for people to exercise their democratic freedom in 
countries scoring poorly on this variable. In contrast, the higher levels of voting in countries that are less 
politically stable may reflect a stronger perception in these countries that voting can have a real influence. 
Reflecting the lack of significant macro-effects, no cross-level interactions are specified. 
 
  
93
Table 3.6. Voting 
  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
  Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE 
FIXED EFFECTS 
Cons 1.16 0.15 1.23 0.15 1.25 0.15 1.25 0.15 1.26 0.14 1.25 0.15 
Male 0.15 0.03 0.15 0.03 0.15 0.03 0.15 0.03 0.15 0.03 0.15 0.03 
Young  -1.62 0.03 -1.62 0.03 -1.62 0.03 -1.62 0.03 -1.62 0.03 -1.62 0.03 
Political interest 0.71 0.03 0.70 0.03 0.70 0.03 0.71 0.03 0.70 0.03 0.70 0.03 
Social trust 0.22 0.03 0.22 0.03 0.23 0.03 0.23 0.03 0.23 0.03 0.23 0.03 
Ideological identity 0.12 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.11 0.03 
  
            COUNTY EFFECTS 
Democratic participation -0.197 0.109 
Government efficiency -0.021 0.116 
Accountability 0.060 0.077 
Human rights 0.052 0.082 
Political stability 0.176 0.093 
Rule of Law 0.087 0.105 
             RANDOM EFFECTS 
            Country 0.763 0.175 0.822 0.188 0.814 0.186 0.821 0.188 0.758 0.174 0.810 0.185 
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Table 3.7 includes estimates from the EIU macro variables. Here, higher scores reflect countries that are 
performing better, therefore a positive effect indicates that residents of a country performing better are 
more likely to vote. Similar to the CIFP measures, no significant effects are identified using the EIU 
macro variables. Again, this suggests that the variations in voter turnout between countries can not be 
explained using these macro characteristics. As a result, not cross-level interactions with the random 
coefficients are specified.  
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Table 3.7. Voting 
  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE 
FIXED EFFECTS 
Cons 1.27 0.13 1.30 0.13 1.26 0.13 1.29 0.13 1.27 0.13 
Male 0.13 0.03 0.13 0.03 0.13 0.03 0.13 0.03 0.13 0.03 
Young  -1.64 0.03 -1.64 0.03 -1.64 0.03 -1.64 0.03 -1.64 0.03 
Political interest 0.70 0.03 0.70 0.03 0.70 0.03 0.70 0.03 0.70 0.03 
Social trust 0.23 0.03 0.23 0.03 0.23 0.03 0.22 0.03 0.22 0.03 
Ideological identity 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.03 
  
          COUNTY EFFECTS 
Civil liberties 0.075 0.060 
Democratic political culture -0.049 0.083 
Electoral process and Pluralism 0.063 0.054 
Functioning of Government 0.060 0.057 
Political participation 0.070 0.069 
RANDOM EFFECTS 
          Country 0.588 0.133 0.602 0.137 0.593 0.135 0.592 0.134 0.593 0.134 
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Conventional participation 
Similar measures of conventional participation are included in the ESS and the ISSP. Looking first at the 
ESS data, table 3.8 includes results from two models. Model 1 provides details of how variation in 
conventional participation is partitioned between countries and regions. Approximately 4.5% of the total 
variation in participation is attributable to differences between countries, with the unique contribution of 
regions lower at 1.5%. The contribution of countries is notably lower than when considering voting, 
suggesting more consistency across countries.  
 
Model 2 includes individual level fixed effects. This reveals no significant differences in participation 
between minority and non-minority groups, and no differences based on gender when other individual 
drivers of participation are included. Younger people are again identified as less likely to participate. 
Those who are more attentive to politics in the media are slightly more likely to participate than those 
who are not attentive, whilst there is a strong positive effect of political engagement on participation 
levels. There are also weaker positive effects of external efficacy and ideological identity, and those who 
feel that their identity is under threat are also more likely to participate. Having adjusted for the full range 
of individual differences in participation, country differences account for approximately 3.4% of the 
remaining variation in participation. This reduction in the contribution of country differences likely 
reflects differences of the composition of each country, with some apparent differences between each 
country actually reflecting differences actually reflecting differences in the sample of each country (for a 
full explanation of this effect, see Snijders and Bosker, 1999). 
 
Table 3.8. Conventional participation 
  Model 1   Model 2  
  Effect SE   Effect SE Odds ratio 
FIXED EFFECTS 
Cons -1.02 0.09 -1.17 0.09 
Minority -0.08 0.08 0.92 
Male -0.01 0.03 0.99 
Young  -0.09 0.04 0.91 
Attentiveness 0.06 0.01 1.06 
Political engagement 
   
0.74 0.02 2.09 
External efficacy 
   
0.15 0.02 1.16 
Institutional trust -0.08 0.02 0.93 
Social trust 0.05 0.02 1.05 
Opinionation 0.03 0.04 1.03 
Ideological identity  0.21 0.03 1.24 
Meet socially 0.06 0.03 1.06 
Identity threat 0.44 0.06 1.56 
RANDOM EFFECTS 
      Country 0.157 0.053 
 
0.117 0.042 
 Region 0.053 0.009   0.047 0.010   
 
To explore the potential country differences that may influence levels of participation, we draw on data 
from the ISSP (table 3.9). This uses a similar measure of conventional participation, but is asked in twice 
as many countries. Model 1 reveals a significantly larger contribution of between country differences that 
accounts for 15.6% of the total variation in levels of participation. This again reflects the more diverse 
range of countries available in the ISSP data when compared to the ESS. 
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Model 2 includes the available socio-demographic variables from the ISSP. The results are generally 
consistent with the ESS, with lower levels of participation amongst young people, and higher levels of 
participation amongst those with higher levels of external efficacy, political engagement, attentiveness, 
and social trust. There is also a (non-significant) reduction in participation amongst those who are more 
trusting in existing institutions, and men are significantly less likely to participate than women (this was 
not shown to be significant when considering the ESS data). Having adjusted for these individual 
differences in conventional participation, countries account for 10.6% of the remaining variation. 
 
Table 3.9. Conventional participation 
  Model 1   Model 2     Model 3   
  Effect SE   Effect SE 
Odds 
ratio   Effect SE 
Odds 
ratio 
FIXED EFFECTS 
Cons -0.99 0.13 
 
-1.01 0.14 
  
-1.03 0.16 0.36 
Male -0.20 0.03 0.82 -0.16 0.07 0.85 
Young  -0.11 0.05 0.90 -0.08 0.09 0.92 
Attentiveness 
   
0.26 0.02 1.30 
 
0.26 0.02 1.30 
Political engagement 0.51 0.02 1.67 0.53 0.03 1.69 
External efficacy 0.12 0.02 1.13 0.11 0.02 1.12 
Institutional trust -0.03 0.04 0.97 -0.04 0.04 0.96 
Social trust 
   
0.09 0.02 1.10 
 
0.10 0.02 1.11 
           RANDOM 
EFFECTS 
Country 0.608 0.139   0.389 0.119     0.525 0.155   
 
Model 3 relaxes the assumption that all individual effects are constant across countries, allowing for the 
possibility that the magnitude of some individual differences varies across countries. Three significant 
random coefficients are identified, with the negative effects of gender and age, and the positive effect of 
political engagement, shown to vary. Crucially, the revised model also shows that the average effect of 
gender is actually non-significant, with the original negative effect reflecting some particularly large age 
differences in particular countries.  
 
Similar to the random coefficient models specified for voting, the country random effect now corresponds 
to the country variation for the reference category: an older female with average levels of political 
engagement. This is higher than the overall average identified in model 2, suggesting that country 
differences are more noticeable for this group. Looking closely at the variance-covariance matrix, county 
differences are identified as less important for men, but of a similar magnitude when considering younger 
people and more political engaged people. 
 
Table 3.10 includes details of the extent that the individual fixed effects vary across the middle 95% of 
the distribution of countries. This reveals considerable variability across countries, with the negative 
effects of gender and age reversing in some countries. Only the positive effect of political engagement on 
levels of participation is shown to be in a consistent direction across countries, although this varies in 
magnitude.   
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Table 3.10. Conventional participation 
  Bottom 2.5% Average Effect Top 2.5% 
Male -0.70 -0.16 0.38 
Young  -0.69 -0.08 0.52 
Political engagement 0.33 0.53 0.73 
 
The covariance terms between the random intercept and each random coefficient reveal additional 
information about the nature of the differences in these individual relationships with participation across 
countries. A negative covariance with the gender variance indicates that in countries where women are 
more likely than average to participate via conventional routes, men are even less likely than average to 
participate (widening the gender gap). A negative covariance term is also evident when considering 
political engagement, however as a result of the positive fixed effect estimate this means that the 
difference in levels of participation between those that are and are not engaged with politics is reduced in 
countries with higher overall levels of participation. 
 
To explore further why these variations in levels of participation, are evident, table 3.11 through 3.14 
introduce the range of macro variables describing differences in the overall socio-political structure of 
each country. Given the relatively small sample of countries available for this analysis, these are included 
independently. Possible interactions are then explored between significant macro effects, and individual 
effects where a random coefficient was identified.   
 
Table 3.11 includes estimate from models incorporating the CIFP variables. A number of significant 
macro variables are identified that are associated with a differential tendency to participate in 
conventional forms of political activity. Countries scoring poorly on the measures of government 
efficiency, accountability, human rights, political stability, and rule of law are all associated with lower 
tendencies for individual residents to participate in conventional activities.  
 
With 39 countries, it is likely that the relative ranking of countries is similar using all macro variables, 
therefore it is not possible to examine all variables simultaneously. However to get a clearer picture of 
which of these macro characteristics is most closely related to conventional forms of political 
participation we can examine the reduction in the random coefficients. In each case, the inclusion of a 
macro fixed effect is associated with a large reduction in country variance. This reduction is largest when 
considering the extent the government is accountable to the public, the situation regarding human rights 
within the country, and the rating of rule of law, where the variance falls by more than 50%. 
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Table 3.11. Conventional participation 
  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
  Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE 
FIXED EFFECTS 
Cons -1.05 0.16 -1.08 0.13 -1.11 0.11 -1.14 0.11 -1.15 0.12 -1.12 0.11 
Male -0.18 0.07 -0.18 0.07 -0.18 0.07 -0.18 0.07 -0.18 0.07 -0.18 0.07 
Young  -0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.08 
Attentiveness 0.26 0.02 0.26 0.02 0.26 0.02 0.26 0.02 0.26 0.02 0.26 0.02 
Political engagement 0.53 0.03 0.53 0.03 0.52 0.03 0.53 0.03 0.53 0.03 0.52 0.03 
External efficacy 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.02 
Institutional trust -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.04 
Social trust 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.02 
COUNTY EFFECTS 
Democratic participation -0.143 0.139 
Government efficiency -0.367 0.114 
Accountability -0.309 0.068 
Human rights -0.331 0.071 
Political stability 
        
-0.298 0.072 
  Rule of Law 
          
-0.376 0.074 
RANDOM EFFECTS 
Country 0.509 0.155 0.341 0.107 0.243 0.079 0.239 0.077 0.282 0.089 0.215 0.071 
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To explore how these macro variables are related to differences in the magnitude of individual fixed 
effects across countries, interaction terms are specified between the significant macro effects and the 
coefficients where a random effect is identified. Table 3.12 includes details of the interaction effects from 
these models, identifying a number of instances where the individual relationships with participation are 
moderated by the characteristics of the country. Reflecting the non-significant main effect of democratic 
participation, no interaction terms were explored for this variable. 
 
Across our measures of government efficiency, accountability, human rights, and rule of law a positive 
gender interaction is evident. This indicates that the impact of the socio-political structure of the country 
is less marked for men, with larger differences in levels of participation between countries when 
considering female residents. As a result, in countries that are ranked poorly on the included contextual 
characteristics, the gender gap will be smaller than average. This finding is consistent with the random 
coefficients from model 3, which suggested that country differences were less influential for men. It is 
likely that this interaction effect reflects the existence of barriers to participation for women that operate 
in some countries, whilst the same barriers to not operate to such an extent when considering male 
residents. The inclusion of the interaction terms with gender has also reduced the magnitude of the 
random coefficient for gender. 
 
The degree of Government efficiency also moderates the effect of age on levels of participation, with a 
negative interaction term meaning that in countries rated poorly on governmental efficiency, the 
participation rates of young people will be reduced. This results in a larger age gap in these countries, 
with very low proportions of young people opting to participate in conventional ways.  
 
Interactions with political engagement are also evident when considering government efficiency, 
accountability, political stability and rule of law. Like the interactions with gender, these are positive, and 
consistent across all measures (although the effect is noticeably larger when considering Government 
efficiency). The positive interaction means that those who are less engaged with political issues are more 
directly influenced by the socio-political structure of the country, with a larger variation in levels of 
participation between poorer and better performing. Those who are more engaged with political issues 
are, to a certain extent, insulated against the broader socio-political structure of the country. Another way 
of interpreting this effect is that in countries with poorer socio-political structures, there is less of a 
reduction in levels of participation amongst those that are more directly engaged with politics (i.e 
interested and believe they can make a difference), reflecting an increased belief that by being involved in 
politics they can actively have an impact on the future direction of the country. The inclusion of these 
interaction terms completely explains the random coefficient for political engagement first identified in 
model 3. 
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Table 3.12. Conventional participation 
  Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
  Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE 
FIXED EFFECTS 
Cons -1.10 0.13 -1.15 0.11 -1.16 0.11 -1.18 0.12 -1.15 0.11 
Male -0.16 0.07 -0.15 0.06 -0.14 0.07 -0.18 0.07 -0.15 0.06 
Young  -0.04 0.08 -0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.08 
Attentiveness 0.27 0.02 0.26 0.02 0.26 0.02 0.26 0.02 0.26 0.02 
Political engagement 0.54 0.03 0.54 0.03 0.52 0.03 0.55 0.03 0.54 0.02 
External efficacy 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.02 
Institutional trust -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.04 
Social trust 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.02 
COUNTY EFFECTS 
Government efficiency -0.551 0.136 
Accountability -0.437 0.078 
Human rights -0.380 0.076 
Political stability -0.389 0.079 
Rule of Law 
        
-0.501 0.080 
           CROSS LEVEL INTERACTIONS 
*Male 0.134 0.072 0.104 0.048 0.101 0.053 0.110 0.051 
*Young -0.147 0.082 
*Political engagement 0.099 0.025 0.053 0.021 0.060 0.022 0.079 0.017 
RANDOM EFFECTS 
Country 0.303 0.097 0.224 0.073 0.233 0.076 0.262 0.084 0.203 0.067 
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Table 3.13 includes estimates from the EIU macro variables. Here, higher scores reflect countries that are 
performing better, therefore a positive effect indicates that residents of a country performing better are 
more likely to participate. Similar to the CIFP measures, these models indicate that residents of countries 
performing better on these macro indicators are more likely to participate, with all effects reaching 
conventional levels of significance. As a result, people are more likely to participate in conventional 
forms of political activity if they live in countries characterised by stronger civil liberties, a clearer 
democratic political culture, a stronger climate of electoral processes and pluralism, a clearly functioning 
government, and higher overall levels of participation.  
 
To try and gauge the importance of these effects, we again consider the impact that the inclusion of these 
effects has on estimates of the remaining residual variation between countries. Here the largest reductions 
are evident when including the measure of civil liberties, and the measure of political participation, 
suggesting that these measures are most closely aligned to differences in estimated levels of participation 
between countries.    
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Table 3.13. Conventional participation 
           
  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE 
FIXED EFFECTS 
Cons -1.14 0.12 -1.07 0.13 -1.10 0.13 -1.09 0.13 -1.06 0.15 
Male -0.16 0.07 -0.16 0.07 -0.16 0.07 -0.16 0.07 -0.16 0.07 
Young  -0.09 0.09 -0.08 0.09 -0.08 0.09 -0.08 0.09 -0.08 0.09 
Attentiveness 0.26 0.02 0.26 0.02 0.26 0.02 0.26 0.02 0.26 0.02 
Political engagement 0.52 0.03 0.52 0.03 0.53 0.03 0.52 0.03 0.53 0.03 
External efficacy 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.12 0.02 
Institutional trust -0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.04 
Social trust 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.02 
COUNTY EFFECTS 
Civil liberties 0.428 0.099 
Democratic political culture 0.198 0.059 
Electoral process and Pluralism 
    
0.510 0.159 
    Functioning of Government 
      
0.226 0.062 
  Political participation 0.146 0.076 
RANDOM EFFECTS 
Country 0.286 0.087 0.351 0.106 0.355 0.108 0.309 0.094 0.436 0.132 
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As with the CIFP measures, we also explore the potential existence of cross-level interactions between 
these measures and the three individual fixed effects where significant variation across countries was 
identified (table 3.14). Fewer interactions are evident when drawing on the EIU data, although the 
direction of their effect is consistent with the CIFP measures.  
 
The democratic political culture of the country, and the level of political participation both moderate the 
magnitude of the gender gap, with women again shown to be more directly influenced by the socio-
political structure of the country. The inclusion of these interaction terms significantly reduces the 
magnitude of the residual variance in the effect of gender first identified in model 3. 
 
An interaction term is also evident between the democratic political culture of each country and the level 
of political engagement. This again demonstrates that there are less differences between countries in 
levels of participation when considering those with higher levels of political engagement. It is possible 
that this effect reflects an increased tendency for those with higher levels of political engagement to 
participate in conventional forms of activity in countries with a weaker democratic political culture, 
partially mitigating the negative impact that a weakened democratic political culture has on levels of 
participation.  
 
Table 3.14. Conventional participation 
  Model 9 Model 10 
  Effect SE Effect SE 
FIXED EFFECTS 
Cons -1.10 0.13 -1.07 0.15 
Male -0.14 0.06 -0.14 0.06 
Young  -0.08 0.09 -0.08 0.09 
Attentiveness 0.26 0.02 0.26 0.02 
Political engagement 0.53 0.03 0.53 0.03 
External efficacy 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.02 
Institutional trust -0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.04 
Social trust 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.02 
COUNTY EFFECTS 
    Democratic political culture 0.319 0.071 
  Political participation 0.211 0.081 
  
CROSS LEVEL INTERACTIONS 
*Male -0.086 0.036 -0.100 0.043 
*Political engagement -0.035 0.016 
RANDOM EFFECTS 
Country 0.323 0.099 0.428 0.130 
 
Non-conventional participation 
Turning to non-conventional forms of participation, the ESS and ISSP also include similar measures. 
Table 3.15 includes results from two models detailing variations in non-conventional forms of 
participation across Europe using the ESS. Model 1 provides details of how variation in non-conventional 
participation is partitioned between countries and regions. Approximately 19% of the total variation in 
participation is attributable to differences between countries, with the unique contribution of regions 
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considerably lower at 2.4%. The contribution of countries is notably higher than when considering voting 
and conventional forms of participation, suggesting that non-conventional participation rates vary 
considerably more across countries.  
 
Table 3.15. Non-conventional participation 
    
  Model 1   Model 2 
  Effect SE   Effect SE 
Odds 
ratio 
FIXED EFFECTS 
      Cons -0.31 0.20 
 
-0.11 0.19 
 Minority -0.34 0.08 0.71 
Male -0.35 0.03 0.70 
Young  0.20 0.04 1.22 
Attentiveness -0.01 0.02 0.99 
Political engagement 0.73 0.02 2.08 
External efficacy 0.13 0.02 1.14 
Institutional trust -0.09 0.02 0.91 
Social trust 
   
0.16 0.02 1.17 
Opinionation 
   
-0.23 0.04 0.79 
Ideological identity  0.02 0.03 1.02 
Meet socially 0.03 0.03 1.03 
Identity threat 0.61 0.06 1.84 
RANDOM EFFECTS 
Country 0.792 0.257 0.678 0.226 
Region 0.104 0.015   0.081 0.014   
 
Model 2 includes individual level fixed effects. Minority groups and men are significantly less likely to 
participate, whilst participation levels are higher amongst younger people. Levels of non-conventional 
participation are also higher amongst those who are more political engaged, those with higher levels of 
external efficacy and social trust, and those who feel that their identity is under threat. In contrast, 
participation rates are lower amongst those with higher levels of institutional trust, and those that do not 
have a strong political opinion. The contribution of country and regional differences to the remaining 
variation in non-conventional participation has dropped to 16.7% and 2% respectively, again reflecting 
differences in the sample composition of each country.  
 
To begin to explore how potential country differences may influence levels of participation, we draw on 
data from the ISSP (table 3.16). This uses a similar measure of conventional participation, but is asked in 
twice as many countries. Model 1 reveals a similar contribution of between country differences that 
accounts for 19.4% of the total variation in levels of participation. The similarity of this estimate to the 
estimate from the ESS suggests that unlike voting and conventional forms of participation, considerable 
variability also exists between countries from within Europe.  
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Table 3.16. Non-conventional participation 
  Model 1   Model 2     Model 3   
  Effect SE   Effect SE 
Odds 
ratio   Effect SE 
Odds 
ratio 
FIXED EFFECTS 
Cons -0.78 0.14 -0.53 0.20 -0.53 0.22 
Male 
   
-0.31 0.03 0.73 
 
-0.30 0.05 0.74 
Young  0.33 0.05 1.39 0.40 0.09 1.49 
Attentiveness 0.16 0.02 1.17 0.18 0.02 1.19 
Political engagement 0.55 0.02 1.73 0.54 0.04 1.72 
External efficacy 
   
0.11 0.02 1.11 
 
0.11 0.03 1.12 
Institutional trust 
   
-0.20 0.03 0.82 
 
-0.20 0.03 0.82 
Social trust 0.07 0.02 1.08 0.07 0.02 1.08 
RANDOM 
EFFECTS 
          Country 0.793 0.180   0.905 0.273     1.078 0.301   
 
Model 2 includes the available socio-demographic variables from the ISSP. The results are consistent 
with the ESS, with lower levels of participation amongst men and those with higher levels of institutional 
trust, and higher levels of participation amongst young people, those with higher levels of external 
efficacy, political engagement, and social trust. There is also a greater tendency to participate amongst 
those who are more attentive to politics, an effect that was not identified when using the ESS. Having 
adjusted for these individual differences in conventional participation, countries account for 21.6% of the 
remaining variation. 
 
Model 3 relaxes the assumption that all individual effects are constant across countries, allowing for the 
possibility that the magnitude of some individual differences vary across countries. Four significant 
random coefficients are identified, with the negative effect of gender, and the positive effects of age, 
political engagement, and external efficacy all shown to vary. Similar to the previous random coefficient 
models, the country random effect now corresponds to the country variation for the reference category: an 
older female with average levels of political engagement and external efficacy. This residual country 
effect is higher than the overall average identified in model 2, suggesting that country differences are 
more evident for this group. Looking closely at the variance-covariance matrix, country differences are 
identified as less important for men, young people, more politically engaged people, and those with 
higher levels of external efficacy.  
 
Table 3.17 includes details of the extent that the individual fixed effects vary across the middle 95% of 
the distribution of countries. This reveals considerable variability across countries, with the positive 
effects of age and external efficacy reversing in some countries. In contrast, the positive effect of political 
engagement on levels of participation is shown to be in a consistent direction across countries, although 
this varies in magnitude.   
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Table 3.17. Non-conventional participation 
  Bottom 2.5% Average Effect Top 2.5% 
Male -0.64 -0.30 0.05 
Young  -0.27 0.40 1.07 
Political engagement 0.37 0.54 0.71 
External efficacy -0.22 0.11 0.44 
 
Looking at the covariance terms between the random intercept and each random coefficient reveals 
additional information about the nature of the differences in these individual relationships with 
participation across countries. A negative covariance with the gender variance implies that in countries 
where women are more likely than average to participate via non-conventional routes, the lower levels of 
participation amongst men is stronger than average (increasing the gender gap). A negative covariance 
term is also evident when considering age, political engagement, and external efficacy. However as a 
result of the positive fixed effect estimates this means that the differences between each group and the 
reference category is reduced in countries with higher overall levels of participation. 
 
To explore further why these variations in levels of participation are evident, table 3.18 through 3.21 
introduce the range of macro variables describing differences in the overall socio-political structure of 
each country. Given the relatively small sample of countries available for this analysis, these are included 
independently. Possible interactions are then explored between significant macro effects, and individual 
effects where a random coefficient was identified.   
  
Table 3.18 includes estimate from models incorporating the CIFP variables. All included country level 
fixed effects are identified as being significantly associated with a differential tendency to participate in 
non-conventional forms of political activity, with coefficients of a larger magnitude than when 
considering conventional participation. With 39 countries, it is likely that the relative ranking of countries 
is similar using all macro variables, therefore we do not examine all variables simultaneously. However to 
determine which of these macro characteristics is most closely related to non-conventional forms of 
political participation we examine the reduction in the random coefficients. In each case, the inclusion of 
a macro fixed effect is associated with a large reduction in country variance, but this reduction is largest 
when considering the efficiency with which the government is judged to operate, the extent the 
government is accountable to the public, and the rating of rule of law, with the impact of unexplained 
country differences falling by approximately 50% in each case. By contrast, despite a significant effect, 
the inclusion of the measure of democratic participation is associated with a considerably smaller 
reduction in country level variance.  
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Table 3.18. Non-conventional participation 
  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
  Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE 
FIXED EFFECTS 
Cons -0.58 0.23 -0.63 0.17 -0.67 0.17 -0.70 0.19 -0.71 0.19 -0.67 0.18 
Male -0.30 0.05 -0.30 0.05 -0.30 0.05 -0.30 0.05 -0.29 0.05 -0.30 0.05 
Young  0.41 0.10 0.43 0.09 0.42 0.09 0.42 0.09 0.42 0.10 0.43 0.09 
Attentiveness 0.18 0.02 0.17 0.02 0.17 0.02 0.17 0.02 0.17 0.02 0.17 0.02 
Political engagement 0.54 0.04 0.53 0.04 0.54 0.04 0.54 0.04 0.53 0.04 0.54 0.04 
External efficacy 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.03 
Institutional trust -0.22 0.04 -0.22 0.04 -0.22 0.04 -0.22 0.04 -0.22 0.04 -0.22 0.04 
Social trust 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 
COUNTY EFFECTS 
Democratic participation -0.612 0.174 
Government efficiency -0.843 0.119 
Accountability -0.559 0.076 
Human rights -0.521 0.090 
Political stability 
        
-0.480 0.097 
  Rule of Law 
          
-0.604 0.088 
RANDOM EFFECTS 
Country 1.013 0.295 0.592 0.164 0.577 0.157 0.720 0.194 0.672 0.192 0.592 0.169 
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To explore how these macro variables are related to differences in the magnitude of individual fixed 
effects across countries, interaction terms are specified between the significant macro effects and the 
coefficients where a random effect is identified. Table 3.19 includes details of the interaction effects from 
these models, with significant interactions identified for all contextual measures with the exception of the 
country record on human rights.  
 
Like conventional forms of participation, a positive gender interaction is evident for all country measures 
with the exception of political stability. This provides further evidence that the impact of the socio-
political structure of the country is less marked for men, with larger differences in levels of participation 
between countries when considering female residents. This finding is consistent with the random 
coefficients from model 3, which suggested that country differences were less influential for men. It is 
possible that this interaction effect reflects the existence of barriers to participation for women that 
operate in some countries, whilst the same barriers do not operate to such an extent when considering 
male residents. The inclusion of the interaction terms with gender fully explaining the random coefficient 
initially identified in model 3. 
 
The degree of democratic participation also moderates the effect of age on levels of non-conventional 
participation, with a negative interaction term meaning that in countries rated poorly on governmental 
efficiency, the participation rates of young people will be reduced. In countries with an average rating for 
democratic participation young people are more likely to be involved in non-conventional forms of 
participation than older residents. However, in countries with a poorer rating the age gap is reduced, with 
young people more negatively affected by the influence of country democratic participation levels.  
 
Interactions with political engagement are also evident when considering democratic participation, 
government efficiency, and political stability. Like the interactions with gender, these are positive, and 
consistent across all measures. The positive interaction means that those who are less engaged with 
political issues are more directly influenced by the socio-political structure of the country, with a larger 
variation in levels of participation between poorer and better performing countries for this group. The 
result of this interaction effect is that in countries with poorer socio-political structures, there is less of a 
reduction in levels of participation amongst those that are more directly engaged with politics (i.e 
interested and believe they can make a difference), reflecting an increased belief that by being involved in 
politics they can actively have an impact on the future direction of the country. The inclusion of these 
interaction partially accounts for the random coefficient for political engagement first identified in model 
3. 
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Table 3.19. Non-conventional participation 
  Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
  Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE 
FIXED EFFECTS 
Cons -0.58 0.22 -0.64 0.17 -0.70 0.17 -0.71 0.19 -0.69 0.17 
Male -0.28 0.04 -0.27 0.05 -0.27 0.05 -0.29 0.05 -0.27 0.05 
Young  0.40 0.09 0.43 0.09 0.42 0.09 0.42 0.10 0.43 0.09 
Attentiveness 0.18 0.02 0.18 0.02 0.17 0.02 0.18 0.02 0.17 0.02 
Political engagement 0.54 0.04 0.54 0.03 0.54 0.04 0.56 0.04 0.53 0.04 
External efficacy 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.03 
Institutional trust -0.22 0.04 -0.22 0.04 -0.22 0.04 -0.22 0.04 -0.22 0.04 
Social trust 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 
COUNTY EFFECTS 
Democratic participation -0.595 0.246 
Government efficiency -0.894 0.136 
Accountability -0.655 0.086 
Political stability -0.460 0.097 
Rule of Law 
        
-0.698 0.095 
           CROSS LEVEL INTERACTIONS 
*Male 0.168 0.051 0.132 0.051 0.088 0.036 0.108 0.036 
*Young -0.199 0.100 
*Political engagement 0.050 0.042 0.076 0.036 0.057 0.027 
RANDOM EFFECTS 
Country 0.913 0.270 0.569 0.160 0.548 0.153 0.666 0.191 0.567 0.163 
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Table 3.20 includes estimates from the EIU macro variables. Here, higher scores reflect countries that are 
performing better, therefore a positive effect indicates that residents of a country performing better are 
more likely to participate. Similar to the CIFP measures, these models indicate that residents of countries 
performing better on these macro indicators are more likely to participate in non-conventional forms of 
activity, with all effects reaching conventional levels of significance. As a result, people are more likely 
to participate if they live in countries characterised by stronger civil liberties, a clearer democratic 
political culture, a stronger climate of electoral processes and pluralism, a clearly functioning 
government, and higher overall levels of participation.  
 
To try and gauge the importance of these effects, we again consider the impact that the inclusion of these 
effects has on estimates of the remaining residual variation between countries. Here the largest reduction 
is evident when including the measure of the function of government within the country.  
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Table 3.20. Non-conventional participation 
           
  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE 
FIXED EFFECTS 
Cons -0.68 0.19 -0.62 0.17 -0.63 0.21 -0.66 0.17 -0.60 0.20 
Male -0.30 0.05 -0.30 0.05 -0.30 0.05 -0.30 0.05 -0.30 0.05 
Young  0.40 0.09 0.40 0.09 0.40 0.10 0.40 0.09 0.40 0.09 
Attentiveness 0.18 0.02 0.18 0.02 0.18 0.02 0.18 0.02 0.18 0.02 
Political engagement 0.55 0.04 0.55 0.04 0.55 0.04 0.55 0.04 0.55 0.04 
External efficacy 0.11 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.11 0.03 
Institutional trust -0.20 0.04 -0.20 0.04 -0.20 0.04 -0.20 0.04 -0.20 0.04 
Social trust 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 
           COUNTY EFFECTS 
Civil liberties 0.487 0.157 
Democratic political culture 0.350 0.076 
Electoral process and Pluralism 0.564 0.235 
Functioning of Government 0.396 0.083 
Political participation 0.270 0.107 
RANDOM EFFECTS 
          Country 0.717 0.212 0.609 0.179 0.875 0.251 0.561 0.165 0.821 0.242 
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As with the CIFP measures, we also explore the potential existence of cross-level interactions between 
these measures and the four individual fixed effects where significant variation across countries was 
identified (table 3.21). Significant interactions are evident when considering the democratic political 
culture, function of government, and the degree of political participation, with effects consistent with the 
CIFP variables. 
 
The gender gap is larger in countries that have a stronger democratic political culture and higher overall 
levels of political participation, with the increase in women’s levels of participation significantly greater 
than the increase in participation for men. Interactions with political engagement are evident when 
considering the functioning of government and the overall levels of political participation, with the levels 
of non-conventional participation of those who are more political engaged more stable (and high) across 
the full distribution of countries.  
 
Table 3.21. Non-conventional participation 
  Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
  Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE 
FIXED EFFECTS 
Cons -0.64 0.17 -0.67 0.17 -0.63 0.20 
Male -0.28 0.05 -0.30 0.05 -0.28 0.04 
Young  0.39 0.09 0.40 0.10 0.41 0.10 
Attentiveness 0.18 0.02 0.18 0.02 0.18 0.02 
Political engagement 0.55 0.04 0.57 0.04 0.56 0.04 
External efficacy 0.11 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.11 0.03 
Institutional trust -0.20 0.04 -0.20 0.04 -0.20 0.04 
Social trust 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 
COUNTY EFFECTS 
      Democratic political culture 0.433 0.084 
    Functioning of Government 0.421 0.084 
Political participation 0.451 0.120 
  
CROSS LEVEL INTERACTIONS 
*Male -0.068 0.028 -0.090 0.030 
*Political engagement -0.049 0.025 -0.048 0.025 
RANDOM EFFECTS 
      Country 0.580 0.172 0.558 0.165 0.777 0.230 
 
Civic engagement 
Finally, we again draw on ESS and ISSP data to explore country variations in levels of civic engagement. 
Looking first at data from the ESS, table 3.22 includes models outlining variations in civic engagement 
across Europe. Model 1 demonstrates a high level of variability between countries, accounting for nearly 
28% of the total variation in levels of engagement. In contrast, regions are again shown to make a 
marginal contribution, with variations between regions only accounting for 2.2% of the total variation.  
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Table 3.22. Civic engagement 
  Model 1   Model 2 
  Effect SE   Effect SE Odds ratio 
FIXED EFFECTS 
  
Cons 0.76 0.26 0.90 0.25 
Minority -0.10 0.08 0.90 
Male 0.10 0.03 1.11 
Young  0.01 0.05 1.01 
Attentiveness 0.00 0.02 1.00 
Political engagement 
   
0.44 0.02 1.55 
External efficacy 
   
0.15 0.02 1.17 
Institutional trust 0.00 0.02 1.00 
Social trust 0.20 0.02 1.22 
Opinionation -0.26 0.04 0.77 
Ideological identity  -0.05 0.04 0.95 
Meet socially 0.09 0.03 1.09 
Identity threat 0.13 0.06 1.14 
RANDOM EFFECTS 
      Country 1.311 0.421 
 
1.106 0.366 
 Region 0.103 0.016   0.092 0.017   
 
Model 2 includes all individual level fixed effects, demonstrating significantly higher levels of civic 
engagement amongst men, those who are interested and engaged with political issues, those with higher 
levels of external efficacy, social trust, and those who feel their identity is under threat. Civic engagement 
is lower amongst those who are less opinionated. Having adjusted for these differences between 
individuals within countries, unexplained country differences still account for 24.6% of the remaining 
variation, suggesting the existence of important country effects.  
 
To explore these potential country effects in more detail, we turn to data from the ISSP (table 3.23). 
Model 1 details the variance attributable to differences between countries, accounting for approximately 
24% of the variance. Including the available individual level fixed effects (model 2), the remaining 
country contribution is similar to the ESS with approximately 26% of the variance at this level. The fixed 
effects are also largely similar to those from the ESS, with those with higher levels of interest and 
engagement more likely to be involved. There are also positive effects of external efficacy and social trust 
which match those from the ESS data. However, unlike the ESS no effect of gender is found, and there is 
a small negative effect of age.  
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Table 3.23. Civic engagement 
         
  Model 1   Model 2     Model 3   
  Effect SE   Effect SE 
Odds 
ratio   Effect SE 
Odds 
ratio 
FIXED EFFECTS 
Cons 0.65 0.16 0.63 0.24 0.63 0.24 
Male 
   
0.00 0.03 1.00 
 
-0.03 0.06 0.97 
Young  -0.10 0.05 0.90 -0.10 0.05 0.90 
Attentiveness 0.16 0.02 1.18 0.16 0.02 1.17 
Political engagement 
   
0.21 0.02 1.24 
 
0.21 0.02 1.24 
External efficacy 0.08 0.02 1.09 0.08 0.02 1.08 
Institutional trust 0.02 0.04 1.02 0.02 0.04 1.02 
Social trust 0.08 0.02 1.08 0.11 0.03 1.12 
RANDOM 
EFFECTS 
Country 1.023 0.236   1.158 0.358     1.168 0.361   
 
Model 3 relaxes the assumption that the effects of these individual characteristics are consistent across 
countries. Here the effects of gender and social trust are shown to vary significantly. In the case of 
gender, this means that whilst on average there is no clear difference between men and women, there is an 
effect in some countries (table 3.24).  
 
Table 3.24. Civic engagement 
  Bottom 2.5% Average Effect Top 2.5% 
Male -0.37 -0.03 0.32 
Social trust -0.55 0.11 0.78 
 
Here the effect of gender is shown to vary from a large negative effect of -.37 to a positive effect of .32. 
This indicates that the gender effect in some countries will identify men as more likely to participate, 
whilst in other countries women will be more likely to participate. The effect of social trust is also shown 
to vary considerably, and is not positive in all countries.  
 
In model 3, the country random effect now refers to the variation between countries in the levels of 
participation of women with average levels of social trust. Looking at the random coefficients in more 
detail, the country contribution is shown to be larger when considering those with higher levels of social 
trust. Turning to the covariance terms, a significant positive covariance term between the intercept and 
random effect for social trust indicates that in countries where those with average levels of social trust are 
more civically engaged, the positive effect of social trust on the tendency to be engaged will be larger 
than average.  
 
To explore these country effects in more detail, table 3.25 through 3.28 include details of the macro 
political structure variables derived from CIFP and EIU. Where significant contextual effects are 
identified, we then explore the link between these macro characteristics and the two individual effects 
where a significant random coefficient was identified.  
 
Looking first at the CIFP variables, table 3.25 includes estimates from a sequence of models exploring the 
6 macro variables independently. Similar to non-conventional participation, all included country level 
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fixed effects are identified as significant and operate in the same direction. People are less likely to be 
civically engaged in countries which have lower levels of democratic participation, the government is 
identified as less efficient and less accountable, there is a poor human rights records, relatively little 
political stability, and a poor score for rule of law.  
 
To assess the relative impact of each of these macro variables, we also examine the extent that they 
reduce the estimates of the unexplained variance attributable to country differences. Here we see that the 
macro variables which explain the most variance at the country-level are the degree of government 
efficiency, and the relative score on the rule of law variable  
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Table 3.25. Civic engagement 
  Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   Model 7   Model 8   Model 9   
  Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE 
FIXED EFFECTS 
Cons 0.59 0.22 0.52 0.19 0.51 0.20 0.49 0.23 0.47 0.21 0.45 0.19 
Male -0.08 0.05 -0.08 0.05 -0.08 0.05 -0.08 0.06 -0.07 0.06 -0.08 0.06 
Young  -0.10 0.05 -0.10 0.05 -0.10 0.05 -0.10 0.05 -0.10 0.05 -0.10 0.05 
Attentiveness 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.02 
Political engagement 0.21 0.02 0.21 0.02 0.21 0.02 0.21 0.02 0.21 0.02 0.21 0.02 
External efficacy 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.02 
Institutional trust 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Social trust 0.12 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.10 0.03 
COUNTY EFFECTS 
Democratic participation -0.597 0.216 
Government efficiency -1.113 0.128 
Accountability -0.499 0.110 
Human rights -0.411 0.135 
Political stability 
        
-0.411 0.123 
  Rule of Law 
          
-0.739 0.104 
RANDOM EFFECTS 
Country 0.913 0.293 0.673 0.210 0.745 0.242 0.919 0.295 0.801 0.256 0.634 0.208 
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Having identified overall differences between countries based on the selected macro characteristics, we 
then examine potential links between these contextual characteristics and individual differences in 
participation based on gender and social trust (table 3.26). Across all six measures of the socio-political 
structure of countries, a significant negative interaction with social trust is evident. This is largely 
consistent in magnitude, although is largest when considering the level of government efficiency.  
 
Across all structural measures, the negative interaction indicates that those with higher levels of social 
trust are more susceptible to differences in the socio-political structure of the country, with larger 
differences between residents of countries performing better and worse on each measure. As a result of 
the positive main effect of social trust, in countries that are ranked lowest, the difference in levels of civic 
engagement between those who have high and low levels of social trust is smaller than average. In 
contrast, in those countries with a better ranking on each of the structural variables, the gap is larger than 
average. Including these cross-level interactions with social trust has also significantly reduced the 
magnitude of the random coefficient associated with social trust. 
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Table 3.26. Civic engagement 
  Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
  Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE 
FIXED EFFECTS 
Cons 0.57 0.22 0.52 0.19 0.48 0.20 0.44 0.22 0.41 0.21 0.45 0.18 
Male -0.07 0.05 -0.08 0.05 -0.08 0.05 -0.08 0.06 -0.07 0.05 -0.08 0.06 
Young  -0.10 0.05 -0.10 0.05 -0.10 0.05 -0.10 0.05 -0.10 0.05 -0.10 0.05 
Attentiveness 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.15 0.02 
Political engagement 0.21 0.02 0.21 0.02 0.21 0.02 0.21 0.02 0.21 0.02 0.21 0.02 
External efficacy 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 
Institutional trust 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Social trust 0.11 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.02 
COUNTY EFFECTS 
Democratic participation -0.803 0.237 
Government efficiency -0.946 0.139 
Accountability -0.577 0.115 
Human rights -0.541 0.146 
Political stability 
        
-0.547 0.138 
  Rule of Law 
          
-0.700 0.106 
CROSS LEVEL INTERACTIONS 
*Social trust -0.074 0.032 -0.082 0.021 -0.046 0.018 -0.047 0.019 -0.041 0.021 -0.059 0.018 
  
RANDOM EFFECTS 
Country 0.860 0.276 0.646 0.212 0.708 0.228 0.875 0.281 0.761 0.244 0.603 0.200 
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Table 3.27 includes estimates from the EIU macro variables. Similar to the CIFP measures, these models 
indicate that residents of countries performing better on these macro indicators are more likely to be 
civically engaged, with all effects reaching conventional levels of significance. As a result, people are 
more likely to participate if they live in countries characterised by stronger civil liberties, a clearer 
democratic political culture, a stronger climate of electoral processes and pluralism, a clearly functioning 
government, and higher overall levels of participation.  
 
In order to assess the relative importance of these effects, we again consider the impact that the inclusion 
of these effects has on estimates of the remaining residual variation between countries. Here the largest 
reduction is evident when including the measure of the function of government within the country. This is 
consistent with the previous models examining non-conventional participation. 
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Table 3.27. Civic engagement 
            
  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE 
FIXED EFFECTS 
Cons 0.45 0.22 0.54 0.19 0.49 0.23 0.48 0.17 0.54 0.18 
Male -0.06 0.05 -0.07 0.05 -0.06 0.05 -0.06 0.05 -0.06 0.05 
Young  -0.11 0.05 -0.11 0.05 -0.11 0.05 -0.11 0.05 -0.11 0.05 
Attentiveness 0.17 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.17 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.16 0.02 
Political engagement 0.22 0.02 0.22 0.02 0.22 0.02 0.22 0.02 0.22 0.02 
External efficacy 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.02 
Institutional trust 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Social trust 0.12 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.10 0.03 
COUNTY EFFECTS 
Civil liberties 0.533 0.159 
Democratic political culture 0.361 0.089 
Electoral process and Pluralism 
    
0.675 0.267 
    Functioning of Government 
      
0.449 0.075 
  Political participation 0.492 0.112 
RANDOM EFFECTS 
Country 0.893 0.272 0.726 0.228 1.016 0.315 0.524 0.159 0.613 0.197 
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Finally, we again explore the extent that individual differences in civic engagement between gender 
groups and based on levels of social trust are related to these macro characteristics (table 3.28). 
Significant interactions with social trust are evident when considering the democratic political culture 
of each country, and the degree of political participation. These both operate in the equivalent 
direction as the indicators from CIFP, with those residents reporting higher levels of social trust more 
influenced by these macro characteristics.  
 
Table 3.28. Civic engagement 
  Model 9 Model 10 
  Effect SE Effect SE 
FIXED EFFECTS 
Cons 0.51 0.19 0.52 0.18 
Male -0.06 0.05 -0.06 0.05 
Young  -0.11 0.05 -0.10 0.05 
Attentiveness 0.16 0.02 0.16 0.02 
Political engagement 0.22 0.02 0.22 0.02 
External efficacy 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.02 
Institutional trust 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Social trust 0.10 0.03 0.11 0.02 
COUNTY EFFECTS 
Democratic political culture 0.437 0.095 
Political participation 0.551 0.113 
  
CROSS LEVEL INTERACTIONS 
*Social trust 0.035 0.015 0.053 0.016 
  
RANDOM EFFECTS 
Country 0.689 0.215 0.589 0.189 
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CHAPTER 4: EXPLORING FORMS OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN 
SOCIAL SURVEY WITH LATENT CLASS ANALYSIS 
 
 
In the previous chapters we have treated each form of participation independently, exploring what 
determines voting, conventional and nonconventional participation, and civic engagement. This 
demonstrated that many of the same influences are evident on all forms of participation, suggesting 
that they are inter-related. It is possible, then, that there are distinct classes of people with very 
different tendencies to participate in all forms of political behavior. In this final chapter we use 
parametric and non-parametric clustering algorithms to classify individuals into different categories, 
or ‘citizenship’ clusters.  
 
 
4.1: LATENT CLASS ANALYSIS 
To identify distinct ‘citizenship’ clusters with qualitatively different patterns of participation we use 
Latent Class Analysis (LCA). This is very similar to standard factor analysis models used to identify 
intangible latent constructs represented by observed data. However rather than each survey item being 
treated as an imperfect indicator of an underlying continuous latent variable, here the unobserved 
latent variable is categorical, with each ‘class’ representing a distinct population.  
 
LCA uses a categorical latent class variable to explain heterogeneity in the parameters of a common 
factor model, producing distinct groupings or sub-populations with similar coefficients on particular 
parameters. Using Information Criteria measures of model fit (e.g. AIC and BIC), LCAs with 
increasing numbers of classes can be evaluated relative to one another to establish the optimal number 
of classes. Once this ‘optimal’ model has been established, interpretation of the sub-population 
groupings in each latent class can be made by reference to the estimated parameters within each class, 
as is done in exploratory factor analysis. The optimal number of classes and their interpretation, 
however, cannot be determined in advance but is, ultimately, an empirical question.  
 
An additional appealing feature of the LCA is that, once the latent classes have been derived, 
regressions can be run between the latent class variable (as outcome) and observed predictors (which 
can themselves be either latent or observed) (Lubke and Muthen 2005). The pattern and significance 
of regression coefficients from this multinomial regression stage will be often be of theoretical 
interest in itself but can also aid in interpreting the latent classes (Allua et al 2008). 
 
 
4.2: DATA 
We again draw our data from the first round of the European Social Survey, with data available from 
20 countries. The four binary dependent variables used in the previous analyses (voting, conventional 
participation, non-conventional participation, and civic engagement) are used as indicators of the 
unobserved latent class variable, allowing us to identify empirically distinct patterns of participation 
across our sample of respondents.  
 
In addition to the four indicators of participation, we also include basic demographic detail about each 
respondent. This allows us to identify which types of people are more likely to belong in particular 
classes of participation. Following the overall aims of the project, we distinguish here between the 
gender, age, and ethnicity of respondents.  
 
 
4.3: ANALYTIC STRATEGY 
LCA is exploratory, with the number of distinct ‘classes’ of participation determined on an empirical 
basis. We estimate an LCA in which the four participation items are treated as indicators of a 
categorical latent variable, with the number of categories determined empirically by examining the fit 
statistics from a sequence of models with an increasing number of latent classes.  
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The three demographic variables are also included in the model as covariates in a multinomial 
regression with the latent class variable specified as the outcome. Lubke and Muthen (2005) advise 
that it is better to incorporate covariates when determining the optimal number of classes, rather than 
finding the optimal number of classes with only the indicator variables included and incorporating the 
covariates in a second stage. 
 
We begin with a two class model (a one class model is not estimatable) and add additional classes in 
sequential stages. BIC and AIC statistics for models with 2-6 classes are presented in Figure 4.1. A 
clear improvement in model fit is evident when moving from a 2 to 3 class model, with a significantly 
smaller improvement when moving from 3 to 4 classes, and almost no improvement moving from 4 to 
5 classes (particularly when considering the BIC and adjusted BIC measures). This clearly 
demonstrates that the best fitting model is the one with four latent classes, with no real improvement 
to model fit when a more complex model is specified. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 
 
Having determined the optimal number of classes, the relative membership of each class is examined, 
as well as the multinomial regression coefficients from this model. Class membership is interesting in 
and of itself, as it enables us to classify people depending on their overall participation profile. 
Supplementing this with a detailed assessment of the multinomial regression coefficients affords us an 
alternative picture of the ways that different demographic groups engage with politics in society.  
 
 
4.4: RESULTS 
Looking at the relative probabilities of membership in each class for the four different forms of 
participation enables us to formulate a taxonomy of patterns of participation (table 4.1). Like 
exploratory factor analysis the labels we apply do not have any true meaning in and of themselves, 
however they act as a convenient heuristic to organize the empirical data. 
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Table 4.1. Latent Class Analysis 
  Predicted probability SE 
Class 1 - Highly politically active 
Vote 0.98 0.02 
Conventional participation 0.52 0.01 
Non-conventional participation 0.82 0.01 
Civic engagement 0.92 0.01 
Class 2 - Not politically active 
Vote 0.19 0.11 
Conventional participation 0.05 0.01 
Non-conventional participation 0.09 0.02 
Civic engagement 0.36 0.02 
Class 3 - Non-conventional participation 
Vote 0.51 0.09 
Conventional participation 0.40 0.02 
Non-conventional participation 0.84 0.05 
Civic engagement 0.82 0.02 
Class 4 - Voters only 
Vote 0.95 0.04 
Conventional participation 0.09 0.01 
Non-conventional participation 0.11 0.01 
Civic engagement 0.43 0.01 
 
Members of class 1 have a high probability of being involved in all forms of political participation, 
therefore this group is identified as highly politically active. Not only are this group likely to vote in 
elections, they also take part in conventional and non-conventional forms of political activity, and are 
likely to be members of different civic groups. They are therefore the most political motivated group 
in the data. Approximately 38% of the total sample have been classified in this group. 
 
By direct contrast, class 2 is characterized by very low levels of participation in all formats. Not only 
is there a very low probability of those that vote being in this class, but the members of this group also 
have a low probability of participating in either conventional or non-conventional forms of activity. 
Members of this class are also relatively unlikely to be members of any form of club or organization.  
This is a comparatively small group of respondents, with only 12.6% of the total sample likely to be 
in this class. 
 
The third class is characterized by relatively low levels of conventional participation, and also low 
levels of voting. However, members of this group are likely to be involved in non-conventional 
activities, and be members of clubs and organizations. As such, this group might be described as 
politically and socially active, but disillusioned with the more traditional pathways open to people to 
have an influence on political issues. As a result, they opt to engage with politics in a more 
unconventional manner. This is the smallest group of respondents in the dataset, with approximately 
8.5% of respondents identified as being likely to be in this group.  
 
Finally, the fourth class are very likely to vote in elections, but do not engage with political issues in 
any other ways. This is the single largest class in the data, with 41% of the sample classified in this 
group. These people are unlikely to be particularly engaged with politics beyond their superficial 
belief in the importance of voting in the general election. As such, they do not look for any other ways 
that they can participate in the political process.  
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Having described the different classes of participation, table 4.2 includes details of the regression 
coefficients from the three demographic variables. This allows us to identity whether some population 
groups are more likely to be members of particular latent classes, providing us with important insights 
into the forms of citizen engagement that are associated with particular people. The multinomial 
regression formulation means that all coefficients represent the likelihood of a particular individual 
being a member of a given ‘class’ relative to membership in the first class (the highly politically 
active group).  
 
Table 4.2. Multinomial regression (reference category: Highly politically active) 
  B SE Odds Ratio 
Class 2 - Non-politically active 
Cons -1.20 0.26 
Male -0.38 0.05 0.68 
Young 2.33 0.47 10.31 
Minority 1.13 0.16 3.09 
Class 3 - Non-conventional forms of participation   
Cons -1.46 0.30 
Male -0.23 0.17 0.80 
Young 2.62 0.57 13.78 
Minority 0.77 0.20 2.16 
Class 4 - Voters only 
Cons 0.16 0.09 
Male -0.35 0.05 0.71 
Young 0.34 0.63 1.40 
Minority 0.05 0.14 1.05 
 
This reveals that men are more likely than women to be in the highly politically active group, with 
odds ratios of less than 1 for membership in each of the other latent classes. By contrast, young people 
are considerably more likely than older people to be either not politically active at all, or active only 
in non-conventional forms of political activity. However, young people are no more likely than older 
people to be in the voter only category.   
 
Finally, minority groups are three times more likely than non-minorities to be identified as not 
politically active rather than highly political active. Similarly they are more than twice as likely as 
non-minorities to be in the non-conventional participation class. Like young people, there is no 
significant difference in the likelihood of membership in the voters only group when compared with 
non-minorities.  
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APPENDIX A.1: RESULTS OF COUNTRY COMPARISONS USING 
EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY 
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Conventional Participation 
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Non-conventional participation 
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Civic engagement 
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Interest in politics 
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Political attentiveness 
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Internal efficacy 
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External efficacy 
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APPENDIX B.1: EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE 
THE DISCRIMINANT VALIDITY BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND 
NON-CONVENTIONAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
 
 
Table B1.1. Distinguishing between conventional and non-conventional participation 
  
Rotated factor loadings 
Conventiona
l 
Non-
conventiona
l 
Worked in political party or action group last 12 months 0.777 0.047 
Donated money to political organisation or group last 12 months 0.551 0.17 
Member of political party 0.744 -0.09 
Worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker last 12 months 0.444 0.355 
Contacted politician or government official last 12 months 0.494 0.212 
Worked in another organisation or association last 12 months 0.442 0.342 
Signed petition last 12 months 0.167 0.657 
Taken part in lawful public demonstration last 12 months 0.281 0.431 
Boycotted certain products last 12 months -0.007 0.755 
Bought product for political/ethical/environment reason last 12 
months 
0.011 0.744 
Participated illegal protest activities last 12 months 0.155 0.256 
 
The rotated factor loadings clearly indicate that contacting a politician is more closely related to the 
items measuring conventional participation. The model also indicates that working in another 
organization in the last 12 months is more closely related to conventional participation, however there 
is also a relatively strong association with non-conventional participation and this measure makes no 
reference to a political organisation.   
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APPENDIX C.1: MACRO VARIABLES 
 
Table C1.1.  Country Indicators for Foreign Policy 
  Indicator Description Indicator Source 
Democratic participation     
Checks and Balances Global ranking of governmental checks and balances 
Database of Political Indicators, 
World Bank 
Degree of Party Dominance 
Number of opposition members in the national legislature 
as a proportion of the total 
Database of Political Indicators, 
World Bank 
Fractionalization of Legislature Herfindal Index 
Database of Political Indicators, 
World Bank 
Percentage of Female 
Parliamentarians 
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament 
(%) World Development Indicators 
Polity Score Net Democracy/Autocracy Score Polity IV 
Executive Recruitment -- 
Regulation Global index measuring regulation of executive recruitment Polity IV 
Executive Recruitment -- 
Competition 
Global index measuring competitiveness of executive 
elections Polity IV 
Executive Constraints 
Global index measuring legal and legislative constraints on 
executive activity Polity IV 
Female Parliamentary Quota Quota for female parlimentaries (%) 
Global database of quotas for 
women 
Minority Access to Civil 
Services Percentage of minority employees in the public service Minorities at Risk 
Minority Voting Rights 
Existence of voting rights for minorities, including the right 
to vote, degree of intimidation, access to polling station Minorities at Risk 
Federalism - Provincial 
Degree of autonomy provided to state/provincial 
governments 
Database of Political Indicators, 
World Bank 
Government and economic 
efficiency     
Economic growth -- Percentage 
of GDP GDP Growth % World Development Indicators 
Economic Size -- Relative -- 
GDP per capita GDP per capita (constant 2000 US $) World Development Indicators 
Economic Size -- Total -- GDP GDP (constant 2000 US $) World Development Indicators 
External Debt -- percentage of 
GNI Present value of debt (% of GNI) World Development Indicators 
Ease of Doing Business Ease of Doing Business Survey  - Overall Rank 
World Bank, Ease of Doing 
Business 
Starting a Business Starting a business rank 
World Bank, Ease of Doing 
Business 
Protecting Investors Protecting investors rank 
World Bank, Ease of Doing 
Business 
Trading Across Borders Trading across borders rank 
World Bank, Ease of Doing 
Business 
Closing a Business Closing a business rank 
World Bank, Ease of Doing 
Business 
Economic Freedom Economic Freedom score 
Heritage Foundation, Index of 
Economic Freedom 
National Savings Level Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) World Development Indicators 
Foreign Investment Freedom Investment Freedom 
Heritage Foundation, Index of 
Economic Freedom 
Intellectual Property Protection of intellectual property 
Fraser Institute/ Free the World 
(Area 2C) 
Contract Regulation Contract Regulation 
Heritage Foundation, Index of 
Economic Freedom 
Enforcing Contracts Enforcing Contracts Rank 
World Bank, Ease of Doing 
Business 
Dealing with Licences Dealing with Licenses Rank 
World Bank, Ease of Doing 
Business 
Registering Property Registering Property Rank 
World Bank, Ease of Doing 
Business 
Educational Attainment Proportion over 15 with no schooling 
World Bank, Thematic Data 
Educational Attainment 
Enrolment Rates 
Gross enrolment ratio, all levels combined (except pre-
primary) UNESCO Statistics 
Health Expenditure Health expenditure, total (% of GDP) World Development Indicators 
Access to Services -- Improved 
Water 
Access to an Improved water source (% of population with 
access) World Development Indicators 
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Government Effectiveness Government Effectiveness, point estimate 
World Bank Group, Governance 
Matters V 
FDI -- percentage of GDP Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) World Development Indicators 
Foreign Aid -- percentage of 
Central Government Expenditures Aid (% of central government expenditures) World Development Indicators 
Inequality -- GINI Coefficient GINI Coefficient World Development Indicators 
Trade Balance -- percentage of 
GDP Current Account Balance (as % of GDP) World Development Indicators 
Unemployment -- Total Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) World Development Indicators 
Paying Taxes Paying taxes rank 
World Bank: Ease of Doing 
Business indicators 
Accountability     
Corruption -- World Bank Control of Corruption 
World Bank Group, Governance 
Matters V 
Voice and Accountability Voice and accountability, point estimate 
World Bank Group, Governance 
Matters V 
Press Freedom Index of Press Freedom Freedom House 
Political Donations 
Provision for disclosure of contribution to parties (binary 
variable) 
IDEA, Political Party Finance, 
Disclosure of Income 
Party Financing 
System of regulation for financing of political parties 
(binary variable) 
IDEA, Political Party Finance, 
Regulation and Enforcement 
Human rights     
Disappearances Disappearances, Number of Cases CIRI Human Rights Index 
Extrajudicial Killings Killings, number of cases CIRI Human Rights Index 
Torture Torture, number of cases CIRI Human Rights Index 
Freedom of Movement Freedom of Movement Index CIRI Human Rights Index 
Freedom of Assembly and 
Association Freedom of Assembly and Association Index CIRI Human Rights Index 
Freedom of Speech Freedom of Speech Index CIRI Human Rights Index 
Women Political Rights Women Political Rights Index CIRI Human Rights Index 
Women Social Rights Women Social Rights Index CIRI Human Rights Index 
Women Economic Rights Women Economic Rights Index CIRI Human Rights Index 
Civil Liberties Civil Liberties Index 
Freedom House, Annual Survey of 
Freedom 
Political Rights Political Rights Index 
Freedom House, Annual Survey of 
Freedom 
Human Rights -- Empowerment Empowerment Rights Index CIRI Human Rights Index 
Human Rights -- Physical 
Integrity Physical Integrity Rights Index CIRI Human Rights Index 
Minority Access to Education Minority Access to Education Minorities at Risk 
Minority Commerce Minority ability to engage in commercial activities Minorities at Risk 
Minority Professions Minority presence in professions Minorities at Risk 
Minority Official Positions Minority presence in governmental institutions Minorities at Risk 
Minority Organization Minority ability and right to organize Minorities at Risk 
Differential Ownership 
Differential rules and practices regarding ownership of 
property Minorities at Risk 
Minority Pol Mil recruitment Recruitment of minorities in to the police and military Minorities at Risk 
Political stability and violence     
Permanence of Regime Type Number of years since last regime change Polity IV 
Black Market Informal Market 
Heritage Foundation, Index of 
Economic Freedom 
Battle-related Deaths Number of Conflict-related deaths per year Uppsala Conflict Database 
Dependence on external support Intervention of other states or external actors 
Fund for Peace (FfP) Failed States 
Index 
Military Expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP Military expenditure (% of GDP) World Development Indicators 
Political Stability Political stability/no violence, point estimate 
World Bank Group: Governance 
Matters V 
Refugees Produced Refugee population by country or territory of origin World Development Indicators 
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Terrorism Fatalities 
Total number of fatalities during recorded terrorist attacks 
per year 
US National Counterterrorism 
Center 
Terrorism Incidents Total number of recorded terrorist attacks per year 
US National Counterterrorism 
Center 
Polity Fragmentation Degree of fragmentation of the polity Polity IV 
Rule of law     
Police, Law, and Criminality Rule of Law 
World Bank, Governance Matters 
database 
Prison Population Rate Prison Population Rate 
International Centre for Prison 
Studies 
Prison Occupancy Level No. of detainees compared to capacity 
Source:International Centre for 
Prison Studies 
Number of Political Prisoners Number of Political Prisoners Fraser Institute/Free the World 
Judicial Independence Independence of the Judiciary Fraser Institute/Free the World 
Impartial Courts Impartiality of the court Fraser Institute/ Free the World 
Integrity of the Legal System Integrity of the Legal System Fraser Institute/ Free the World 
Military Interference in the Rule 
of Law Presence of the military in political systems Fraser Institute/ Free the World 
Property Rights Protection of rights to private property Heritage Foundation 
Minority Legal Protection Minority Legal Protection Minorities at Risk 
Minority Dispossessed Land Minority Dispossessed Land Minorities at Risk 
Minority Legal Procedures Minority Legal Procedures Minorities at Risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C1.2.  Economist's Intelligence Unit 
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Electoral process and pluralism 
Are elections for the national legislature and head of government free? 
Are elections for the national legislature and head of government fair? 
Are municipal elections both free and fair? 
Is there universal suffrage for all adults? 
Can citizens cast their vote free of significant threats to their security from state or non-state bodies? 
Do laws provide for broadly equal campaigning opportunities? 
Is the process of financing political parties transparent and generally accepted? 
Following elections, are the constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power from one government to another clear, 
established and accepted? 
Are citizens free to form political parties that are independent of the government? 
Do opposition parties have a realistic prospect of achieving government? 
Is potential access to public office open to all citizens? 
Are citizens free to form political and civic organisations, free of state interference and surveillance? 
  
Functioning of government 
Do freely elected representatives determine government policy? 
Is the legislature the supreme political body, with a clear supremacy over other branches of government? 
Is there an effective system of checks and balances on the exercise of government authority? 
Government is free of undue influence by the military or the security services. 
Foreign powers do not determine important government functions or policies. 
Special economic, religious or other powerful domestic groups do not exercise significant political power, parallel to democratic 
institutions? 
Are sufficient mechanisms and institutions in place for assuring government accountability to the electorate in between elections? 
Does the government’s authority extend over the full territory of the country? 
Is the functioning of government open and transparent, with sufficient public access to information? 
How pervasive is corruption? 
Is the civil service willing and capable of implementing government policy? 
Popular perceptions of the extent to which they have free choice and control over their lives 
% of people who think that they have a great deal of choice/control (WVS) 
Public confidence in government. 
% of people who have a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in government (WVS) 
Public confidence in political parties. 
% of people who have a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence (WVS) 
  
Political participation 
Voter participation/turnout for national elections. (average turnout in parliamentary and/or presidential elections since 2000. Turnout as 
proportion of population of voting age). 
Do ethnic, religious and other minorities have a reasonable degree of autonomy and voice in the political process? 
Women in parliament. % of members of parliament who are women 
Extent of political participation. Membership of political parties and political non-governmental organisations. 
Citizens’ engagement with politics. 
% of people who are very or somewhat interested in politics (WVS) 
The preparedness of population to take part in lawful demonstrations. 
% of people who have taken part in or would consider attending lawful demonstrations (WVS) 
Adult literacy 
Extent to which adult population shows an interest in and follows politics in the news. 
% of population that follows politics in the news media (print, TV or radio) every day (WVS) 
The authorities make a serious effort to promote political participation. 
Consider the role of the education system, and other promotional efforts. Consider measures to facilitate voting by members of the 
diaspora. 
  
Democratic political culture 
Is there a sufficient degree of societal consensus and cohesion to underpin a stable, functioning democracy? 
Perceptions of leadership; proportion of the population that desires a strong leader who bypasses parliament and elections. 
% of people who think it would be good or fairly good to have a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections (WVS) 
Perceptions of military rule; proportion of the population that would prefer military. 
% of people who think it would be very or fairly good to have army rule (WVS) 
Perceptions of rule by experts or technocratic government; proportion of the population that would prefer rule by experts or technocrats. 
% of people who think it would be very or fairly good to have experts, not government, make decisions for the country (WVS) 
Perception of democracy and public order; proportion of the population that believes that democracies are not good at maintaining 
public order. 
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% of people who disagree with the view that democracies are not good at maintaining order (WVS) 
Perception of democracy and the economic system; proportion of the population that believes that democracy benefits economic 
performance. 
% of people who disagree with the view that the economic system runs badly in democracies (WVS) 
Degree of popular support for democracy. 
% of people who agree or strongly agree that democracy is better than any other form of government (WVS) 
There is a strong tradition of the separation of church and state. 
  
Civil liberties 
Is there a free electronic media? 
Is there a free print media? 
Is there freedom of expression and protest (bar only generally accepted restrictions such as banning advocacy of violence)? 
Is media coverage robust? Is there open and free discussion of public issues, with a reasonable diversity of opinions? 
Are there political restrictions on access to the internet? 
Are citizens free to form professional organisations and trade unions? 
Do institutions provide citizens with the opportunity to successfully petition government to redress grievances? 
The use of torture by the state 
The degree to which the judiciary is independent of government influence. Consider the views of international legal and judicial 
watchdogs. Have the courts ever issued an important judgment against the government, or a senior government official? 
The degree of religious tolerance and freedom of religious expression. Are all religions permitted to 
operate freely, or are some restricted? Is the right to worship permitted both publicly and privately? Do some religious groups feel 
intimidated by others, even if the law requires equality and protection? 
The degree to which citizens are treated equally under the law. Consider whether favoured members of groups are spared prosecution 
under the law. 
Do citizens enjoy basic security? 
Extent to which private property rights protected and private business is free from undue government influence. 
Extent to which citizens enjoy personal freedoms. Consider gender equality, right to travel, choice of work and study. 
Popular perceptions on human rights protection; proportion of the population that think that basic human rights are well-protected. 
% of people who think that human rights are respected in their country (WVS) 
There is no significant discrimination on the basis of people’s race, colour or creed. 
Extent to which the government invokes new risks and threats as an excuse for curbing civil liberties. 
 
 
